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ON DESIGNING PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS
Research on professional service firms (PSFs) did not come off the ground until recently.
This lack of attention is surprising, given their integral role in contemporary knowledge-
based economies. In this dissertation, I focus on two professional industries: law and
accounting. Historically, these industries were infused with a dominant professional logic,
with its corresponding Professional Partnership configuration as dominant form of enter -
prise organization. However, changes in economic and social trends, government policies,
and client preferences have led to the spread of a commercial ethos in the professions,
with the corresponding configuration of the Managed Professional Business. This shift
from the professional to the commercial logic is the point of departure for this disserta -
tion. But what are the effects of this changing logic from professionalism to commercialism
on PSFs? This dissertation shows, first, that the shift from professionalism to commer -
cialism is not complete for all PSFs, as many professionals in mid-sized firms resist this new
logic. Second, although in conflict with the logic of professionalism and the corresponding
organizational practices, novel-to-context practices of strategy formation and formal
governance do contribute to the performance of PSFs. Yet they do so at a cost, third, as
they increase misconduct of lawyers which in Professional Partnerships were effectively
remedied by collegial controls. Fourth, PSFs face a choice about the corporate objective
function they pursue, as my final study suggests that combining professional and
commercial logics in a single configuration is seemingly impossible.
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 Chapter 1. Introduction  
Organizational sociologists and management scholars have long been interested in the 
status and position of professionals in organizational collectives and society at large 
(Schön, 1983; Sorensen & Sorensen, 1974). Yet until relatively recently, these scholars 
have primarily dedicated their research attention to a better understanding of the 
professions (Abbott, 1988; Goode, 1957; Parsons, 1939): autonomous vocations into 
which professionals are selected on the basis of specialized educational training. In 
contrast, research on professional service firms (PSFs) – commercial businesses “whose 
primary assets are a highly educated (professional) workforce and whose outputs are 
intangible services encoded with complex knowledge” (Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & 
Deephouse, 2005: 661) – did not come off the ground until relatively recently.  
This lack of attention on the part of academics is surprising given that PSFs 
form an integral part of the contemporary knowledge-based economy without which 
“business as we know it, would come to a grinding halt” (Sharma, 1997: 758). 
Organizations draw on law firms to broker commercial transactions and accounting 
firms ensure the veracity of their disclosures (Greenwood, Suddaby & McDougald, 
2006). In recent years the Fortune 1000 firms have increased their demand for the 
services of PSFs. Where in the 1980s global revenues for PSFs amounted to $107 billion, 
this increased to $911 billion by 2000 (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002). There are three reasons 
for their prominent role in the post-industrial economies.  
First, some of the PSFs are among the largest and most affluent business 
enterprises (Ahroni, 1993; Greenwood et al., 2006). In 2011, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
was the largest accounting firm in terms of employees and located in 154 countries 
worldwide. Linklaters, the world’s largest law firm, is significantly smaller compared 
to the largest accounting firms, but still had revenues of $1,90 billion and operated in 
19 countries.  
Second, the influence of PSFs is not limited to their own industries, but 
extends to others as they disseminate their innovations and set working standards 
through their client firms (Alvesson, 1995). Through the application of professional 
knowledge to unique organizational problems (Hansen, Nohria & Tierney, 1999; 
Løwendahl, Revang & Fosstenløkken, 2001) as well as through the publication of 
books and articles PSFs can be considered the knowledge engines for other businesses 
(Lorsch & Tierney, 2002).  
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Third, besides their business acumen, PSFs also have a public professional 
objective by serving vulnerable clients and third party interests. As so-called 
“gatekeepers” (Coffee, 2006: 2), they are entrusted with monitoring the compliance of 
organizations with regard to the law, financial statements and disclosures. As 
reputational intermediaries, they vouch for the “signal sent by the corporate issuers” 
by staking their reputation (Coffee, 2006: 2). When gatekeepers fail in their public 
function, this can have serious economical and societal repercussions. Whereas well-
documented cases like Ahold, Enron, and WorldCom are prime examples of 
gatekeeper failure, unprofessional behavior in PSFs is often of a more mundane form. 
It tends to take the shape of overcharging clients or transgressing against firm, 
professional or governmental rules and regulations.  
Although over the last decade we see an increase in the study of PSFs, a 
definitive definition of them as an organizational form is still lacking. Instead, authors 
often avoid providing a precise definition, and simply refer to examples of firms in 
industries such as law, accounting, consulting or advertising (e.g. Greenwood & 
Empson, 2003). Additionally, the term PSF is often used interchangeably with that of 
the Knowledge Intensive Firm (KIF; Morris & Empson, 1998). Although these types of 
firms also employ expert knowledge in the delivery of their services, their knowledge 
is not professional in nature. Therefore a KIF may not be a PSF, even though all PSFs 
are KIFs (Starbuck, 1992). In this dissertation, an organization is considered a PSF 
when: (1) the majority of its members are professionals; (2) professionals define and 
achieve the organizational goals; (3) administrative authority lies within the firm, even 
when authority in professional matters lies with the professional associations (Hall, 
1968; Montagna, 1968). In this dissertation I will focus on two of the canonical 
examples of PSFs: law and accounting firms. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a precise definition, recent work has identified 
the PSF as a distinctive organizational form facing specific challenges, which derive 
from the nature of the services it delivers, its distinctive resource dependencies, and 
the highly institutionalized environment in which it operates (Greenwood & Empson, 
2003; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). First, PSFs deliver knowledge-intensive and intangible 
services (Løwendahl, 2005) that are highly customized through intensive client 
consultations (Hansen et al., 1999), making the knowledge they exploit difficult to 
codify and commodify. Second, because of the resulting inalienability of professional 
knowledge from its human carriers (Dow, 2003), PSFs are human capital intensive 
(Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu & Kochnar, 2001), while they have little need for external 
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financial capital (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Third, as many PSFs are routinely involved 
in the provision of (quasi) public and gatekeeper services, which facilitate complex 
market exchange by assuring the quality, legality, and integrity of transactions (Coffee, 
2006; Kraakman, 1986), they operate in highly institutionalized environments. Here, 
both public authorities and professional associations set and enforce constraints on the 
services provided and on the professionals providing these (Greenwood, Suddaby & 
Hinings, 2002).  
To cope with these challenges, PSFs are characteristically owned internally by 
a subset of their members (Dow, 2003; Hansmann, 1996; Hart & Moore, 1996; Richter & 
Schröder, 2007), and organized as professional partnerships (Greenwood & Empson, 
2003). Through extensive empirical research on Canadian accounting firms, 
Greenwood, Hinings and Brown (1990) were able to retrieve the essential properties of 
such professional partnerships, which are sometimes simply referred to as ‘P2’ 
organizations. The core observation of Greenwood and his associates is that the P2 
organization comprises an organizational form in its own right, to be distinguished 
from other forms of enterprise organization by features like its limited size, weakly 
developed strategic capabilities, and consensus-oriented decision-making (Greenwood 
et al. 1990).  
Although the P2 has historically been the dominant form of enterprise 
organization in classic professions such as law and accounting (Greenwood & 
Empson, 2003), changes in economic and social trends, government policies, and client 
preferences (Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck & Shimizu, 2006; Løwendahl, 2005; Maister, 
2003; Nachum, 1996) have led to the spread of a commercial ethos in the professions 
(Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996), which challenges traditional P2 
organizational practices (Cooper, Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1998; Empson, 2007). 
Many PSFs are therefore now adopting face-changing strategies and practices, and are 
expected to move in the direction of a new organizational template coined the 
‘Managed Professional Business’ (MPB; Cooper et al., 1996). In principle, the adoption 
of new managerial practices should enable PSFs to grow in terms of size, develop 
stronger strategic capabilities, and experiment with other, more centralized forms of 
decision-making. And indeed, a number of recent empirical studies have documented 
the diffusion of these new properties across various populations of contemporaneous 
PSFs (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Pinnington & Morris, 2003).    
This shift from the professional logic to the commercial logic is the backdrop 
of this dissertation and underlies my overarching question: what are the effects of the 
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changing logic from professionalism to commercialism on PSFs? This question will be 
addressed through a number of sub-questions in the following chapters. First, how do 
PSFs perceive the current institutional changes and what are their organizational 
responses to the resulting clash of the professional with the commercial logic?  
Second, although prior literature has documented the introduction of novel-
to-context strategic and governance practices alongside the traditional drivers of PSF 
performance, their actual implications are as of yet, unknown. Therefore a related 
second research question is: what are the performance effects of the novel 
organizational practices as compared to the original drivers of PSF performance?  
Third, the professional or so-called “social trustee definition of 
professionalism subordinates self-interest and commercial gain in favor of ideals of 
service and public welfare” (Greenwood, 2007: 191). When these ideals of service and 
pubic welfare are subordinated in favor of commercial gain and self-interest, this 
could be quite detrimental to professional behavior (Greenwood, 2007). As novel 
practices in the MPB-configuration are developed to that aim, the question becomes: 
What are the effects of both novel organizational and traditional PSF practices on 
professional misconduct?  
In the final chapter I combine the novel and traditional practices by analyzing 
causal configurations of PSFs. Using set-theoretic methods I analyze what the effects of 
specific combinations of practices within PSFs are on substantive and symbolic 
performance as well as on professional misconduct. An interesting question that is 
dealt with in this chapter is: can we empirically identify theoretically coherent 
configurations of organizational practices that allow for the simultaneous 
maximization of both profits and the professionalism in PSFs?  
1.1 Shifting logics and PSF configurations 
The traditional PSF industries were governed by a professional/trustee logic (Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2005) where professional values and a feeling of societal guardianship 
were integral. Although normally professional industries are characterized by their 
stable nature, recent shocks in the PSFs’ environment have brought an end to the era in 
which PSFs were “an oasis of organizational stability” (Gilson & Mnookin, 1988: 567). 
First, technological developments have had significant impact on the audit 
process. Computer aided audit systems have reduced the complexity and labor 
intensity of the audit process (Brock, 2006), resulting in accountancy firms needing to 
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seek ways to generate profits in a different way. On the client side, the increased 
emphasis on costs and the internet and mobile technologies that allow for shopping 
around, put even more pressure on the fees of the audit and law delivery process 
(Aharoni, 1999). Secondly, due to globalization, law and accounting firms now have to 
deal with international standards and practices of their international clients more often 
(Nanchum, 1996), leading to new knowledge requirements. Third, statutory protection 
for providing services has been reduced or removed (Hart, Schlesinger & Maher, 
1992). This resulted in growing intra- and inter-professional competition (Gray, 1999). 
Fourth, the implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley act as well as the shift from principle-
based to rule-based accounting has changed the way in which the large accounting 
firms have structured their organizations (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), reducing the 
importance of the individual accountant. Finally, accountancy firms also face changes 
in client demands. Here the role of the traditional accountant is slowly being shifted 
towards that of an advisor to the firm, clients are not only more critical towards the 
service they receive, but also demand more and different services. All these 
developments pushed PSFs to rationalize their service delivery process, adopt more 
efficient structures, broaden their activities in consultancy services, and actively 
engage in marketing campaigns (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).  In all, the combined 
changes in economic and social trends, legislation and government policies 
(Løwendahl, 2005; Maister, 2003; Nanchum, 1996) as well as the product market, 
financial and factor pressures (Cooper et al, 1998; Greenwood et al., 1990) have put 
strain on the trustee logic, and have lead many PSFs to complement or supplant it with 
a more commercial logic (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).  
These two logics underlie what in the literature on PSFs are discerned as the 
two main organizational configurations. The classic P2 configuration documented by 
Greenwood et al. (1990) hinges on the idea that professional firms rely on a different 
set of controls as compared to regular organizations, due to their specific 
organizational challenges. As professionals apply an esoteric body of knowledge—
which is difficult to code into knowledge systems—to complex problems they enjoy 
high levels of discretion and autonomy in the delivery of their services (Greenwood et 
al., 1990). Additionally, senior members who typically own and manage the firms, 
continue to contribute to the delivery of the service. They are often responsible for 
their particular practice areas and hence place priority hereon in favor of the entire 
organization. In practice this means that the strategy of the firm can be described as 
the aggregate of the partners’ individual interest (Pinnington & Morris, 2003). In terms 
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of organizational systems and practices, the P2-configuration relies primarily on 
informal and collegial control mechanisms at the expense of more formal and 
hierarchical systems (Greenwood et al., 1990). Additionally they employ credentials-
based hiring practices (Hitt et al., 2001) and use merit-based, tournament type 
promotion practices (Gilson & Mnookin, 1988; Malos & Campion, 1995).   
The second documented configuration of organizational practices within PSFs 
can de described as being more consciously managed (Cooper et al., 1998). The 
underlying values of the PSF have shifted from the application of expertise in the 
interest of public service to a focus on efficiency and value added provision of the 
services rendered by the firm (Pinnington & Morris, 2003). In comparison to the P2-
configuration, MPB-organized firms complement their existing P2 practices with “more 
formal strategic planning, controls over quality of work and productivity of staff, 
greater emphasis on coordinated marketing activities and more elaborate and 
centralized financial systems (Morris & Pinnington, 1998: 76) in order to avoid 
strategic drift (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002). Within the accounting sector, Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006) coined this form the Multidisciplinary Practice, whereas Cooper and 
colleagues (1996) within the law industry termed it the Managed Professional 
Business.  Although different in name, the logic behind the two forms is similar; they 
both operate on the basis of a more commercial ethos (Cooper et al., 1996).   
1.2 Profits or professionalism? 
The fundamental questions raised above will be addressed in the subsequent chapters 
starting with the first set of questions:  how do PSFs perceive the current institutional 
change and what are their organizational responses to the resulting clash of the 
professional with the commercial logic? 
1.2.1 Heterogeneous organizational responses to changing institutional logics 
In PSF research, generalizability is an important issue (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). 
Although there is indeed little evidence that generalizing across industries is possible; 
our knowledge even within the traditional PSF industries remains limited. For 
instance, the change from a professional logic to a more commercial logic has been 
documented for large law and accounting firms, however the implications for the 
remaining actors in these industries are unclear.  
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Institutional logics – defined by Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) as “the 
socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values and 
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” – 
shape how organizations and individuals behave in specific organizational fields. 
Organizational structures and processes are the expressions of these institutional 
logics (Greenwood, Diaz, Li & Lorente, 2009). In the professional industries, as 
discussed above, the trustee logic was until recently the dominant paradigm. 
However, as major shocks had a detrimental impact on the profitability of PSFs, the 
logic shifted towards one with a more commercial focus (Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005).    In this chapter I will first focus on the institutional changes faced by the mid-
tier firms and if they feel similarly pressured to respond to the changing logics.  
Literature on institutional logics shows four possible outcomes of the clash 
between logics: the introduction of elements of a new logic into the dominant one (e.g. 
Glynn, 2000), the hybridization of elements of both the old and new logic (e.g. Purdy & 
Gray, 2009; Colyvas & Powell, 2006; D’Aunno, Sutton & Price, 1991), a shift from the 
old dominant logic to the newly introduced logic (e.g. Thornton, 2002; Zilber 2002) or 
the permanent co-existence of both logics (e.g. Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009; Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna, 2000). 
Given that the mid-tier accounting firms face the same shocks as the big 4 firms and-
although they have a different client base as compared to the big 4-they too have to 
address the changing demands of their clients (ING, 2010). As organizational 
responses, given conflicting institutional logics are unlikely to be similar (Oliver, 1991; 
Pache & Santos, 2010), the question becomes:  which strategic responses do mid-tier 
accounting firms use to balance the tension between the professional and commercial 
logic? This will be addressed in the second part of this chapter. 
In this paper I draw on a sample of eleven out of the twenty-two accounting 
firms ranked directly behind the big 4 in terms of revenue. Through interviews with 
partners and professionals with decision making authority I sought to answer three 
questions: (1) What forces for change are mentioned by the firms; (2) which structures 
and practices of the firm did these pressures influence; and (3) what organizational 
responses did the firm show given the pressures exerted on their firm? In order to 
document “changes in structures and systems” and “the ways in which these changes 
coincide with institutional templates” large scale comparative studies are necessary 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996: 1047). They are necessary as changes involve difficult to 
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measure concepts (e.g. resistance) and radical changes take lengthy periods of time. 
Hence I opted for a qualitative, multiple case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). I first 
conducted a within-case analysis. Subsequently, a cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 
1989) was used to determine the conflicting demands that emanate from the drivers for 
change and whether the organizational responses to these conflicting demands were 
similar. 
 By exploring the ways in which the mid-tier accounting firms deal with the 
tensions between the traditional trustee logic and the commercial logic in the field of 
accounting, we make three contributions. First, I contribute to the literature on 
institutional logics and change. Fundamental changes in environmental conditions of 
organizations are frequently noted to lead to organizational change (Romanelli & 
Tushman, 1994). Within the accountancy sector, changes such as increased regulation, 
automation of services, and changing client demands have recently punctuated a long 
period of stability in the field, and have forced mid-tier firms to respondent to the 
overarching shift from the trustee to the commercial logic. These significant 
environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982) are hypothesized in prior literature to result in 
revolutionary transformations of organizations rather than their evolutionary 
development (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985). Yet, this is not what we observe in our group of mid-tier firms. These 
firms do not show a comprehensive transformational embrace or outright rejection of 
the novel commercial logic. Rather, the mid-tier firms respond by addressing separate 
and specific strategic and structural issues, which are invoked by the new logic and 
relevant for their organization in terms of resource dependencies or autonomy 
challenges, in an incremental way. This is caused by their embeddedness in the 
existing trustee logic. As such, embeddedness provides a significant force for stability 
and causes resistance to change (Granovetter, 1985; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 
Maguire, 2007; Oliver, 1997) with regard to the demands of the new logic.  
The source of resistance is located internal to the firm and this insight forms 
my second contribution. In my study, I observe a fragmented implementation of 
elements of the new logic. Mid-tier firms thus do not respect the internal coherence of 
the commercial logic by adopting all of its constitutive elements simultaneously, but 
use it rather strategically and opportunistically by selecting only those elements that 
have the perceived potential to resolve concrete managerial challenges regarding 
specific strategic issues. The diffusion process of the commercial logic in the field 
segment populated by mid-tier firms therefore looks more like a process of 
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institutional bricolage (Aldrich, 2010), especially because of the enduring influence on 
mid-tier actors’ behavior of the traditional trustee logic. The continued influence of this 
logic causes a piecemeal acceptance of elements comprising the new logic as well as 
variation in the way new systems are adopted and implemented. The trustee logic 
continues to exercise its effect through the embedded action of managing partners as 
well as non-partnered accountants, whom are unwilling to forgo their professional 
traditions and norms, in no small part because of their vested interests. To deal with 
these internal sources of resistance, the majority of mainstream accountancy firms, 
adopt and adapt practices that are in the ‘zone of acceptance’ (Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 
2010; Lewis & Seibold, 1993; Radnor, Feller & Rogers, 1978). Studying these internal 
sources of resistance therefore contributes to our understanding of when and what 
strategic responses are likely to form. It informs the diffusion literature by showing the 
dynamics of “interrupted, incomplete, or even failed diffusion processes (Johnson, 
2009), an area which have so far received very little attention” (Ansari et al., 2010). 
 My third contribution is to the literature on PSFs by addressing the issue of 
generalizability of this literature’s extant findings to other (segments of) professional 
fields (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). The change in institutional logics identified and 
documented by Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) in their longitudinal qualitative study 
of the big 4 accounting firms in Canada cannot straightforwardly be extrapolated to 
the rest of the actors in the accounting industry. While Greenwood and Suddaby’s big 
4 firms are dealing with multinational clients in a supra-national arena, my mid-tier 
firms are well-established in their national setting, engaging primarily with local 
clients and experiencing greater influence of national professional organizations. My 
findings indicate that the commitment to the traditional trustee logic is considerably 
stronger within this group of more locally grounded firms. While I observe that the 
group of mid-tier firms respond to the previously mentioned challenges by adopting 
elements of the commercial logic, they do not embrace the latter logic consistently, let 
alone wholesale. Thus, Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) finding that group of elite 
firms pushes a comprehensive and consistent agenda propagating the commercial 
logic simply does not translate to the group of mid-tier firms. This suggests that 
organizational responses to conflicting or changing logics may differ systematically 
across the different demographic strata into which organizational fields tend to be 
segmented.  
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1.2.2  Drivers of professional service firm performance 
In my third chapter I take a closer look at the effect of organizational practices on firm 
performance. More specifically, I examine the effects of both traditional and novel 
organizational performance drivers given the presence of organizational 
contingencies. 
In delivering their services, PSFs face a number of discretionary choices about 
their organizational design (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). As 
these choices are to some extent interdependent, they can repeatedly be observed 
across populations of PSFs in the form of archetypical configurations of properties 
(Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1994; Malos & Campion, 2000). Historically, the 
organizational design of most PSFs resembled that of the professional partnership. The 
archetype of this organizational design was first codified by Greenwood, Hinings, and 
Brown (1990), who identified four of its properties. First, senior members of such 
partnerships continue to be involved in the actual delivery of professional services. 
Second, all professional members routinely apply difficult-to-codify knowledge to 
complex problems. Third, these members enjoy levels of autonomy in organizing their 
work processes that are not commonly observed in other organizations (Hall, 1968; 
Montagna, 1968). Fourth, decision-making in professional partnerships is 
decentralized, to foster the tailoring of professional services to specific client demands 
(Greenwood et al., 1990). As all four of these properties critically hinge on the quality 
of the professional staff, the performance drivers identified by students of professional 
partnerships primarily involve human capital (Hitt et al., 2001) and the reputational 
capital necessary to recruit top talents in the labor market and signal their quality to 
clients (Greenwood et al. 2005). 
In more recent years, however, a subset of PSFs has begun to challenge the 
dominant features of the professional partnership archetype, in response to demands 
for greater efficiency spurred on by intensified competition and deregulation 
(Malhotra & Morris, 2009). A choice set of firms in the fields of both accounting 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) and law (Pinnington & Morris, 2003) has adopted a 
different but likewise coherent set of properties facilitating professional service 
delivery, which center on a greater commercial orientation and more conscious 
management. This alternate archetype was first codified and labeled the managed 
professional business by Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, and Brown (1996). It similarly 
has four core properties. First, while its senior members remain at least nominally 
competent in performing the productive labor of those they supervise (Freidson, 1984), 
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they increasingly take on purely managerial roles. Second, while the delivery of 
complex knowledge remains its core activity, the managed professional business 
increasingly strives to commodify that knowledge, thereby reducing it to a routinized 
and codified product (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). Third, organizations adopting 
this archetype encroach upon the autonomy of the individual professional, as their 
management in general becomes more heavy-handed and increasingly establishes 
formal bureaucratic control over professional work (Leicht & Fennell, 1997). Fourth, in 
managed professional businesses the decision authority related to issues like client 
activities and resource allocation becomes increasingly centralized, limiting the 
decision powers of non-managing members (Malhotra & Morris, 2009). As these four 
properties are all part of a process whereby lateral, peer-based controls are being 
supplanted by hierarchical managerial controls, the hallmark of managed professional 
businesses is the adoption of formal systems in the areas of organizational governance 
and strategy implementation (Cooper et al., 1996; Pinnington & Morris, 2003). 
In practice, however, we do not readily observe the wholesale replacement of 
the professional partnership by the managed professional business. Rather, we observe 
sedimentation: “the persistence of values, ideas, and practices, even when the formal 
structures and processes seem to change, and even when there may be incoherence” 
(Cooper et al., 1996: 624). Yet the issue of sedimentation raises important but as of yet 
unanswered questions about the performance of contemporary PSFs. First, is the 
diffusion of organizational features associated with ‘elite’ managed professional 
businesses across a wider population of PSFs conducive to their performance? At 
present, this question is still very much open. This is not only because a systematic test 
of the contribution of formal governance and strategic planning to PSF performance is 
still lacking. While these features are sometimes assumed to contribute to PSF 
efficiency (Cooper et al., 1996), they may alternatively jeopardize performance by 
disgruntling professionals through an assault on their autonomy (Von Nordenflycht, 
2010) and by upsetting the fragile balance of understanding between various groups of 
internal stakeholders (Empson & Chapman, 2006). Second, how important are the 
various drivers of PSF performance relative to one another? Various groups of scholars 
have theorized and occasionally tested the effects of important performance drivers in 
isolation. Third, which organizational characteristics determine the contingent value of 
these performance drivers to PSFs (cf. Greenwood et al., 2006; Hitt et al., 2001)? 
Structural contingency scholars (Donaldson, 2001) would likely predict that formal 
governance and strategic planning are more important as drivers of performance in 
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larger, more diversified PSFs. Yet the applicability of contingency theory to PSFs is 
uncertain. PSFs can have several organizational characteristics, like being organized as 
a federal structure of semi-autonomous practice areas (Anand, Gardner, & Morris, 
2007) and utilizing a core technology that is strikingly similar across organizations of 
different sizes (Greenwood et al., 1994), that make them less susceptible to 
contingency-theoretical explanations. In this chapter I test the influence of four 
organizational processes on PSF performance. I argue that both human capital and 
reputation are paramount in ensuring successful PSF performance. The implications of 
the MPB-related strategy formation and governance practices are yet unknown and I 
argue, could potentially have a positive or a negative effect on PSF performance. 
Finally, I posit that in the relation between contingencies such as PSF size and 
diversification, formalized governance practices and strategic planning will be 
positively mediated.  
Based on survey data from 792 lawyers representing 354 law firms (a response 
rate of 21.2% at the firm level), I use Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) to test my 
research model. Hypothesis 1 suggested that human capital would be one of the main 
drivers of PSF performance, due to the knowledge-intensiveness of the services PSFs 
deliver. My results support this hypothesis, as human capital has a positive and 
significant direct effect on PSF performance. Also, Hypothesis 2 stated that PSF 
reputation would have a positively effect on performance, as the quality of 
professional services is difficult to observe directly (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). This 
assertion too was supported by my analyses. Hypothesis 3a predicted a positive effect 
of formal governance on PSF performance, due to its ability to rationalize business 
practices and manage possible conflicts of interest, while Hypothesis 3b highlighted 
the possible negative ramifications of interfering with professionals’ autonomy 
through more formal controls. Hypothesis 3b had to be rejected in favor of Hypothesis 
3a, as the positive effects of formal governance on PSF performance clearly prevail. 
Another set of rivaling hypotheses juxtaposed the possible positive effects of strategic 
planning (Hypothesis 4a) with its possible negative effects (Hypothesis 4b). 
Hypothesis 4a clearly prevailed over Hypothesis 4b, as benefits like improved resource 
allocation and overcoming myopia outweighed costs like practice rejection and 
working with planning methods that are possibly ill-suited to the nature of 
professional work. The relationship between PSF size and performance was indeed 
strongly mediated by formal governance and strategic planning. Similarly, I also 
found that the relationship between PSF diversification and performance was 
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mediated by formal governance and strategic planning. In short, my analyses support 
Hypothesis 5. 
Through my findings I contribute to the literature on PSFs in three ways. My 
study is the first to empirically assess the effects of novel-to-context organizational 
practices, and I find evidence that the positive effects of formal governance and 
strategic planning outweigh their negative performance implications. While this 
finding is relevant for scholars working on PSF performance, it should also be 
interesting to PSF scholars working on the diffusion and legitimation of the managed 
professional business archetype (e.g., Brock, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Pinnington & Morris 2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). My study shows that the 
spread of this archetype is spurred on not only by the rhetorical strategies and 
institutional entrepreneurship of elite PSFs who have a stake in its social acceptance 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), but possibly also 
because adopting its features provides substantive benefits to PSFs in general.  
Second, prior work aimed at identifying the drivers of PSF performance has 
largely tested their effects in isolation, as most existing studies scrutinize only a single 
or maximally two performance drivers. In contrast, my study offers a comprehensive 
test of four salient drivers of PSF performance, integrating prior research by scholars 
interested in human capital (Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Hitt et al., 2001), firm reputation 
(Greenwood et al., 2005), and other drivers. This yields two clear benefits. First, for PSF 
scholars interested in performance, a salient benefit of my more inclusive test is that it 
establishes the robustness of earlier findings to the inclusion of several other variables 
with a known effect on the dependent variable. My finding that these factors continue 
to have a statistically significant effect on performance in a competitive test validates 
and highlights the relevance of earlier studies. Second, for practitioners interested in 
enhancing PSF performance, a clear benefit of my research is that it enables a direct 
comparison of the regression coefficients in order to see which performance drivers 
matter most, with reputation being the most important driver. 
Third, several scholars have recently made a case for a special theory of the 
PSF, as the type of services PSFs provide and the organizational design choices they 
make to facilitate their delivery set them apart from most other organizational forms 
(Empson & Chapman, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2005, Greenwood, Deephouse & Li, 
2007; Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). An important question 
for this emerging theory is whether or not it should embrace a contingency-theoretical 
set-up, such that its core predictions are theorized to be dependent on PSFs’ scores on 
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core contingency variables like organizational size and diversification (Greenwood & 
Miller, 2010). My results do suggest that contingency elements should be built into the 
design of the nascent theory of the PSF. 
1.2.3 External agency relations and agency problems in professional service firms: A 
multilevel study 
In chapter four of this dissertation, the focus is primarily on PSF’s public or gatekeeper 
function. As previously described, PSFs are characterized as having a public function 
of protecting vulnerable client and third-party interests. However with the recent 
increased emphasis on commercialism, this public function is under strain. In this 
chapter I try to uncover which organizational practices mitigate – or propagate – 
professional misconduct on the part of lawyers. The set of organizational practices 
under examination here are a combination of both practices from the professional logic 
and from the commercial logic. This is done, in part, by positioning misconduct by 
lawyers as agency problems deriving from external agency relationships. 
Agency relationships arise in almost every form of human cooperation, 
including vertical delegation relationships (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Klein, Crawford, & 
Alchian, 1978) and horizontal co-production efforts (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; 
Holmstrom, 1982). As most PSFs are held by a subset of their employees (Dow, 2003; 
Greenwood & Empson, 2003), PSFs do not face agency problems in the classical sense 
of separation of ownership and control. However, when defining an agency 
relationship to include: (a) a separation of decision making and exposure to the 
consequences of those decisions, under conditions of (b) at least partially conflicting 
interests and (c) knowledge and information asymmetries (Arrow, 1985; Eisenhardt, 
1989), PSFs are subject to external agency problems.  
The first type of agency relationship is that between professional and clients. 
This relationship is highly vulnerable to the occurrence of agency problems, not only 
because of possible conflicts of interest in respect to fees and billable hours (Hayward 
& Boeker, 1998), but also on account of substantial information and knowledge 
asymmetries, making it difficult for clients to evaluate the quality and integrity of the 
professional judgments and actions taken on their behalf (Sharma, 1997). Client 
vulnerability is historically one of the most salient reasons behind the 
institutionalization of professions such as law and accounting. Professional–client 
agency is likely to be associated with agency problems like overbilling, sub-standard 
service quality delivery, and neglect of professional ethics. When detected, these 
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behaviors tend to give rise to complaints filed by clients with the disciplinary bodies of 
professional associations. 
The second form of external agency problems of PSFs I define as professional - 
third-party agency. In their daily affairs, professionals routinely make decisions that 
affect a host of other external parties, even though they do not transact with them 
directly. Paradigmatic examples of such ‘third party beneficiaries’ (Eisenberg, 1992) are 
the beneficiaries of a trust made up by a lawyer, and the participants in public equity 
markets relying on the assurance over the annual accounts of public firms provided by 
accountants (Goldberg, 1988). The professional association may in all instances be seen 
as the principal in this agency relationship as it is the primary enforcer of the rules and 
professional standards that protect third-party interests. These professional-third party 
agency problems are manifested through breaches of professional rules, standards, or 
procedures. Both the professional-client as well as the professional-third party agency 
problems is reported to the professional disciplinary bodies in the form of complaints. 
I develop a distinctively organizational, multilevel theory of corporate 
governance practices in PSFs. In this view, the agency relationships that characterize 
PSFs as an organizational form merely constitute the ‘fault lines’ along which agency 
problems can materialize (Heath, 2009). Whether or not agency problems will actually 
occur, however, is at least partly dependent on the specific organization-level 
governance practices that PSFs feature, as well as on individual-level risk propensities 
that arise from functioning as a professional.  
Governance in PSFs has historically been based on informal or ‘soft’ controls, 
whose functioning is facilitated by the high degree of face-to-face interaction between 
professionals in PSFs (Zey-Ferrel & Ferrell, 1982), and founded in their employees’ 
commitment to professionalism (Gendron, Suddaby, & Lam, 2006; Hall, 1968). Two 
features of the P2 configuration function as soft controls containing behavioral risks 
resulting from agency relations in PSFs: professional socialization and the social or 
‘club’ value that the organization provides to individual professionals. The first set of 
practices are aimed at socialization (Anderson-Cough, Grey & Robson, 2000) of their 
members with the goal of transferring expert knowledge to junior professionals and 
demonstrating expectations regarding appropriate behavior (Brief, Buttram & 
Dukerich, 2001). The second set is practices related to the club value of the PSF. As an 
organization’s climate influences the behavior of employees (Deshpande, George & 
Joseph, 2000), professionals that feel intrinsically bound to the organization are more 
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likely to demonstrate appropriate professional behaviors. Stimulating this club value 
thus will serve to reduce agency problems.  
When referring to hard controls I address the more novel-to-context 
organizational practices introduced through the more commercial ethos.  I argue that 
these controls are likely to increase agency problems. The introduction of performance 
and strategic planning practices force professionals to prioritize profits over 
professional ethics. This may result in more calculative behavior and may negatively 
influence cooperative dispositions (Frank, Gilovic & Regan, 1993) as well the 
prevalence of unethical behavior (Frank & Schulze, 2000). Additionally, formal 
governance of ethical programs removes the locus of responsibility from the 
professional to the organization thus reducing collegial monitoring.  
A final set of variables that potentially induce professional misconduct are 
related to the individual professional’s risk propensity. In PSFs, individual 
professionals are likely to have different propensities to become involved in agency 
problems due to the differential risk orientations that result from their experience and 
job roles. One vulnerable category is the non-partnered associate. PSFs feature highly 
competitive human resource management practices, centered on ‘up or out’ promotion 
principles (Morris & Pinnington, 1998), which stage the process of an associate’s 
admission to partnership as an all-or-nothing tournament. In ‘up or out’ systems, the 
fruits of several years of deferred compensation, hard work, and relentless dedication 
are distributed highly unequally between associates (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Eriksson, 
1999). The substantial rewards associated with becoming a partner, the disproportional 
influence of the threat of being denied partnership on decision making (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), and the single-shot character of promotion to partner decisions all may 
lead associates to become more frequently involved in agency problems than 
individuals working in different roles.  
Another vulnerable category is the experienced professional. With experience, 
professionals may become more risk-prone and more frequently involved in agency 
problems (Elm & Nichols, 1993). More seasoned professionals can become 
overconfident in their own skills and expertise, and may therefore overestimate the 
chance of getting away with opportunistic behaviors. More experienced professionals 
are also less likely to be subjected to collegial correction of beliefs and behaviors, as 
they tend to work more autonomously. Furthermore, experienced professionals also 
tend to work on more complicated cases, which increase the chance of them becoming 
involved in agency problems. 
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Using hierarchical linear modeling on a sample of 2083 lawyers representing 
203 law firms (response rates of 53.5% and 36.5%, respectively) I model the effects at 
both the individual and the organizational level. My findings suggest that soft controls 
are better suited in addressing professional agency problems, mainly through 
socialization processes. The presence of strategic planning on the other hand 
exacerbates the number of complaints. In terms of individual risk propensity I find 
that more seasoned professionals are likely to receive more complaints, whereas junior 
associates receive significantly less complaints.  
Based on these findings I contribute to the literature in three ways. First, my 
study contributes to the emerging literature on the corporate governance of non-
publicly listed firms (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Gómez-Mejía, Takács Haynes, Núñez-
Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; McCahery & Vermeulen, 2008; Schultze, 
Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholz, 2001). Second, after conceptualizing agency problems in 
PSFs, my findings suggest that the type of long-established informal practices that 
feature predominantly in PSFs of the P2–type (Greenwood et al., 1990) are better 
attuned to the specific governance challenges of PSFs than the more formal practices 
characterizing MPB-like PSFs (Cooper et al., 1996). Presumably, this is because these 
informal practices are better suited to deal with hard-to-observe and difficult-to-
monitor professional behaviors than more formal organizational practices (Greenwood 
& Empson, 2003). While the latter seem better attuned to monitoring economic 
performance, and have often been specifically adopted for that purpose, they also 
appear to ‘crowd out’ traditional professional values from PSFs (Frey & Jegen, 2001). 
In general, my findings suggest that effective corporate governance practices are likely 
to be highly specific to an organizational form, and emphasize the need for corporate 
governance researchers to move beyond the study public firms and research the 
governance challenges and practices of other organizational forms, even if the data for 
such studies is difficult to collect. 
Third, in this study I show that individual-level risk factors also play a role in 
the PSF context, where they can put additional strain on the unique types of agency 
relationships that characterize this organizational form. While we have only just begun 
to understand the finer-grained mechanisms through which professionals come to 
accept excessive risk and reduce the self-policing impact of professional norms on their 
behavior, my findings do point out new avenues for PSF research. In particular, they 
demonstrate the applicability of demographic (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and 
Chapter 1 
 
18
decision-making (Hitt & Tyler, 1991) theories of organizational action in the PSF 
context. 
1.2.4 Organizational forms and professional service firm outcomes: A set-theoretic 
study  
In the final chapter of this dissertation, the main contribution lies in using set-theory to 
analyze the effects of specific organizational configurations of practices on the two 
principal objectives of PSFs: maximizing their professional standards and the quality 
of their professional work, and maximizing their profits and broader commercial 
performance.   
The first step to this aim is to check whether the two configurations previously 
discerned by the literature – the P2 (Greenwood et al., 1990) and the MPB (Cooper et 
al., 1996) – are the only extant configurations in the law industry, or whether there are 
also different configurations present. Although several landmark studies embracing 
these two configurations (Greenwood et al., 2002, 2005; Hitt et al., 2001; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005) set the stage for a productive stream of empirical research on PSFs, 
they also raised a number of fundamental questions in regard to PSF configurations.  
First, as most of the foundational work on PSF configurations is qualitative 
and interpretative (e.g., Robertson, Scarbrough, & Swan, 2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005) or conceptual (e.g., Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Malhotra & Morris, 2009) in 
kind, we presently lack a more systematic empirical validation of the P2 and MPB 
configurations. 
Second, against the backdrop of contingency-theoretical explanations of the 
substantive and symbolic performance of organizational forms (Donaldson, 2001; 
Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985), the extant PSF literature raises the question whether the 
P2 and MPB configurations are well-fitted and efficient organizational forms, or 
whether they owe their existence primarily to the competition-reducing institutional 
peculiarities of the professional environment in which they operate (Von Nordenflycht 
2010). All firms need to address the contingencies they face in their environment in 
order to achieve fit and maximize their effectiveness (Donaldson, 2001; Drazin & Van 
de Ven, 1985). Consequently, top management of law firms has to decide how to use 
their resources in order to support their different activities (Penrose, 1959; Løwendahl, 
2005). This choice is primarily related to how the firm sees its product/market strategy 
(Ansoff, 1967), i.e. who are its clients, what will be its geographical reach, and finally, 
what types of services will it deliver. I argue that P2 organized firms are uniquely 
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suited to deliver specialty services of high quality to local or national clients. This 
compared to the MPB organized firms that are best at serving international clients that 
demand generic, one-stop-shop services. Configurations that fall in between the two 
configurations will not be able to offer these services as efficient as the pure forms. 
Therefore, I propose that pure configurations will outperform mixed configurations 
both in terms of substantive and symbolic performance.   
Third, and as stated, all PSFs serve at least two objectives. One is the public 
objective of serving vulnerable client and third-party interests, for example by 
buttressing the legal system (law firms) or by ensuring the materiality and 
transparency of information in financial markets (auditing firms). Another is the 
private objective of generating profits for the owners of the firm. Prior contributors 
have argued that PSF’s public objectives have greater currency in the P2 configuration, 
while private objectives are deemed more important in the MPB configuration (Cooper 
et al., 1996; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Given that firms will rarely – if ever – be 
able to maximize multiple objectives simultaneously (Jensen, 2002), I argue that the P2 
configuration - which prioritizes the professional objective - outperforms the MPB – 
which prioritizes the profit objective - and mixed configurations in the degree of 
violations of client and third-party interests.  
I test these propositions on a sample (n = 450) of Dutch law firms. Using 
survey data I can determine per firm whether it is organized along the P2 or MPB 
configuration or whether a firm is a hybrid. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis (fs/QCA: Fiss, 2011), I am able to map multi-variate causal complexity and its 
implication for performance, reputation and misconduct.  
First, contributors to the PSF literature have previously documented two 
organizational configurations, the P2 and the MPB (Greenwood et al., 1990; Cooper et 
al., 1996). However, their description has been based on interpretative case studies, 
and with the notable exception of Pinnington and Morris (2003), the extent of their 
applicability in the entire domain of a professional industry such as law and 
accounting has not been researched. Based on the outcomes of my study, my 
contributions are threefold. First, I find evidence that the MPB is indeed a common 
organizational configuration, and that it has persisted to this day in much the same 
form as was originally described by Cooper and his associates (1996). Second, 
however, my results also show that the P2-configuration, while still discernable, no 
longer exists in exactly the same form as first described by Greenwood and his 
colleagues (1990). Specifically, I observe that, consistent with the broader societal trend 
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towards formalization, efficiency, and commercialization (Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005), law firms are also subject to these institutional forces. Originally the P2-
configuration relied exclusively on informal and collegial manners of supervision and 
control. Yet I find that especially the reliance on the informal governance practices has 
been wholly replaced by formal governance and strategy formation processes. 
However, consensus decision making remains the most adequate form of inter-partner 
interaction. To highlight this change that has occurred in the P2 configuration, I 
dubbed this form the P2.1. 
Second, I have assessed the causal links between the various types of 
configurations present in the Dutch law industry and their substantive and symbolic 
performance. What is noteworthy about these analyses is that I detected that only P2.1 
and MPB configurations are present in the Dutch law industry, but also a number of 
different hybrid configurations. Whereas such hybrid configurations have been 
described in the literature as being unstable and inconsistent in their values, systems, 
and structures (Gray, 1999), my analyses show that they do not necessarily yield poor 
performance. While I cannot assess whether these hybrids are stable or unstable, their 
performance and reputation implications are often positive. On the other hand, the 
MPB configuration in its purest form appears to be the most powerful configuration 
for generating high substantive and symbolic performance. These results seem to 
support a generic structural contingency theory-based take on PSF performance, 
indicating that the success of PSF configurations is dependent on the contingencies 
these firms face.  
My third contribution entails an improved understanding of what produces 
the darker side of organizational configurations. Specifically, my answer to the 
question as to what causes PSFs to engage in misconduct (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 
2010) and jeopardize vulnerable client and third party interests lies in the tradeoffs that 
PSFs must necessarily make when combining public and private objectives. In general, 
PSF research treats these two objectives as being separate, while the findings I have 
reported suggest the necessity of conjoint analysis. What my empirical results show, 
however, is that it is absolutely critical to assess the private and public objective 
functions of PSFs simultaneously when vetting the effectiveness and desirability of 
any PSF configuration in particular. For example, the MPB configuration offers an 
organizational design that does well in terms of private objectives by ensuring high 
substantive and symbolic performance, but it does so at the cost of poor outcomes on 
public objectives: the MPB scores very high in terms of the level of organizational 
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misconduct it produces. The absence of strong informal governance, through which 
professionals can collegially correct one another’s misdeeds and which is one of the 
hallmarks of the original P2-configuration, is the key ingredient that is missing in these 
firms. As my analyses suggest, informal governance can be used as a complement to or 
as a substitute for formal governance when organizational size, complexity, and scope 
are minimal. However when PSFs grow, diversify, or internationalize, they require 
more formal governance. 
1.3 Final remarks and structure of this dissertation 
My overarching question was: what are the effects of the changing logic from 
professionalism to commercialism on PSFs? In effect should PSFs focus on profits or 
professionalism? This is an important question for professionals when designing their 
organizations as the findings in this dissertation suggest that they are difficult to 
combine with a single configuration. Given the importance of PSFs in the 
contemporary economy, I contribute to our understanding of the impact of 
organizational design on corporate objective functions. With this dissertation, I aspire 
to say something of interest to academics, practitioners and public policy makers alike. 
Although I have given only a cursory overview of my findings in this introduction, I 
will address these issues in the remaining chapters. In chapter two I show how 
accountants at mid-tier accountancy firms perceive and deal with the push towards 
commercialization. In chapter three I focus on the effects of novel and traditional 
performance drivers on PSF performance. In chapter four, I again focus on the 
different sets of practices in order to investigate their impact on misconduct. In the 
final chapter I look at configurations of organizational practices and at their impact on 
performance, reputation and misconduct. 
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 Chapter 2. Heterogeneous organizational 
responses to conflicting institutional logics1 
 
Abstract 
We study how mid-tier accounting firms engage with changes in their institutional 
environment that results in a shift from a trustee logic to a commercial logic. We find 
that these mid-tier firms selectively adopt practices related to the commercial logic, 
while retaining a principal commitment to the trustee logic. Main strategic issues for 
the mid-tier firms relate to the changing role of the accountant and changes in 
organizational structure and practices. As these issues fundamentally challenge 
characteristics of their professional identity, there is internal resistance against this 
transformation. Non-partnered accountants mainly challenge new roles that upset 
their extant work routines, whereas partners resist changes affecting their autonomy. 
These types of resistance directly impact the strategic organizational responses 
accounting firms undertake. The upshot of our analysis is an enriched understanding 
of actor engagement in processes of institutional transformation. 
2.1 Introduction 
In prior investigations of processes of institutional change, scholars have pointed to 
the importance of institutional tension based in the incompatibility of competing 
institutional logics (Seo & Creed, 2002; Thornton, Jones & Kury, 2005; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008). Institutional logics reflect the socially constructed basis of “historical 
patterns of material practices, assumptions, values and beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and 
space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 804). 
They shape how organizations and individuals behave and thereby affect 
organizational structures and processes (Greenwood, Diaz, Li & Lorente, 2009). While 
logics are fundamental and influential, organizational fields are rarely subject to a 
                                                             
1 This chapter is co-authored with Dr. Bas Koene and Shelly S. Linssen, MSc. A previous version of this 
paper was presented at the EGOS consortium in Lisbon, 2010. This paper is currently under review at 
Accounting Organizations and Society. 
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single dominant logic. Rather, firms have to contend with multiple, often contradicting 
logics that affect institutional stability and change (c.f. Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton et al., 2005; Raey & Hinings, 2005; Purdy & Gray, 2009).  
When external expectations regarding these conflicting logics are unclear, this 
leaves room for managerial discretion (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Weaver, Treviño 
& Cochran, 1999b). Therefore, intra- and interorganizational sociopolitical conflict will 
affect the adoption processes of practices related to these conflicting logics (Fiss & 
Zajac, 2004), as practices will not necessarily be in line with the goals and strategies of 
sets of actors within and between firms (Lounsbury, 2007). It is therefore unlikely that 
strategic responses to conflicting logics will be similar across all actors populating an 
organizational field (Pache & Santos, 2010). Following Greenwood et al. (2009), we 
look at the heterogeneity of organizational responses in a well-documented 
organizational field: the accounting industry. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) showed 
how a new organizational form developed under the auspices of a limited set of elite 
firms. They described how the development of the big 5 accounting firms and 
concomitant developments in their international environment led to a tension between 
the traditional trustee – or fiduciary (Thornton et al., 2005) – logic and an emerging 
commercial – or corporate (Thornton et al., 2005) – logic. The big 5 accounting firms 
were instrumental in advancing the commercial logic, as developments both in the 
internal and external environment disengaged these elite firms from the traditional 
trustee logic (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).  
Where most studies focus on the elite (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) or the 
mavericks (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay & King, 1991), the core of an organizational field 
consists of mainstream firms and studies examining change within this group has 
remained limited (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). In this paper we investigate the strategic 
responses (Oliver, 1991) displayed by mid-tier accountancy firms in the Netherlands in 
the face of conflicting demands of the trustee and commercial logic. These mid-tier 
firms present an interesting sample for three reasons. First, although still quite large in 
size (both in terms of employees and revenues), they are less able to directly influence 
and change their organizational field as compared to the big 4, which could possibly 
lead to a different set of organizational responses. Secondly, their client base differs, as 
they tend to serve smaller more local clients than the big 4. Hence, they face different 
client demands. Third, given the relatively small size of the professional cadre and the 
relatively easy access to the strategic apex of the firm, non-partnered professionals still 
have a great deal of influence on its day-to-day operations.  
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By exploring the ways in which the mid-tier accounting firms deal with the 
tensions between the traditional trustee logic and the commercial, we make three 
contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on institutional logics and change. 
Fundamental changes in environmental conditions of organizations lead to 
organizational change (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Within the accountancy sector, 
changes such as increased regulation, automation of services, and changing client 
demands have recently punctuated a long period of stability. These significant 
environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982) are hypothesized in prior literature to result in 
revolutionary transformations of organizations rather than their evolutionary 
development (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985). Yet, this is not what we observe in our group of mid-tier firms. These 
firms do not show a comprehensive transformational embrace or outright rejection of 
the novel commercial logic. Rather, the mid-tier firms respond by addressing separate 
and specific strategic and structural issues, which are invoked by the new logic and 
relevant for their organization in terms of resource dependencies or autonomy 
challenges, in an incremental way. This is caused by their embeddedness in the 
existing trustee logic. As such, embeddedness provides a significant force for stability 
and causes resistance to change (Granovetter, 1985; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 
Maguire, 2007; Oliver, 1997). 
The source of resistance is located internal to the firm and this insight forms 
our second contribution. In our study, we observe a fragmented implementation of 
elements of the new logic. Mid-tier firms use it strategically and opportunistically by 
selecting only those elements that have the perceived potential to resolve concrete 
managerial challenges regarding specific strategic issues. The diffusion process of the 
commercial logic in the field segment populated by mid-tier firms therefore looks 
more like a process of institutional bricolage (Aldrich, 2010), especially because of the 
enduring influence of the traditional trustee logic on mid-tier actors’ behavior. This 
influence results in a piecemeal acceptance of elements comprising of the new logic as 
well as variation in the way new systems are adopted and implemented. The trustee 
logic continues to exercise its effect through the embedded action of managing 
partners as well as non-partnered accountants, whom are unwilling to forgo their 
professional traditions and norms, in no small part because of their vested interests. To 
deal with these internal sources of resistance, the majority of mainstream accountancy 
firms adopts and adapts practices that are in the ‘zone of acceptance’ (Ansari, Fiss & 
Zajac, 2010; Lewis & Seibold, 1993; Radnor, Feller & Rogers, 1978). Studying these 
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internal sources of resistance therefore contributes to our understanding of when and 
what strategic responses are likely to form. It informs the diffusion literature by 
showing the dynamics of “interrupted, incomplete, or even failed diffusion processes 
(Johnson, 2009), an area which have so far received very little attention” (Ansari et al., 
2010). 
 Our third contribution is to the literature on PSFs by addressing the issue of 
generalizability of this literature’s extant findings to other (segments of) professional 
fields (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). The change in institutional logics identified and 
documented by Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) in their longitudinal qualitative study 
of the big 4 accounting firms cannot straightforwardly be extrapolated to the rest of the 
actors in the accounting industry. While Greenwood and Suddaby’s big 4 firms are 
dealing with multinational clients in a supra-national arena, our mid-tier firms are 
well-established in their national setting, engaging primarily with local clients and 
experiencing greater influence of national professional organizations. Our findings 
indicate that the commitment to the traditional trustee logic is considerably stronger 
within this group of more locally grounded firms. While we observe that mid-tier 
firms respond to the previously mentioned challenges by adopting elements of the 
commercial logic, they do not embrace the latter logic consistently, let alone wholesale. 
Thus, Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) finding that a groups of elite firms pushes a 
comprehensive and consistent agenda propagating the commercial logic simply does 
not translate to the group of mid-tier firms. This suggests that organizational 
responses to conflicting or changing logics may differ systematically across the 
different demographic strata into which organizational fields tend to be segmented.  
2.2 Theoretical orientation 
2.2.1 Shifting institutional logics 
Traditionally, the accounting industry was governed by a trustee logic (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005) where professional values and a feeling of societal guardianship 
were central to the professional identity. Professional audit practices were the core of 
the accountants’ activities and as these activities meant applying an esoteric body of 
knowledge to complex problems, they enjoyed high levels of discretion and autonomy 
(Greenwood, Hinings & Brown, 1990). Additionally, senior members, who typically 
own and manage the firms are often responsible for their particular practice areas and 
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hence place priority hereon. In practice this means that the strategy of the firm can be 
described as the aggregate of the partners’ individual interest (Pinnington & Morris, 
2003). In terms of organizational systems and practices, these firms relied primarily on 
informal and collegial control mechanisms at the expense of more formal and 
hierarchical systems (Greenwood et al., 1990).  
However, recently the accounting industry experienced a number of 
upheavals that challenged traditional professional practice. First, technological 
developments have had significant impact on the audit process. Computer aided audit 
systems have reduced the complexity and labor intensity of the audit process (Brock, 
2006). In the Netherlands, the introduction of a standardized software language XBRL 
meant additionally increases in efficiency and ultimately less billable hours in the 
consolidation practice (ING, 2010). On the client side, the increased emphasis on costs 
and the internet and mobile technologies that allow for shopping around, add to the 
pressure on the fees of the audit process (Aharoni, 1999). Secondly, due to 
globalization, accountancy practices now have to deal with international standards 
and practices of their international clients (Nanchum, 1996), leading to new knowledge 
requirements of accountants. Third, statutory protection for providing services has 
been reduced or removed (Hart, Schlesinger & Maher, 1992). This resulted in growing 
intra- and inter-professional competition (Gray, 1999). Fourth, the implications of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act as well as the shift from principle-based to rule-based accounting 
has changed the organizational structure of accounting firms (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006), reducing the importance of the individual accountant. In the Netherlands, for 
those firms that perform statutory audits of annual and consolidated accounts, the Wet 
toezicht accountantsorganisaties (Wta; law on the supervision of accounting firms), 
has been implemented. This law entails that accountancy firms require permits for 
statutory audits, the allocation of which is determined by a number of stringent 
quality demands. This has led to a decrease in the number of firms allowed to conduct 
audits. The Wta has created a large barrier of entry as the costs of these permits, are 
significant. There are the direct costs of obtaining and maintaining this permit as well 
as indirect costs stemming from the investments firms have to make in their quality 
systems (ING, 2010). Finally, firms also face changes in client demands. Here the role 
of the traditional accountant is slowly being shifted towards that of an advisor to the 
firm. Clients are not only more critical towards the service they receive, but also 
demand more and different services. This full service advice is also increasingly 
demanded by the firms serviced by the mid-tier firms in the Netherlands (ING, 2010).  
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These developments pushed accounting firms to rationalize their service 
delivery process, adopt more efficient structures, broaden their activities in 
consultancy services, and actively engage in marketing campaigns (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006). Combined, the changes in economic and social trends, legislation and 
government policies (Løwendahl, 2005; Maister, 2003; Nanchum, 1996), as well as 
those in product market, financial and factor pressures (Cooper, Greenwood, Hinings 
& Brown, 1998; Greenwood et al., 1990) have put strain on the trustee logic formerly 
dominant in the accounting sector and resulted in the propagation of the commercial 
logic (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Under this logic the large accounting firms can be 
described as more consciously managed. The underlying values have shifted from the 
application of expertise in the interest of public service to a focus on efficiency and 
value added provision of the services rendered by the firm (Pinnington & Morris, 
2003). To assure this efficiency and avoid strategic drift (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002) the 
large accounting firms introduced formal strategic planning and governance, 
emphasized marketing and work with centralized financial systems (Morris & 
Pinnington, 1998). 
2.2.2 Strategic responses 
Changing institutional demands inherently result in a changed organizational field. 
Literature on institutional logics shows four possible outcomes of the clash between 
logics: the incorporation of elements of a new logic into the dominant one (e.g. Glynn, 
2000), the hybridization of elements of both the old and new logic (e.g. Purdy & Gray, 
2009; Colyvas & Powell, 2006; D’Aunno, Sutton & Price, 1991), a shift from the old 
dominant logic to the newly introduced logic (e.g. Thornton, 2002; Zilber, 2002) or the 
permanent co-existence of both logics (e.g. Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 
2007; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009; Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna, 2000). The mid-tier 
accounting firms face the same upheavals and as a result organizational responses in 
the face of conflicting institutional logics are unlikely to be similar (Oliver, 1991; Pache 
& Santos, 2010).  
Oliver (1991: 145) points to the lack of “attention to the strategic behaviors that 
organizations employ in direct response to the institutional processes that affect 
them.” Drawing on institutional and resource dependence theory she describes how 
organizations within the field react and behave. To cope with institutional demands 
firms can employ five different strategic responses: (1) acquiescence, organizations 
accede to institutional pressures; (2) compromise, organizations try to balance between 
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inconsistencies between institutional expectations and organizational objectives; (3) 
avoidance, organizations try to preclude the necessity of conformity; (4) defiance, 
organizations actively resist institutional expectations; and (5) manipulation, 
organizations actively try to redefine the institutional expectations. Following the 
publication of this seminal work, a productive research stream developed to uncover 
which strategic responses are employed by firms in various settings. This research 
stream can be classified in three categories of articles. 
 By far most articles discuss shifts in the organization field of firms and the 
resulting demands placed upon them by field members. However, these studies often 
investigate a specific issue facing focal firms to which they need to respond rather than 
wholesale shifts in logics. Additionally, the possible responses of these firms are 
limited to mostly acquiescence/adopt or defiance/non-adopt. For example, adoption 
or resistance has been tested for cesarean surgeries (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996), 
university recycling programs (Lounsbury, 2001), divisionalization (Thornton, 2002), 
independent professional money management firms (Lounsbury, 2007), shareholder 
value orientation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006), investor relations departments (Rao & 
Sivakumar, 1999), issue management practices (Greening & Gray, 1994), work family 
issues (Milliken, Martins & Morgan, 1998), information systems outsourcing (Ang & 
Cummings, 1997) and TQM systems (Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997). As such, the 
focus of these studies is on inter-firm differences in responses to specific issues on a 
field level often explained through firm level variables. A significantly smaller set of 
papers directly investigates all five strategic responses, however again geared towards 
specific issues (e.g. Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995). The final category of 
papers study organization responses through in-depth case studies that look at field 
level changes with regard to shifting institutional logics. In these studies, however the 
focus on the reconfiguration of logics and strategic options of firms are implicitly 
assumed rather than formally investigated (e.g. Hoffman, 1999; Townley, 2002).  
  Recently, Pache and Santon (2010) argued that the type of strategic response 
given by firms is not solely determined by external forces, rather by internal 
representation. The term internal representation is different from the term dominant 
coalition (Cyert & March, 1963; Thompson, 1967) as this refers to a particular group 
that has superior power of the remaining constituents. This is not necessarily the case 
in terms of internal representation, logics can also not be represented or two equally 
powerful coalitions may support different logics. Internal representation is determined 
in part by hiring practices of professionals that adhere to a different set of norms 
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(D’Aunno et al, 1991). It is also influenced by perceptions of the existing internal 
audience based on the dominant institutional logic in which they operate (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991). As compared to the previous studies investigating organizational 
responses, we focus on a shifting logic to which multiple strategic responses are 
possible given the influence of internal representation. Therefore our research question 
is: 
Research Question: Which strategic responses do mid-tier accounting 
firms use to balance the tension between the trustee and commercial 
institutional logics? 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Rationale 
The aim of this research is to elaborate our current theoretical understanding (Lee, 
Mitchell & Sablynski, 1999) regarding multiple institutional logics and their impact on 
the heterogeneity of organizational responses. Similar to Greenwood and Suddaby 
(2006) we use inductive reasoning, to map organizational responses to institutional 
pressures as perceived in the demographic of mid-tier accounting firms. In order to 
document “changes in structures and systems” and “the ways in which these changes 
coincide with institutional templates” large scale comparative studies are necessary 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996: 1047). They are necessary as changes involve difficult to 
measure concepts (e.g. resistance) and radical changes take lengthy periods of time. 
Hence we opted for a qualitative, multiple case study (Eisenhardt, 1989) and use event 
sequencing of historical and contemporary processes (Lee et al., 1999) within and 
between cases. In order to disentangle the process of organizational change we draw 
on interview and archival data.  
2.3.2 Research context: The Dutch accountancy sector 
The accountancy firms included in the sample are drawn from these 22 largest 
accountancy firms listed directly behind the big four firms.  In terms of profits and 
full-time employees mid-tier firms differ substantially from the big 4 accounting firms. 
In the ranking of largest accounting firms in the Netherlands the big 4 are followed by 
three firms with profits in excess of €100 million and employing over 1000 fte. The 
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following six firms have over €50 million in profits and employ over 500 employees. 
Finally, the remaining 13 mid-tier firms have profits in excess of €15 million and 
employ more than 150 employees (www.accountant.nl).  
2.3.3 Data sources 
We define our sample geographically, which is a tried and tested sampling method for 
professional organizations whose operations are (somewhat) contingent on the 
jurisdiction in which they are active (Ruef & Scott, 1998; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) 
Our data was collected from 2009 to 2011, in the jurisdiction of the Nederlandse 
Beroepsorganisatie voor Accountants (NBA; Dutch Accounting Association).  
Our primary sources of data are interviews with senior-level informants 
within 11 mid-tier accounting firms in the Netherlands (see table 1 for firm and 
informant information). These informants were theoretically sampled on a number of 
characteristics (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). First, the informants needed to have insight in 
the strategic plans of the firms. Preferably - and most of our informants were - the 
informants needed to be (managing) partners and as such have decision making 
authority. Secondly, the informants represented the different areas of the firm such as 
the audit branch, the consolidation branch and the fiscal branch.  
Table 1: Informant information 
Firm   Informants 
A1  Turnover = € 215.7 
million 
# FTE = 1950 
OOB licensed 
CEO (20 years at firm) 
A2 National senior manager (3 years at firm) 
A3 Managing partner (8 years at firm) 
A4 Regional managing partner (25 years at firm) 
B1  Turnover = € 115.5 
million 
# FTE = 1160 
OOB licensed 
Regional managing partner (7 years at firms) 
B2 Managing partner audit (9 years) 
B3 Managing partner accountancy (2 years at firm) 
C1  Turnover = € 111.7 
million 
# FTE = 1280 
Senior policy maker HR (5 years at firm) 
C2 Regional managing partner (9 years at firm) 
C3 Director general business affairs (15 years at firm) 
D1  Turnover = € 97.2 
million 
# FTE = 866 
OOB licensed 
National managing partner (28 years at firm) 
D2 Regional managing partner (12 years at firm) 
D3 Managing partner (12 years at firm) 
D4 National managing partner & member of the board (21 years at 
firm) 
E1  Turnover = € 68.8 
million 
# FTE = 756 
CEO (6 years at firm) 
E2 Managing partner & member of the board (40 years at firm) 
E3 Partner (2 year at firm) 
F1  Turnover = € 59 
million 
# FTE = 636 
Senior relations manager (1 year at firm) 
F2 Regional manager tax and international affairs (11 years at firm) 
F3 Regional manager accountancy (21 years at firm) 
G1  Turnover = € 53.5 Managing partner & international representative (9 years at firm) 
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As we study institutional logics conflicts we are tapping into cognitive aspects 
such as perceptions, thought and interpretation we are at the risk of several biases 
(Miller, Cardinal & Glick, 1997). In order to mitigate subject biases, we used multiple 
informants per firm. The added benefit of using multiple informants is that it often 
results in richer data (Schwenk, 1985). In the first instance, the managing partner or 
director was contacted and informed about the study’s objectives and asked to 
participate in an interview. Subsequently, using snowball sampling (Kerlinger, 1986), 
we asked the first informant to specify at least two other potential informants. The 
interviews ranged from one to one and a half hour in length. We always started by 
asking the informant background information on the firm as well as the informant. 
Hereafter, open-ended questions were used to elaborate on five important forces for 
change in the accounting industry. Open-ended questions lead to higher accuracy in 
reports (Miller et al., 1997). Examples of questions include: “what are the five most 
important changes in the firm’s environment that led to changes in the mindset of the 
firm?’ Why were these changes seen as important in the firm?” Subsequent questions 
were used to uncover the effects of these forces on the strategy and/or structure in the 
last five years within the informants’ firm. Example questions include: “what were the 
influences of these changes on organizational structures and practices?” “What is the 
best response to the changes for your firm in terms of strategies, structures and 
practices?” “Why was this response (not) chosen?” “Was their any resistance to the 
changes in the firm?” All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The total number 
of transcribed pages amounted to 1400 double-spaced pages. In order to minimize 
retrospective bias (Miller et al., 1997), we asked informants to reflect on real time and 
retrospective change or non-change events. This motivated informants to tell their 
G2 million 
# FTE = 465 
OOB licensed 
National managing partner & member of the board (29 years at 
firm)
G3 Managing partner (18 years at firm)
G4 Managing partner (22 years at firm)
H1  Turnover = € 43.3 
million 
# FTE = 476 
Managing partner audit (15 years at firm) 
H2 Managing partner accountancy (16 years at firm) 
H3 Compliance officer and director of education (8 years at firm) 
I1  Turnover = € 29.6 
million 
# FTE = 293 
Senior Manager (3 years at firm) 
I2 Managing partner audit, member of the board (5 years at firm) 
I3 Director Audit (13.5 years at firm) 
J1  Turnover = € 21.3 
million 
# FTE = 161 
Managing partner (1 year at firm) 
K1  Turnover = € 17.4 
million 
# FTE = 180 
Regional managing partner (6 years at firm) 
K2 Regional managing partner (16 years at firm) 
K3 Regional managing partner (3 years at firm) 
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story on (non-)changes in their firm and the substantiation of accounts through 
instructive examples. We also provided anonymity for both the informants as well as 
the firms they represent to encourage openness with regard to the strategic responses 
of the firms (Miller et al., 1997). As these informants are at the heart of organizational 
decision making, they are exceptionally knowledgeable and reliable regarding the 
events they were asked to describe (Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993; Seidler, 1974). 
These example events thus referred to structural (e.g. directive decision making), 
strategic (e.g. extension of services rendered) or changes in practices (e.g. cold 
acquisition). Subsequently, we compared responses of the multiple informants of the 
firms, on these change issues. If there exits substantial differences between the 
accounts of informants of the same firm, retrospective biases are present or our 
interview protocol is unreliable. This did not prove to be the case as we did not find 
significant difference between the responses between stories and instructive examples 
of respondents of the same firm (Seidler, 1974).  
We used additional sources of data in order to address potential subject bias 
(Jick, 1979). Archival data on both changes in the industry as well as changes within 
firms were consulted when available. We used three different kinds of archival 
information. First, we used annual reports (2008-2010) of the professional accountancy 
association in order to determine key trends as well as important legislative changes 
within the accountancy industry. Secondly, we perused the companies’ websites to 
uncover any press releases (from 2008-2011) for descriptions of major changes the 
firms have gone through. Finally, we used information drawn from industry journals 
(e.g. Maandblad voor Accountancy and Bedrijfseconomie (MAB; Monthly journal on 
accountancy and business economics). Information herein was analyzed after the 
interviews were held and was used to supplement both the information of forces for 
change in the field, as well as changes that were initiated by various actors in the field.  
These data were primarily used to corroborate the information drawn from the 
interviews however at times it was used to supplement our data. 
2.3.4 Data analysis 
The data analysis had both a planned and emergent character. During the analysis the 
authors shifted back and forth between raw data and theory in order to make sense of 
the effect of conflicting logics on organizational responses (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In 
doing so, we focused on three basic questions: (1) what forces for change are 
mentioned by the firm; (2) what elements of the firm did these pressures influences; 
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and (3) what were the organizational responses given by the firm? The process 
involved two distinct steps.  
Stage 1. Case studies were written for each of the firms in the sample based on 
informant quotes as well as archival data (Graebner, 2009) and varied in length 
between 20 to 40 pages. In these case studies, first, the drivers of institutional change 
that resulted in conflicting institutional logics were coded. Following common 
inductive processes, we went from broad generic classification of the issues related to 
the questions above in the first coding round, to more specific categories in coding 
round two. In the first round quotes that identified drivers for change were coded as 
such. In the second round of coding, these drivers were classified in more specific 
categories such as stemming from rules and regulation, or automation of processes. 
These drivers where subsequently analyzed for their influence on the two existing 
institutional logics. However, as it is difficult to empirically identify institutional logics 
we followed Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen and Van de Ven (2009) by searching for 
indicators of these logics in our data. We looked in particular for evidence of norms, 
beliefs and values associated with each of these logics such as quality standards, 
professionalism for the trustee logic and efficiency and profitability for the commercial 
logic.  
For the organizational points of contention we open-coded first, for broad 
categories (e.g. accountant to advisor, organizational governance, etc). These broad 
categories were specified to the particular issues pertaining to that category (i.e. for 
organizational governance: background management & decision making). When 
coded these organizational points of contention could be grouped in two categories 
(Table 2) of strategic themes for our mid-tier firms: (1) the changed role of the 
accountant; and (2) changes to the organization’s structure and practices.  
  
Table 2: Organizational change categories 
Role of the accountant Organization 
Accountant to Advisor Organizational governance 
Core business(Consolidation-Advise) Background management/board members 
Training Decision making/voting (all-directive) 
(Advisory) Services Performance pay system 
Formal business development Division profits 
Range of services, specialist concept Evaluation functionality  
Client acquisition(reactive-proactive) Organizational structure 
Cold Acquisition (Merging) Number of locations 
Mentality professionals Critical mass 
Work/life balance Separation audit & advisory 
Part time employment Service lines 
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General mentality Staff services 
Automation of services Internationalization 
Portals/ Online Service Network 
XBRL Clients/ Services 
 
In the third round we looked for specific examples of the categories.  For 
example, for organizational governance, the authors coded whether a firm engaged in 
directive or consensus decision making.  
The final part in writing the individual case studies was coding the 
organizational responses to each of the organizational points of contention. We 
excluded the avoidance strategy, as in all our cases the firms engaged with at least one 
of the logics legitimating there praxis. Independent of each other, two authors coded 
these responses and tactics in order to ensure consistency. The interrater reliability 
score was .84 indicating good reliability (Cohen, 1968). When assigned responses 
differed, the authors discussed and determined the appropriate coding.  
 
Table 3: Organizational response strategies and tactics* 
Strategies Definition 
Acquiescence Adoption of demands 
Compromise An attempt to achieve partial conformity to at least partly accommodate all 
institutional demands 
Defiance Explicit rejection of at least one to the institutional demands 
Manipulation Active attempt to alter the content of the institutional demands 
*Drawn from Oliver (1991) 
 
For internal representation we coded for two sources of resistance within the 
firm.  Pache and Santos (2010) theorize that the internal pattern of representation of 
logics affects the eventual strategic institutional response by the organization. In 
professional accounting firms, internal representation seems to be particularly salient 
with professionals who have been socialized in their profession and are committed to 
maintain its values, and is particularly salient in the trustee logic. To capture the 
impact of internal representation, we coded the internal representationi.e. non-
partnered or partner accountants.  
Stage 2. Once all case studies were written and coded, we conducted a cross-
case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). This cross-case analysis served two purposes. First, by 
comparing the perspectives of the firms, we established an overview of the 
institutional pressures on these firms that could be related to the trustee logic or the 
commercial logic. This overview is presented in the first part of our findings section.  
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Secondly, we analyze the strategic responses to institutional pressures of the 
firms in our sample for the main strategic issues identified. Given that the firms faced 
contradicting institutional demands, we document how their responses to the specific 
strategic issues draw on either trustee logic or the novel commercial logic. The 
outcomes of this analysis are presented in the second part of our findings. 
2.4 Findings
2.4.1 Multiple logics, conflicting demands 
For the mid-tier accounting firms, we  see that there is a clash of logics and that the 
drivers of this clash place divergent demands on the organizations. This results in 
heterogeneous responses to conflicting institutional demands. 
The trustee logic 
The original institutional logic present in the accounting industry – the trustee logic 
(Thornton et al., 2005) - placed emphasis on professional values and technical expertise 
of the accountants and all organizational systems were geared to accommodate these 
demands. Firms delivered a narrow range of professional auditing-related services, 
around which the firm was organized. Consensus decision making was the norm and 
decision making was done at the local offices. Profits were shared and accountants and 
partners were not held accountable for their financial performance (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006). The issue of accountability was directed mostly towards professional 
norms and values and the quality of the auditing practice.  
Several of the pressures faced by the set of mid-tier firms support these 
values. The more stringent rules and legislation put forward by the professional 
associations as well as the government reinforce the importance of the technical 
qualities and fiduciary responsibilities of the accountants. If these quality standards 
are not met, permits to conduct audits of annual accounts will not be provided. Two 
such permits exist, the OOB-permit for organizations of public importance (i.e. banks, 
public firms, as well as stock-listed firms) and are the most stringent.  The ‘normal’ 
permit allows accounting firms to audit organization that exceed the threshold for 
mandatory deposition of annual accounts. These pressures forced firms to invest in 
quality systems. The Dutch Tax Authority similarly requires high quality of the 
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accounting firms, in order to be allowed to take part in the new high trust tax format. 
Herein firms are no longer checked yearly by the tax authority, but are trusted upon to 
provide proper tax figures through their accountant (for smaller companies) or 
directly. Large firms and accountant organizations (on behalf of smaller firms) are 
allowed to take part when they have proven to be in control, which entails that they 
have systems in place to check their financial situation on a regular basis.  
Coupled to the assurance of quality through legislation is the automation of 
the processing of invoices as well as through XBRL systems, which provide real-time 
information on the company’s finances. XBRL output is increasingly requested by 
banks when deciding to provide loans. Clients also stimulate the trustee logic as they 
demand that their accountants are available and knowledgeable on their particular 
situation, as well as locally present. This requires generalist knowledge on the part of 
the accountant, local decision making capabilities and large number of local offices. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the drivers that reflect the remaining importance of 
the trustee logic.   
 
Table 4: Drivers of the trustee logic 
Drivers Effect Example quote 
Rules & 
regulation
More stringent certification 
demands place emphasis on 
quality controls and 
professional values 
A1: Lots of rules and regulation has been fired at 
us. To which we all need to adhere. This has 
resulted in changes in systems and procedures 
within our organization.  
B1: When I think of the factors that can cause 
change I first of all think of regulation. We need 
a license from the AFM and in order to get or 
keep that license, it was important and necessary 
to change several things within the company. 
That means we have made a separate entities for 
our audit and further we also have the clustered 
the similar clients. 
E1: Regulation for accountancy firms has 
changed to such as extend that we have made our 
audit branch a separate entity. Responsibilities 
and duties are such that they are in line with 
AFM demands. We have increased our quality 
we now have tighter procedures. 
F3: When you look at the regulatory changes, 
this has had a tremendous impact on the internal 
organization of the firm. 
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I2: Regulations are mandatory, so you need to 
work with them and ensure that you reach that 
level of quality and create the proper internal 
structure. 
K2: The license system necessitates us to set up a 
system that ensures the quality of our services. 
Automation 
& XBRL 
Automation and standard 
reporting language systems 
place emphasis on quality 
controls and professional 
consistency 
D1: This forces us to send financial messages via 
the internet at an agreed standard. A few years 
ago, the government forced us to sign a covenant 
to deliver financial statements in XBRL format. 
Client 
Demands 
Clients demand local presence 
and generalist approach of 
their accountant 
A1: We have an international network that others 
do not have, but we also have a personal 
approach that fits our customer segments. They 
demand this of us.  
G1: I think that we are quite unique at the 
moment. We deliver high quality in an 
international network, combined with small scale 
and personal approach.  
H1: Our clients want their accountant close by, 
so that if something goes wrong you can quickly 
react. Because we know the local network we 
can help in all sorts of ways. 
Tax 
authority 
The Dutch Tax authority has 
shifted to a new form of tax 
collection governed by high 
trust. This demands from the 
accountant an emphasis on 
quality controls, professional 
values and consistency 
B3: The Dutch fiscal authority using high trust 
governance, now uses the auditors and 
bookkeepers to ensure a certain level of quality 
control on tax returns.  
I3: horizontal governance just demands that you 
have a quality insurance system. 
The commercial logic 
Although the drivers of the trustee logic demand a focus on, and an investment in 
quality standards within the accounting firms they at the same time force firms to be 
more commercially oriented. The investments in quality systems as well as in 
automation systems and XBRL demand a certain scale within the organization in order 
to make investments lucrative. This however puts a strain on existing practices such as 
collegial decision making and local presence. Additionally, when the core product of 
the accountant, the consolidation of annual accounts becomes automated, the 
corresponding profit margins drop significantly. As a result, the accounting firms seek 
other sources of revenue and we observe that most firms start developing specialized 
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advisory services. This shift to more advice type of services is also demanded by the 
clients. In the face of the economic crisis, which is also affecting the business of clients, 
they want to be advised on ways to improve their bottom line. This again stimulates 
the formation of advisory services at the expense of the traditional accounting 
products. Additionally, international firms also demand their mid-tier accounting 
firms to venture international, which brings about new sets of control and 
performance management processes to improve coordination at the expense of 
collegial controls present under the trustee logic. Finally, the economic crisis has also 
impacted the mid-tier accounting firms forcing them to proactively approach clients 
and provide a broader range of services that have higher profit margins. Table 5 
provides evidence for the presence of these commercial logic drivers. 
 
Table 5: Drivers of the commercial logic 
Drivers Effect Example quote 
Rules & 
regulation
The increased quality demands 
because requires firms to invest in 
quality systems and controls, this 
requires sufficient size (critical 
mass) to make this worthwhile. 
E1: The investment in quality due to 
increased regulation has cost us tons of 
money and had a tremendous impact on 
the organization.  
K2: Introducing a quality system costs 
money and as a result you need to 
expand.  
Automation & 
XBRL 
Automation and standard 
reporting language systems reduce 
profits from core product, the 
annual statement, forcing 
accounting to engage in different 
services 
B2: Another big change has of course 
been technology. The invoice 
processing, which we used to do in the 
past is disappearing because of 
computers. This means we need to 
change our business model from making 
figures to explaining them. When you go 
from producing to explaining figures; 
that demands a different skill set.  
E1: XBRL should reduce the 
administrative burden by being able to 
quickly connect with the banks, tax 
authority and chamber of commerce. 
This should really improve efficiency as 
is a very exiting development. 
H3: I would not be surprised when in 5 
years annual reports have disappeared 
and they are all submitted electronically 
to the authorities. This means that a large 
part of our lower qualified work 
disappears. It is madness to think you 
can compensate for this with new clients.  
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J1: Increased efficiency in IT will lower 
the profits from delivering annual 
reports.  
Client demands Clients not only demand an annual 
statement, but also advice on how 
to improve their performance. 
Additionally international clients 
demand international services.  
A1: Customers are increasingly going 
international with their business, so we 
now also need to service those firms that 
go abroad, as well as the firms that come 
here.  
B1: And you see that advisory services 
are really important. The people who are 
in contact with our clients are trained to 
give advice, to be more of a sparring 
partner for the client.  
C1: Clients have less interest in looking 
back, they have got that covered with 
their bookkeeping software, what they 
seek is a partner in business that will 
help them look forward.  
F2: Clients are no longer interested in 
the annual statement; they are interested 
in what they can do with those figures. 
H3: Clients are much smarter nowadays. 
They shop around for the best place to 
buy their services, especially larger 
clients do.  
K3: Your average entrepreneur is 
smarter. Their education level is higher 
and they can Google what they want to 
know. You now need specialist 
knowledge in order to be considered of 
added value.  
Labor market The tight labor market for 
accountants forces firms to cater 
to the demands of the new 
generation of accountants (whom 
are very different).  
B1: There are less and less accountants 
available in the market. What we see is 
that accountancy is not ‘sexy’. So it is 
very difficult to get good people.  
C1: Once the final crisis is over and the 
baby boomers start retiring, you need to 
be attractive enough as an employer to 
reel these people in.   
I2: You see that you need to find suitable 
people for advice otherwise you just 
won’t make it. 
Economic/market 
conditions 
The dire economic situation in 
general and the difficult market 
C2: Well what you see is that the crisis 
actually ensures change takes place 
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conditions in the accounting sector 
in particular have pushed firms to 
place emphasis on new business 
generation and development, 
efficiency and change in services. 
automatically; you end up with lower 
profits so you need to do something.  
D4: The credit crisis really forces us to 
engage in business development.  
H3: The crisis clearly drives change. 
J1: I think the accountancy market will 
continue to consolidate. It is very scary 
as it looks like there is overcapacity on 
the supply side. 
 
A pressure that is ‘new’ stems  from the labor market. Pressures here are the 
result of a shortage in the labor market and the changing mentality of the 
professionals, both having a different impact on firms. An interesting observation is, 
that although the mid-tier seems to be considering implementing strategies and 
structures that resemble what the big 4 have done, they do not reference the big 4, as a 
‘trigger’ to change.  In fact most firms consider them to occupy a completely different 
part of the accounting industry. 
2.4.2 Organizational responses to conflicting demands 
The drivers described above place contradicting demands on how firms organize 
themselves in terms of strategy, structure, systems and processes. Our findings show 
that how organizations deal with these demands depends on the extent they feel 
pressured to comply with pressures from clients, regulators and professional 
associations. Additionally, the socialization process of their constituency also impacts 
the extent to which these conflicting demands permeate the organizations. These 
differences between organizations lead to different organizational responses on 
specific strategic issues.  
These findings will be discussed next, sequentially analyzing organizational 
responses around the two main themes: the changing role of the account and the 
implications for organizational structure. As explained before, each firm is assigned a 
response strategy as defined by Oliver (1991). If firms continue to comply with the 
demands of the professional/trustee logic, they acquiesce to these demands. If they 
feel that they need to reconcile demands from both logics, firms are assigned the 
compromise strategy. If firms choose to follow the new commercial logic on a 
particular issue, they are assigned the defiance strategy as they are defying the old 
logic. Finally, if they firms go beyond what is demanded by the commercial logic, we 
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classify their strategy as manipulation, as they are trying to change the logic to their 
standards.  
In our analysis, we have not assigned firms to either the professional or the 
commercial logic as they combine elements of both these logics and this differs per 
firm. At times, they choose to follow the old logic, and on a different issue the new 
logic. Therefore, we assign firms strategies on each of the choices they have concerning 
the changing role of the accountant and adaptations to organizational practices and 
structures. In the description below, we make little use of excerpts from the interviews. 
In the appendix A the assigned strategy is illustrated by one quote for each issue per 
firm. At times organizations are not able to conduct the strategy they want, because of 
internal resistance. However, in some cases firms do conduct their strategies 
regardless of the internal resistance. The dynamics of resistance are also described 
below in the aggregate. Support for our conclusions regarding resistance is presented 
in appendix B. 
The changing role of the accountant 
The role of the accountant is changing stimulated in part by the new generation 
professionals. However, the main driver is the diminishing revenue from their core 
business (consolidation and auditing of annual statements), due to technological 
improvements and changing client demands. Clients are no longer satisfied with just 
their annual reports rather they now expect their accountants to advise them on how 
to improve their business. This shift has been acknowledged by all firms in the sample 
however, most firms still cling to their traditional business and try to increase their 
delivery of advisory services. Other more actively move away from the old core 
business to advisory type services. Related to this changing role, our data show that 
the firms need to decide: (1) to which degree and how do they want to make the 
transition possible; (2) what services they want to deliver; (3) how much effort they 
place in client acquisition; (4) if they want to conform to demands of the new 
generation of processionals; and (5) how heavily they invest in automation of their 
services. Table 6 provides an overview of firm responses with regard to the changing 
role of the accountant. In general there are in three groups of firms that can be 
clustered together based on their inclination to adopt practices from the new logic. 
However within and across these groups, most firms describe their change events as 
stand-alone strategic choices that they deal with on a daily basis rather than as part of 
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a coherent strategy. This results combinations of elements from both the old and the 
new logic.  
The first group of firms - firms A, F, and J – has fully embraced this new role. 
They invest heavily in developing new products; offer a wider range of services, 
complemented with industry specific or product specific specialty services. 
Additionally, they either retrain their people to be able to fulfill this new role or hire 
people with suitable credentials and skills. An extreme example is firm F who are the 
first to have relation managers. These are often non-accountants, who brainstorm free 
of charge with their clients to discover their needs. Subsequently the back office caters 
to these demands and delivers the actual services, ranging from accounting, 
organizational or law related advice. This group of firms also offer its clients portal 
based access to their files, which are updated regularly. In terms of marketing, this is 
done more proactively, however cold calling is still not fully accepted. 
 
Table 6: Firm specific responses relating to the role of the accountant* 
 Acquiescence Compromise Defiance Manipulation  
Role of the accountant  
Accountant 
to Advisor 
Core business K B, C, D, E, G, 
I 
A, H, J F 
Training J, K C, D, E, G, H  A, B, I 
(Advisory) 
Services 
Formal business 
development 
 E, K A, B, D, 
H, J 
I 
Range of 
services, 
specialist 
concept 
 B, D, E, G, H, 
I, K 
A, C, F, J  
Cold 
Acquisition 
B, C, H, J F, K D, G, I  
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life 
balance 
 B, C, E, G, H, 
J 
F, I, K  
Part time 
employment 
D E, G, H, I, K   
General 
mentality 
C A, D, G, H   
Automation 
of services 
Portals/ Online 
Service 
 E, I B, C, H,  J A, F 
XBRL D, K A, C, E, I B, F, J  
*Firms have not commented on all strategic choices. If that was the case they were not assigned a 
strategy. 
 
The second cluster of firms – firms B, C, E, G, H & I – is somewhat in between 
both logics. They perceive the need to change their service portfolio but develop these 
in an ad hoc manner with their core service, the consolidated account, as basis to 
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which these advise services are related. They also have not yet developed specialty 
services to a great extent, although some specialty services for certain industries are 
present. Similarly, in this group marketing efforts are increased but also here cold 
calling is not the preferred option. Finally, they do invest in automation of their 
services but they do not try to lead this change, rather they either choose to be 
followers or are so by necessity of insufficient size and/or resources. 
The final set of firms – firms D & K - still comply predominantly with the 
trustee logic. Although firm D perceives the need to develop new products and invests 
in them, it is not investing significantly in automation in order make the creation of 
annual accounts as efficient as possible. Firm D as well as Firm K, indicate that first 
thing really have to start hurting before anything will actually change.  
A common conclusion that can be drawn across all three categories is that 
they cater to the demands of the new generation of professionals. They all indicate 
placing emphasis on work/life balance and allowing part-time employment to some 
extent.  
The primary reason why firms differ with regards to the extent in which they 
embrace the new role of the account lays in the value they place on the old role. 
During the interviews, it became clear that strategies in relation to the changing role of 
the accountant were often adapted in the face of internal resistance by non-partner 
accountants and in some cases by partners. This is illustrated in table 7. 
 
Table 7: Locus of resistance to the changing role of the accountant 
 Accountants Partners 
Role of the accountant  
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business A, C, D, E, F, H, I, J, K K 
Training E, G, I, J  
(Advisory) 
Services 
Formal business 
development 
D, K K 
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition D, G, H, I, K G, H, I, K 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance  C, E, H, I 
General mentality A E 
Automation of 
services 
XBRL B B, D, K 
 
Partners indicated that non-partner accountants have problems adapting to 
the new role or actually resisted making this change. This has led a number of firms to 
compromise by embracing both roles to some extent. Others find ways to deal with 
this problem, like for example firm F which has created a front and back office. 
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However, if partners resist this changing role however (e.g. firm K), no change to any 
real extent is observed. The reason why few firms go for cold acquisition is that both 
accountant and partners resist this practice. As for work/life balance and the 
automation of services, partners also have their reservations. In terms of work/life 
balance and automation of services firms, like firm H, have indicated that this 
emphasis has gone too far and creates problems in service delivery and filling 
management positions. Finally, automation of services is often not an integral part of 
the strategy of a firm, as it requires heavy investments that partners sometimes are 
unwilling to make. This paints an interesting picture regarding internal representation:  
Most accountants seem to be hesitant to comply with issues that affect the professional 
role of the accountant, while some partners resist changes in the role of the accountant 
that affects their returns on investment. 
The changing organizational practices 
The conflicting logics do not only have influence on the role of the accountant but also 
on the organizational practices. Main drivers here are the imposed rules and 
regulation that demand high control of quality; developments in technology, which 
ask for a coherent system; the globalization of clients, which has led firms to join 
international networks, which in their turn demand certain changes in structural 
arrangements; and the demands of clients for more specialized advisory services has 
implications for ‘critical mass’.  In terms of the practices our data show that 
organizations adapt to respond to the differences in logics in four important ways: (1) 
Firms can maintain their traditional form of organizational governance through 
collegial decision making or place the management of the firm in the hands of a non-
professional or engage in directive decision making; (2) in order to stimulate the 
obtainment of new clients and successful delivery of new advisory services, 
performance-pay systems can be introduced; (3) more stringent quality demands make 
firms reevaluate their organizational structure; and (4) clients increasingly demand 
international services to which these firms need to respond. Table 8 provides an 
overview of firm responses with regards to organizational structures and practices. 
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Table 8: Firm specific responses relating to organizational structures and practices* 
 Acquiescence Compromise Defiance Manipulation  
Organization  
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/
board 
members 
A, B, D, F, G, I C, H, K  E, J 
Decision 
making/ 
voting  
C, H, K A, B, D, E, G, 
I 
J F 
Performance 
pay system 
Division 
profits 
A, E, G, H, I, J, 
K 
C B, D, F  
Evaluation 
functionality  
K C, F, H, I, J A, D, E  
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) 
Number of 
locations 
A, B, C, D, E, 
F, G, H, I, J, K 
   
Critical mass  C, D, F, G, H, 
I, K 
A, B, E J 
Separation 
audit & 
advisory 
A, K C B, D, E, 
F, H, I 
 
Service lines   A, H B, D, G, I  
Staff services  C A, B, D, 
F, G, H, I, 
J 
 
Internationaliz
ation 
Network E, J, K C, F, H, I G D 
Clients/ 
Services 
E, J B, F A, G D 
*Firms have not commented on all strategic choices. If that was the case they were not assigned a 
strategy. 
 
In terms of adaptations to existing organizational practices, we can discern 
two clusters of firms in the extent to which they comply with the old or the new logic. 
Within and between these clusters there again is great divergence in practices these 
firms adopt and resist. The first cluster of firms – firms E, F & J – has adapted most of 
their structures to the new commercial logic. Firms E and J have a non-professional 
managing partner, whereas firms F and J have abandoned collegial decision making in 
favor of more directive forms. Firm F also works with differential performance-pay 
systems for partners and has high levels of directive decision making. Firm J has 
decided to create more and smaller offices throughout their region.  
The second cluster, i.e. the remainder of the firms, makes little changes with 
regard to their organizational practices and continues to adhere to the demands of the 
trustee logic. Most firms still have partners who manage the firm through collegial 
decision making processes. These processes however, are slightly more directive to 
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reduce differences in implementation of strategic decisions. Additionally, they divide 
the profits evenly, and do not wish to merge their locations. They do however comply 
with the implications of the increased use of automation and specialization. They 
either have consolidated locations or try to grow the size of their offices in order to 
have critical mass. This would ensure returns on automation investments and create 
the possibility for specialization. They also have professionalized their organization by 
introducing staff departments and in order to increase their service quality they often 
separating audit from advice and structure their organization along service lines.  
Finally some firms decide to cater to the international wishes of their clients, most by 
joining an international network as they do not want to open up office abroad. The 
pattern of strategic responses in table 8 shows that our mid-tier firms draw more on 
the traditional trustee logic when concerned with issues concerning performance pay 
systems and the governance of their firm, while they relate to the commercial logic 
when strategic choices pertain organizational structure and internationalization. 
The reason why there is relatively little change in the practices and structure 
of most organizations can again be found in the level of internal resistance. This time 
however, resistance is solely located on the level of the partners. Especially with 
regard to the governance of the firm, almost all informants indicated that a non-
professional as managing partner would not be accepted as they believed a firm grasp 
of the profession is necessary to run the firm. Similarly most partners still want a say 
in the strategic direction of the firms, hence these firms still employ, for the majority, 
collective decision making processes. The sources of resistance are shown in table 9. 
Clearly our mid-tier firms are relying on their professional identity to a great extent 
and are not intending to change the basic structure and identity of their accounting 
firms. 
 
Table 9: Locus of resistance to the organizational structure and practices 
 Accountants Partners 
Organization  
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board members 
 A, B, D, F, G, I 
Decision making/voting   A, C, G, I 
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits  E, G, H 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number of locations  D 
Service lines   A 
Internationalization Network  D, G 
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2.5 Discussion 
In this study we set out to investigate organizational responses in the face of 
conflicting institutional logics by mid-tier accountancy firms. While most studies 
describe how institutional changes trigger institutional action by either elite 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) or maverick actors (Leblibici et al, 1991), we focused 
on the impact of institutional changes and the resulting conflicts between the trustee 
and commercial logic on mainstream actors in an organizational field. Based on 
secondary material and interviews with 34 top management level informants of eleven 
mid-tier accounting firms, we contribute to the literature on institutional change and 
conflicting logics and organizational responses in three ways.  
2.5.1 Punctuated fields & institutional bricolage 
First, we documented how significant institutional changes with regard to regulation, 
automation of services and changing clients’ demands have ended a period of stability 
for the mid-tier accounting firms. These environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982) are 
hypothesized by prior literature to result in revolutionary transformations of 
organizations rather than piecemeal evolutionary development (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). This is 
however not what we observe in our group of mid-tier firms. Mid-tier firms in our 
sample respond selectively, and on an independent basis to strategic and structural 
issues invoked by the new commercial logic. Most firms remain adherents to the old 
trustee logic in their industry in which they are still heavily embedded, which causes 
their resistance to change (Granovetter, 1985; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Maguire, 
2007; Oliver, 1997). The socialization of their professionals, the institutional 
prescriptions of the context in which the mid-tier firms operate, are reproduced 
(Anderson-Gough, Grey & Robson, 2000).  
 While most studies on organization responses as put forth by Oliver (1991) 
study adoption or non-adoption of specific issues (e.g. Ang & Cummings, 1997; Fiss & 
Zajac, 2004, 2006; Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Greening & Gray, 1994; Lounsbury, 2001, 
2007; Milliken, Martins & Morgan, 1998; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Thornton, 2002; 
Westphal et al., 1997), we look at all possible strategic responses not to a specific issue 
but rather elements of two conflicting institutional logics. In our data we see a 
fragmented implementation of elements of the new logic, not based on the internal 
coherence of the logics at hand, but dependent on the suitability of the elements for 
resolving concrete managerial challenges regarding specific strategic issues. As the 
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managerial challenges can differ between firms, we observe than firms choose 
elements differently from each other as such, the process of diffusion looks more like a 
process of institutional bricolage (Aldrich, 2010). Specifically, two main themes 
permeated discussions of change for the mid-tier firms: the role of the accountant and 
organizational changes. Because of the perceived independence of the strategic issues, 
firms drew differently on the elements of the competing institutional logics for each 
issue leading them to accept and reject different elements of what should be 
considered logical connected systems and structures. Therefore, in the case of mid-tier 
actors we do not see a general pattern like a shift from the old dominant logic to the 
newly introduced logic (e.g. Thornton, 2002; Zilber, 2002); the introduction of elements 
of a new logic into a dominant one (e.g. Glynn, 2000) or the hybridization of elements 
of both the old and new logic (e.g. Purdy & Gray, 2009; Colyvas & Powell, 2006; 
D’Aunno et al. 1991).  
2.5.2 Organization strategic responses and internal resistance 
Our second contribution is to the literature on failed diffusion of practices which has 
received little attention (Ansari et al., 2010) and the results in this study are one of the 
first to investigate the sources of failed attempts. We find that logics that are 
considered incompatible with the existing professional norms, or the strategic 
direction of the firm, result in resistance. The source of the resistance lies internal to the 
firms and can take two forms. First, when a proposed logic, such as having a non-
professional managing the firm, is at odds with the professional norm for autonomy 
this leads to resistance by partners. As a consequence our informants revert to the 
trustee logic to develop and support their strategic responses. Additionally, partners in 
these mid-tier firms have a greater ability to influence strategic actions through 
collegial forms of governance and decision making. Hence changing these structures 
and practices is difficult for three interrelated reasons (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988). 
First, change in organizations is unlikely as its members are caught in the current 
design and underlying values that the possibility of change is not even considered. 
Second, when this need for change is perceived however, change will not occur as it is 
then often subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. The outcome of which mostly results in 
postponing change until it becomes unavoidable. Secondly, we find indications of 
differences in alignment of partners and non-partner accountants with the different 
institutional logics. In some cases top management of our mid-tier firms does see the 
merit of the proposed change but is unable to align its internal constituency. In case of 
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issues related to more operational practices firms base their choices in the novel 
commercial logic. Examples are the separation of audit & advisory skills and the 
internationalization of clients and services. Non-partnered accountants mainly resist 
these practices (Cooper & Robson, 2006). In professional services firms, the individual 
professional’s job description and identity are directly informed by the standards of 
the profession that to a large extent also make up the organization’s institutional 
environment (Freidson, 2001; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005; Scott, 2008). Furthermore it is part of the professional’s identity and 
responsibility to actively maintain the professional institution, thereby resisting the 
commercial logic. In their article, in which Greenwood and Suddaby (2006: 44) 
documented organizational change with the big 4, they asked: “how influential are 
professional norms when required to stretch across very different organizational 
members, ranging from elite, central firms, to modestly sized, local firms?” We would 
argue that they are quite strong for both partnered and non-partnered professionals in 
mid-tier firms.  
2.5.3 Generalizability of PSF research 
Our third contribution is to the literature on PSFs by addressing the issue of 
generalizability (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). The changes identified by Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006) cannot straightforwardly be extrapolated to the rest of the actors in the 
accounting industry. While the big 4 in Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) research are 
operating in an international arena, dealing with multinational clients in a supra-
national arena, our mid-tier firms are well-established in their national professional 
arena and our findings indicate that professional norms are stronger with these group.  
We clearly see the group of mid-tier firms responding to the conflicting institutional 
logics that have been recognized in previous research on the big 4 accounting firms. 
However, while these firms had relatively comprehensive / consistent agenda pushing 
the commercial logic, our study suggests that organizational responses to conflicting 
or changing logics may be subject to different dynamics across different sets of actors 
within an organizational field. 
 In all, our study highlights the complexity and richness of the institutional force 
field in which mid-tier accounting organizations operate. This makes easy and linear 
explanations of transitions from, for example professional partnerships to managed 
professional businesses simplistic. Our findings sensitize us to the incremental nature 
of institutional change and to the importance of the internal organizational dynamics 
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for understanding organizational responses to institutional pressures. As such our 
study is a call for more fine-grained analyses of the dynamics guiding processes of 
institutional change and evolution. 
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 Chapter 3. Drivers of professional service firm 
performance2 
 
Abstract 
Current ideas on the drivers of professional service firm performance are largely 
grounded in a view of those firms as professional partnerships, highlighting the role of 
human and reputational capital. Over the past two decades, however, PSFs have 
become significantly larger through mergers and acquisitions and more diversified 
through internationalization and alliance network creation. To accommodate these 
changes, many PSFs have adopted features of the managed professional business, 
formalizing their governance and adopting strategic planning. Our study is the first to 
assess the ramifications of these developments by offering a concurrent test of the 
effects of human and reputational capital as well as formal governance and planning 
on PSF performance. We also highlight the relevance of contingency-theoretical 
reasoning to the emerging theory of the PSF, as the relative importance of the drivers 
of PSF performance changes considerably as these organizations grow and diversify. 
Empirically, our results are based on a study of 354 Dutch law firms, combining both 
survey and archival data. 
3.1 Introduction 
Professional service firms (PSFs) are organizations which predominantly rely on 
human and reputational capital, rather than financial or technological capital, to offer 
their clients customized, knowledge-intensive services (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; 
Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & Deephouse, 2005; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). PSFs play a 
pivotal role in modern economies for three reasons. First, several PSFs rank high 
amongst the world’s largest and most affluent businesses (Aharoni, 1993; Greenwood 
et al., 2005). In service-intensive, post-industrial economies, law firms like Clifford 
Chance and Baker & McKenzie, and accounting firms like KPMG and 
                                                             
2 This chapter is co-authored with Prof.Dr. Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens and Prof.Dr. J. (Hans) van 
Oosterhout. A previous version of this paper was presented at the Academy of Management 
consortium in Chicago, 2010. This paper is currently under review at Journal of Management Studies. 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers, are the new ‘blue chip’ firms realizing both stable growth 
and predictable profits. Second, PSFs are “knowledge engines” (Lorsch & Tierney, 
2002: 15) which set work standards for, and disseminate innovations amongst their 
clients (Alvesson, 1995). They contribute to their clients’ value creation processes and 
alleviate their needs for expert help through the application of professional knowledge 
to unique organizational problems (Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999; Løwendahl, 
Revang, & Fosstenløkken, 2001). Third, PSFs function as “gatekeepers” by mediating 
complicated business transactions and by providing assurance on other firms’ business 
processes and information disclosures. They do so, more specifically, by acting as 
reputational intermediaries who vouch for the quality and legitimacy of their client’s 
actions and communications by pledging their reputation (Coffee, 2006: 2). In light of 
their importance to current business practice, it is unsurprising that a growing 
contingent of organizational scholars is developing an interest in uncovering the 
drivers of PSF performance (French, Kelly, & Harrison, 2004; Greenwood et al., 2005; 
Greenwood, Deephouse, & Li, 2007; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Von 
Nordenflycht, 2007). 
In delivering their services, PSFs face a number of discretionary choices about 
their organizational design (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). As 
these choices are to some extent interdependent, they can repeatedly be observed 
across populations of PSFs in the form of archetypical configurations of properties 
(Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1994; Malos & Campion, 2000). Historically, the 
organizational design of most PSFs approached that of the professional partnership. 
The archetype of this organizational design was first codified by Greenwood, Hinings, 
and Brown (1990), who identified four of its properties. First, senior members of such 
partnerships continue to be involved in the actual delivery of professional services. 
Second, all professional members routinely apply difficult-to-codify knowledge to 
complex problems. Third, these members enjoy levels of autonomy in organizing their 
work processes that are not commonly observed in other organizations (Hall, 1968; 
Montagna, 1968). Fourth, decision-making in professional partnerships is 
decentralized, to foster the tailoring of professional services to specific client demands 
(Greenwood et al., 1990). As all four of these properties critically hinge on the quality 
of the professional staff, the performance drivers identified by students of professional 
partnerships primarily involve human capital (Hitt et al., 2001) and the reputational 
capital necessary to recruit top talents in the labor market and signal their quality to 
clients (Greenwood et al., 2005). 
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In more recent years, however, a subset of PSFs has begun to challenge the 
dominant features of the professional partnership archetype, in response to demands 
for greater efficiency spurred on by intensified competition and deregulation 
(Malhotra & Morris, 2009). A choice set of firms in the fields of both accounting 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) and law (Pinnington & Morris, 2003) has adopted a 
different but likewise coherent set of properties facilitating professional service 
delivery, which center on a greater commercial orientation and more conscious 
management. This alternate archetype was first codified and labeled the managed 
professional business by Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, and Brown (1996). It similarly 
has four core properties. First, while its senior members remain at least nominally 
competent in performing the productive labor of those they supervise (Freidson, 1984), 
they increasingly take on purely managerial roles. Second, while the delivery of 
complex knowledge remains its core activity, the managed professional business 
increasingly strives to commodify that knowledge, thereby reducing it to a routinized 
and codified product (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). Third, organizations adopting 
this archetype encroach upon the autonomy of the individual professional, as their 
management in general becomes more heavy-handed and increasingly establishes 
formal bureaucratic control over professional work (Leicht & Fennell, 1997). Fourth, in 
managed professional businesses the decision authority related to issues like client 
activities and resource allocation becomes increasingly centralized, limiting the 
decision powers of non-managing members (Malhotra & Morris, 2009). As these four 
properties are all part of a process whereby lateral, peer-based controls are being 
supplanted by hierarchical managerial controls, the hallmark of managed professional 
businesses is the adoption of formal systems in the areas of organizational governance 
and strategy implementation (Cooper et al., 1996; Pinnington & Morris, 2003). 
In practice, however, we do not readily observe the wholesale replacement of 
the professional partnership by the managed professional business. Rather, we observe 
sedimentation: “the persistence of values, ideas, and practices, even when the formal 
structures and processes seem to change, and even when there may be incoherence” 
(Cooper et al., 1996: 624). On the one hand, organizational design choices associated 
with the professional partnership remain important for all PSFs. For example, Morris 
and Pinnington (1998) have shown that a time-honored human resource management 
practice like the up-or-out promotion rule is also often observed in managed 
professional businesses, as it allows them to control salary costs by employing younger 
professionals more cheaply. Similarly, in a study on the largest U.S. law firms, Hitt and 
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his associates (2001) found that human capital remains an important performance 
driver, even though this group of firms simultaneously showed significant strategic 
prowess in the form of aggressive client, geographic, and service diversification. On 
the other hand, MPB features – like formal governance and strategic planning – have 
definitely diffused beyond the ‘elite’ firms that once pioneered these practices (cf. 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). Professionals in nearly 
every conceivable organizational setting are now increasingly confronted with formal 
bureaucratic controls (Freidson, 1984; Leicht & Fennell, 1997). In short, senior members 
of PSFs enjoy considerable discretion when making organizational design choices to 
facilitate professional service delivery, which often results in sedimented organizations 
combining features of both the professional partnership and managed professional 
business archetypes (Cooper et al., 1996; Empson & Chapman, 2006). 
Yet the issue of sedimentation raises important but as of yet unanswered 
questions about the performance of contemporary PSFs. First, is the diffusion of 
organizational features associated with ‘elite’ managed professional businesses across 
a wider population of PSFs conducive to their performance? At present, this question 
is still very much open. This is not only because a systematic test of the contribution of 
formal governance and strategic planning to PSF performance is still lacking. While 
these features are sometimes assumed to contribute to PSF efficiency (Cooper et al., 
1996), they may alternatively jeopardize performance by disgruntling professionals 
through an assault on their autonomy (Von Nordenflycht, 2010) and by upsetting the 
fragile balance of understanding between various groups of internal stakeholders 
(Empson & Chapman, 2006). Second, how important are the various drivers of PSF 
performance relative to one another? Various groups of scholars have theorized and 
occasionally tested the effects of important performance drivers in isolation. In 
particular, prior studies have respectively highlighted the importance of human 
capital (Hitt et al., 2001), firm reputation (Greenwood et al., 2006), strategic planning 
(French et al., 2004), and formal governance (Empson & Chapman, 2006). Yet a 
comprehensive test comparing the magnitude of these drivers concurrently is still 
forthcoming, even though these features tend to occur in conjunction in sedimented 
PSFs. Third, which organizational characteristics determine the contingent value of 
these performance drivers to PSFs (cf. Greenwood et al., 2006; Hitt et al., 2001)? 
Structural contingency scholars (Donaldson, 2001) would likely predict that formal 
governance and strategic planning are more important as drivers of performance in 
larger, more diversified PSFs. Yet the applicability of contingency theory to PSFs is 
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uncertain. PSFs can have several organizational characteristics, like being organized as 
a federal structure of semi-autonomous practice areas (Anand, Gardner, & Morris, 
2007) and utilizing a core technology that is strikingly similar across organizations of 
different sizes (Greenwood et al., 1994), that make them less susceptible to 
contingency-theoretical explanations.  
We set out to address these questions through an empirical study amongst 792 
lawyers admitted to the Dutch Bar and representing 354 law firms. We combine 
archival and self-reported survey data, and use maximum likelihood structural 
equations modeling as our analytical approach. Our study has three intended 
contributions to the organizational literature on PSFs. We are the first to offer a test of 
the potential contribution of organizational design features associated with managed 
professional businesses (formal governance and strategic planning) to PSF 
performance. This empirically corroborates the efforts of a group of scholars who have 
previously theorized on the importance of these characteristics to the functioning of 
contemporary, often sedimented, PSFs (Cooper et al., 1996; Empson & Chapman, 2006; 
Pinnington & Morris, 2003). Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive test of four of 
the most salient drivers of PSF performance: in addition to formal governance and 
strategic planning, we also concurrently scrutinize human capital and firm reputation. 
This integrates the efforts of prior scholars interested in PSF performance, who have 
thus far largely tested these factors in isolation (French et al., 2004; Greenwood et al., 
2005; Hitt et al., 2001). Third, we develop and test arguments rooted in structural 
contingency theory (Donaldson, 2001), explaining how the contribution of formal 
governance and strategic planning is dependent on the size and level of diversification 
of PSFs. Hereby we contribute to the efforts of researchers to understand the effect of 
organizational factors on core business and administrative processes in PSFs (Anand et 
al., 2007; Empson, 2001; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses 
3.2.1 Human capital and PSF performance  
All PSFs, professional partnerships and managed professional businesses alike, 
depend on human capital – “the knowledge, skills, and abilities residing within and 
utilized by individuals” (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005: 451) – for the delivery of high 
quality customized services to their clients (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Grosse, 2000; 
Chapter 3 
 
58
Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck & Shimizu, 2006; Løwendahl, 2005; Maister, 2003; Nachum, 
1996). Human capital is so essential to PSFs because professional knowledge is largely 
inalienable from its human carriers (Dow, 2003), in spite of ongoing efforts to 
commodify it (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). Professional knowledge consists to a 
large degree of the ability to apply publicly available knowledge to different 
individual cases, which involves a significant amount of human creativity and 
judgment. This makes it a tacit resource (Szulanski, 1996) that is difficult to codify in 
rules, procedures, or even expert systems. As a result, human capital is a non-
substitutable yet vital input for PSFs, as it cannot be replaced by more generic 
knowledge resources (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). 
The dependence of PSFs on human capital is aggravated by the fact that there 
is significant and difficult to bridge variability in the quality of the human capital 
employed by PSFs. For example, individuals graduating from elite institutions are 
perceived as having obtained the best possible pre-experience training (Hitt et al., 
2001), the value of which is buttressed by their access to the elite social networks that 
such credentials provide (D’Aveni, 1989). After their entry into the labor force, these 
quality differentials increase even further as professionals continue to develop their 
human capital through on-the-job training, usually in the form of an apprenticeship 
which allows them to ‘learn by doing’ (Pisano, 1994). The quality of the mentoring 
they receive in the initial stages of their career and the challenges deriving from the 
cases on which they work further increase the differences in value their human capital 
represents (Hitt et al., 2001). The most talented professionals with the greatest earning 
potential, often referred to as ‘stars’ (Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Lorsch & Tierney, 2002) 
and ‘rainmakers’ (Anand et al., 2007; Pinnington & Morris, 2003), are therefore also a 
durably scare resource to PSFs, allowing only the PSFs that control such resources to 
take on the most challenging assignments and develop highly lucrative client 
relationships (Hitt et al., 2001). 
In the increasingly competitive environment of the legal profession (Phillips, 
2001), the reliance on non-substitutable and scarce human capital creates specific 
challenges for PSFs. First, these firms compete intensively to hire the best talents from 
each cohort of recently graduated professionals (Sherer & Lee, 2002). Second, PSFs 
must proactively maintain their human resource base, because professionals are highly 
mobile and are therefore often referred to as ‘walking assets’ (Spar, 1997). Turnover of 
key professionals can have serious repercussions for PSFs, not only because valuable 
knowledge leaves the firm with each departing professional, but also because 
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professionals often take their clients with them when they leave (Alvesson & 
Robertson, 2006). Because PSFs are differentially successful in acquiring and retaining 
their human capital base, they also differ in their ability to deliver value to their clients 
and secure revenues from them. We therefore expect that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: In PSFs, the quality of the human capital base 
will be positively associated with organizational 
performance. 
3.2.2 Reputational capital and PSF performance  
Another performance driver that is commonly recognized in the PSF literature is firm-
level reputational capital (Greenwood et al., 2005; Hitt et al., 2006; Von Nordenflycht, 
2010). Firm reputation is a socially constructed evaluation of the firm that emerges as 
its stakeholders subject it to social comparisons with peer organizations on a variety of 
dimensions like quality, esteem, and favorableness (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). 
Reputation is important to all firms, as it allows them to acquire and manage critical 
resource dependencies in financial, labor, and product markets (Deephouse & Carter, 
2005). Yet it is especially significant in PSFs, due to the intangible nature of the services 
they provide and the centrality of reputation-sensitive human capital in their 
organizational resource base (Greenwood et al., 2005). 
Reputational capital can explain performance differentials between PSFs for 
four related reasons (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Grosse, 2000; Nachum, 1996). First, 
due to the intangible character of the services provided by PSFs, it is hard for 
prospective clients to decide which PSF would be able to best cater to their needs. This 
problem is often referred to as the ‘client choice problem’ (Goode, 1957). As a result, 
prospective clients tend to select PSFs on the basis of their reputation rather than on 
specific knowledge of their abilities. Second, even for existing clients it can be difficult 
to assess the quantity of inputs provided and the quality of services delivered by PSFs 
(Alvesson & Robertson, 2006; Gilson & Mnookin, 1985; Starbuck, 1992), due to 
knowledge and information asymmetries between client and professional. Clients 
therefore derive their confidence in professionals’ efforts and abilities primarily from 
the reputation of the PSF that employs them, as other forms of ‘social proof’ (Rao, 
Greve, & Davis, 2001) of their competence are in scarce supply. Third, having a 
superior reputation allows PSFs to hire the best newly minted professionals, charge 
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premium prices for the services they render, and lower their marketing costs 
(Greenwood et al., 2005; Podolny, 1993, 1994; Teece, 2003). Fourth, as is true for human 
capital, reputation can explain performance differentials between PSFs (Greenwood & 
Empson, 2003; Hitt et al., 2006; Maister, 2003) because it represents a firm-specific 
intangible asset that is hard to acquire and difficult to imitate by competitors (Barney 
& Hesterly, 1996; Combs & Ketchen Jr., 1999; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). We therefore 
expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In PSFs, the quality of the reputational capital 
base will be positively associated with organizational 
performance. 
3.2.3 Formal governance and PSF performance.  
Changes in economic and social trends, government policies, and legislation 
(Løwendahl, 2005; Maister, 2003; Nachum, 1996), as well as financial, factor, and 
product market pressures (Cooper, Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1998), have 
strained the traditional partnership structure in PSFs (Empson, 2007). Traditionally, 
collegial decision-making, self-supervision, and face-to-face monitoring by peers were 
seen as particularly suited for PSFs, due to the nature of their human capital inputs 
and intangible outputs (Mills & Posner, 1982). As long as professionals realized 
satisfactory levels of billable hours without getting into trouble, they were largely free 
to exercise their own judgment and were granted considerable autonomy by senior 
colleagues (Cooper et al., 1996; Malos & Campion, 2000; Pinnington & Morris, 2003; 
Sherer, 1995; Wholey, 1985). Insofar as disciplining professionals was necessary, this 
was done mostly informally by their peers or more formally by professional 
associations, which typically have the power to strike individual professionals from 
the formal register with corresponding losses of privileges and livelihood (Freidson, 
1984).  
Yet increases in the size and level of diversification of PSFs have eroded the 
functionality of these types of informal governance practices, as they require frequent 
and intensive face-to-face contact between professionals. Such interactions become 
increasingly difficult as PSFs grow and diversify, making the professional partnership 
a progressively unwieldy template for modeling PSFs’ governance structure 
(Greenwood & Empson, 2003). Furthermore, growth and diversification tend to 
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increase the heterogeneity of partner preferences, which interferes with consensual 
decision-making (Hansmann, 1996). As a result, a sizeable group of PSFs – which is 
hard to quantify but which numerically certainly exceeds the relatively narrow ranks 
of ‘elite’ firms (cf. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001) – has 
begun to implement more formalized governance practices (Freidson, 1984; Leicht & 
Fennell, 1997). These include formalized decision-making (Cooper et al., 1996), 
centralized operational and quality controls (Pinnington & Morris, 2003), and 
management by financial targets (Cooper et al., 1996). 
One group of scholars has argued that these formal governance practices are 
likely to increase the efficiency and performance of PSFs (Cooper et al., 1996; Hitt et al., 
2006). For one, as these practices are a substitute for face-to-face governance in large, 
diversified PSFs, they can safeguard the manageability and accountability of firms that 
are on a strong growth trajectory (Anand et al., 2007; Hitt et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
more centralized management by a limited number of managing partners or even a 
board that includes non-professionals frees up expensive and productive senior 
workers, as it relieves them of the obligation of being involved in the day-to-day 
running of the firm (Cooper et al., 1996; Hinings, Brown, & Greenwood, 1991). Finally, 
although PSFs do not suffer from the type of agency problems resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control in public firms, they could still benefit from more 
formal governance practices to curb the type of inter-partner conflicts that are 
associated with increased partner heterogeneity in growing and diversifying PSFs 
(Morris & Pinnington, 1998). It might therefore be expected that:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: In PSFs, the adoption of formal governance 
practices will be positively associated with 
organizational performance. 
 
Yet the effects of governance on PSF performance are not unambiguous. A 
different group of scholars has highlighted at least three detrimental effects the 
formalization of control in PSFs can have on their performance. First, both Løwendahl 
(2005) and Von Nordenflycht (2010) use the famous ‘cat herding’ metaphor to describe 
the governance of professional workers. As professionals are trained and socialized to 
value and protect their autonomy, they can become disgruntled when they are made 
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to surrender part of it to bureaucratic control systems. A different but related concern 
is voiced by Frey (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey & Jegen, 2001). Many 
professionals are instilled with a strong sense of professional ethic and intrinsic 
motivation, due to both self-selection in job choice and prolonged professional 
socialization. When confronted with control through external interventions like formal 
monitoring or incentives, their ethical standards and intrinsic drive may erode as their 
professional motivation is crowded-out. Finally, Empson and Chapman (2006) stress 
that the type of informal, peer-centered controls used in the professional partnership 
have evolved over a prolonged period of time to strike a delicate balance between the 
potentially competing claims of three critical stakeholder groups: owners, 
professionals, and clients. The introduction of more formal types of governance could 
put strain on the delicate balance of stakeholder interests and relations in PSFs. This is 
the case, for example, when professionals defy the call by owners for stronger formal 
controls or when clients feel that professionals’ expert knowledge and independence is 
compromised by business acumen and strategic prowess. As all three of these concerns 
might strain PSFs’ performance, it might alternatively also be expected that: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: In PSFs, the adoption of formal governance 
practices will be negatively associated with 
organizational performance. 
3.2.4 Strategic planning and PSF performance 
PSFs have traditionally paid little attention to formal strategic planning activities 
(Greenwood et al., 1990). In the words of Cooper and his associates, PSFs used to be 
organizations with “weak strategic capability, coupled with low analytical emphasis” 
(Cooper et al., 1996: 628). In the absence of more formalized planning, the strategy of a 
PSF can broadly be understood as the aggregate outcome of the partners’ individual 
pursuits. Important decisions are then made locally, with little eye for the possible 
benefits of engaging in joint courses of action (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002; Pinnington & 
Morris, 2003). More recently, however, PSFs have begun to recognize the value of 
strategic planning and have been rationalizing and centralizing the way they make 
long-term decisions. Compared to the recent past, PSFs can therefore now be typified 
by “more formal strategic planning, controls over quality of work and productivity of 
staff, greater emphasis on coordinated marketing activities and more elaborate and 
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centralized financial systems” (Morris & Pinnington, 1998: 76). This has turned PSFs 
into sedimented organizations, in which such rational new practices co-exist with 
traditional, more informal and collegial practices (Cooper et al., 1996). 
Strategic planning has at least three broad advantages for PSFs. First, without 
conscious planning, organizations become vulnerable to strategic myopia. Unless they 
routinely engage in practices that help them envision possible future states of the 
world, and how these will affect their organization as a whole, decision makers tend to 
overlook the future, non-local environments, and prior failures (Levinthal & March, 
1993). Second, strategic planning can help PSFs improve the effectiveness of their 
resource allocation processes (Hitt et al., 2001). Like other firms, PSFs are most 
profitable when they put their human and reputational capital to productive use in 
projects where their expected marginal returns are highest. But leaving such allocation 
decisions in the hands of individual partners may lead to sub-optimal outcomes, as 
partners may hoard their best resources to maximize private gains (Lorsch & Tierney, 
2002). Third, in lieu of formal planning, the boundaries of PSFs are determined 
endogenously, as new practice areas emerge and are embedded in PSFs through 
internal career and growth trajectories (Anand et al., 2007). This can cause PSFs to keep 
certain activities in house, even if other organizations could perform them at lower 
cost or more effectively. Strategic planning can then help PSFs concentrate on their 
core strengths and leverage these profitably by finding alliance partners for activities 
in geographical areas or stages in the service delivery chain in which they do not excel 
(Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998; Koza & Lewin, 1999). These 
reasons lead us to expect the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: In PSFs, the adoption of formal strategic 
planning practices will be positively associated with 
organizational performance. 
 
But the benefits of strategic planning to PSFs are not undisputed. First, 
professionals have traditionally perceived of strategic planning “as irrelevant or even 
detrimental to success of their firms” (Løwendahl, 2005: 77), often under the pretense 
that it would lead to too much rigidity (Miller & Cardinal, 1994). In highly 
institutionalized fields such as law and accounting, professionals remain individually 
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responsible for their acts and omissions within the framework provided by 
professional associations. The ‘political fit’ (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010) between the 
practice of strategic planning, which calls for centralization and surrendering local 
decision autonomy, and professional work, which draws towards decentralization and 
preservation of autonomy, can therefore be poor, causing the rejection of the practice. 
But even if political resistance can be overcome, the problem remains that most models 
of strategic planning are developed for public firms that do not specialize in 
professional services. Given the substantial differences in terms of work organization, 
governance, and accountability relationships between ‘classic PSFs’ (Von 
Nordenflycht, 2010) and public firms (cf. Greenwood et al., 2007; Von Nordenflycht, 
2007), it remains uncertain as to whether extant planning systems can be instrumental 
to the rationalization of decision making and resources allocation processes in PSFs. 
These alternate reasons might therefore also produce the following outcome: 
 
Hypothesis 4b: In PSFs, the adoption of formal strategic 
planning practices will be negatively associated with 
organizational performance. 
3.2.5 PSF size and diversification as critical contingencies 
In response to increased competition, client pressure, and regulatory changes, PSFs 
have considerably altered their business models over the last two decades (Greenwood 
& Suddaby, 2006). In pursuit of economies of scale in product development, client 
handling, and service delivery, both ‘elite’ and mid-tier PSFs have engaged in 
aggressive merger and acquisition strategies (Empson, 2001; Greenwood et al., 1994). 
Furthermore, the client organizations of many PSFs have internationalized 
considerably in the recent past, and they expected their professional service providers 
to follow suit. These changing client expectations have lead PSFs to set up offices or 
search for network partners in new international contexts (Aharoni, 1993; Hitt et al., 
2006). Finally, to leverage their core strengths and to retain organizational flexibility in 
uncertain competitive and regulatory environments, PSFs have also sought potentially 
reversible associations with peer organizations, resulting in constellations of strategic 
alliances (Jones et al., 1998; Koza & Lewin, 1999). Together, these developments mark 
the end of the era in which PSFs were “an oasis of organizational stability” (Gilson & 
Mnookin, 1988: 567) in the organizational landscape. 
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But these business model alterations simultaneously put pressure on the 
informal type of control and decision processes that long typified PSFs (Empson & 
Chapman, 2006; Greenwood & Empson, 2003). Mergers and acquisitions have made 
PSFs larger and more heterogeneous than they ever were, making their consensual and 
collective decision-making routines increasingly unwieldy (Empson, 2001; Greenwood 
et al., 1994; Hansmann, 1996). To accommodate heterogeneity and prevent it from 
having negative performance implications, formal governance and strategic planning 
routines needed to be put in place which concentrated decision-making powers in the 
hands of a select group of managing partners. Similarly, international diversification 
has exposed PSFs to multiple and often contradicting institutional logics, and has 
forced them to do business in contexts and cultures hitherto unknown for them 
(Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). To maintain the effectiveness of an 
internationally diversified practice, PSFs had to implement planning systems through 
which they could obtain appropriate information from locally operating partners and 
practice groups, and governance systems through which these local actors could be 
held accountable if they failed to meet their targets (Hitt et al., 2006). Dealing with 
alliance partners, finally, has forced PSFs to develop policies for curbing unwanted 
knowledge and client transfers and for dealing with potential partner opportunism, 
like formal periodic reviews of partners’ contribution toward organizational objectives 
(Jones et al., 1998; Koza & Lewin, 1999). In short, we expect that both the adoption by 
and the performance benefits to PSFs of formal governance and strategic planning 
practices will increase with their size and level of diversification. See the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The relationships between PSF size and PSF 
diversification on the one hand, and performance on 
the other, will be positively mediated by the adoption 
of formalized governance and strategic planning 
practices. 
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3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Sample and data collection 
We tested our hypotheses on a representative sample of Dutch law firms. Studying 
law firms is appropriate in light of the hypotheses we aspire to test, as these firms are 
‘classic’ PSFs (Von Nordenflycht, 2010), of which at least a fraction is moving in the 
direction of sedimented organizational structures through the adoption of formal 
governance and strategic planning practices (Cooper et al., 1996; Empson, 2007). For 
Dutch law firms, archival data on organizational variables is difficult to obtain for two 
reasons. First, like the legal systems of all other countries with a civil law tradition, 
Dutch law explicitly forbids external ownership of law firms, such that they are 
subjected to only rudimentary disclosure obligations. In practice, this means that only 
a summary of an annual report will have to be submitted annually with the Chamber 
of Commerce. Second, again similar to other civil law jurisdictions, Dutch corporate 
law does not provide for the legal form of the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP). In 
practice, most Dutch law firms emulate the LLP form through the construction of a 
limited holding company consisting of many different limited company daughters, 
often for the business of each individual partner. This has the unfortunate effect of 
exempting these limited daughter companies from disclosure obligations altogether. 
We therefore relied mostly on self-reported data, developing a survey instrument to 
collect first-hand information on PSFs. Yet for a select set of variables, including our 
dependent variable, we did manage to obtain archival data, thereby mitigating 
problems related to common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). 
We chose an online survey design using Global Park survey administration 
software (www.globalpark.com). Our research was endorsed by the Dutch Bar 
Association (www.advocatenorde.nl). It provided us with a mailing list of all lawyers 
admitted to the bar in the Netherlands, which contained the valid email addresses of 
7903 lawyers working for 3258 independent law firms. We deleted all 1580 single-
lawyer firms from the list, as the organizational practices we intended to study were 
not relevant for them, leaving us with a sampling frame of 6323 lawyers representing 
1678 law firms. We sent out two waves of electronic surveys. The first wave resulted in 
440 fully completed responses. The second wave was sent out as a reminder two 
weeks later, and provided us with an additional 352 responses. Total response was 
thus 792, accounting for an individual response rate of 12.5 percent. Jointly, these 
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lawyers represented 354 law firms, leaving us with a 21.2 percent firm-level response 
rate. The breakdown of this firm-level sample over the various size strata represented 
in our sampling frame is provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Sample description 
Organization size Sampling framea In sample Percentage 
2 – 5 lawyers 1187 124 10.4% 
6 – 10 lawyers 284 99 34.9% 
11 – 60 lawyers 183 107 58.5% 
> 60 lawyers 24 24 100% 
3.3.2 Measures 
To the largest extent possible, we relied on psychometric scales that were used and 
validated in prior research, as recommended by several experts (Babbie, 2009; Dillman, 
2007). In case appropriate scales were not available in the literature, we relied on 
canonical scale development processes to ensure construct validity (Hinkin, 1998; 
Nunnally, 1978; Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991). These processes involved: (1) inductive 
and deductive item generation; (2) content validity assessment and item reduction 
with the help of an expert panel consisting of 10 academics specialized in strategy and 
organization and 10 lawyers; (3) internal consistency assessment; (4) confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) for goodness of fit assessment; and (5) convergent/discriminant 
validity assessment. All multi-item scales were measured with seven-point Likert 
items, where 1 always represented ‘strongly disagree’ and 7 ‘strongly agree’.  
Our survey instrument consisted of 44 items representing 5 latent variables. In 
survey research using SEM, there are three ways in which items can be linked to latent 
constructs (Kishton & Widaman, 1994; Williams & O’Boyle, 2008). First, the total 
disaggregation approach considers all items individually as indicators. Second, the 
partial disaggregation method combines small sets of items to form indicators known 
as ‘parcels.’ Third, the total aggregation method combines all items into a single 
indicator, using reliability information to control for random measurement error. In a 
recent review article, Williams and O’Boyle (2008) found that 33 out of 75 articles 
published in journals like AMJ, JAP, & JOM relied on a parceling strategy. This partial 
disaggregation strategy is preferable for the analysis of large and complex models 
containing dozens of items, especially when the goal of the research is to understand 
the relationships between latent variables (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 
2002).  
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Parceling is a preferable approach for two reasons. First, individual items 
often have lower reliability and communality as well as smaller common-to-unique 
variances than parcels (Coffman & MacCallum, 2005; Little et al., 2002). Second, 
parceling reduces the number of parameters to be estimated, which supports the 
efficiency of estimation routines (Kishton & Widaman, 1994; Williams & O’Boyle, 
2008). Based on the large number of items in our survey instrument, and given that 
our primary research interest is in the relationship between latent constructs, we opted 
for parceling. We constructed our parcels using the so-called domain 
representativeness approach (Kishton & Widaman, 1994), in which individual items 
are divided over a smaller number of parcels (in our case always three) on the basis of 
their standardized factor loadings on the first dimension extracted through CFA. The 
item with the highest factor loading on the first dimension is assigned to parcel 1, the 
second-highest to parcel 2, the third- and fourth-highest to parcel 3, and so forth. This 
approach is called the domain representative approach because the parcels thus 
constructed come to represent the broad domain of content captured by the latent 
variable, rather than any specific sub-dimension of it (Kishton & Widaman, 1994).  
Dependent variable: Law firm performance. Because law firms serve the 
interests of multiple stakeholders simultaneously (Brickson, 2005; Empson & 
Chapman, 2006), law firm performance is a multidimensional construct. We therefore 
operationalized it as a latent variable, incorporating archival indicators for those 
dimensions of performance for which they were available and self-report indicators for 
those dimensions for which they were not. The first performance dimension we 
tapped into was the returns law firms generate for their owners, which is commonly 
operationalized in PSF studies as profits per partner (cf. Greenwood et al., 2005; Malos 
& Campion, 2000). Archival scores on this indicator were derived from a trade 
publication (Coppes, 2008), complemented with write-in responses to a corresponding 
survey item. To reduce the impact of outliers, we used a natural log transformation of 
this indicator. The second performance dimension we included was organizational 
growth, measured as the two-year percentage-wise increase (or decrease) in the 
number of lawyers employed by the firm. Next to profits per partner, organizational 
growth is a complementary indicator for PSF performance because it captures a firm’s 
ability to increase future business. Because in professional services, increases in 
business will need to be met by increased employment of professionals able to deliver 
them, the main strategic challenge for PSFs is to balance growth with profitability 
(Maister, 2003). Growth is additionally important to retain human capital, because it 
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determines the opportunities for non-partnered associates to become co-owners of the 
firm (Malos & Campion, 2000; Morris & Pinnington, 1998). Archival scores for this 
indicator were obtained from the Dutch Bar Association. Two further performance 
dimensions we tapped into were the ability of the firm to deliver value to its clients, 
and the overall efficiency of its organizational processes. To capture these final two 
dimensions of the law firm performance construct, we developed 8 new survey items 
(see Appendix A), using both inductive item generation based on conversations with 
our expert panel and deductive item generation based on treatments of PSF 
performance in the literature (e.g. Løwendahl, 2005). The resulting 8-item parceled 
construct showed sufficient reliability (ǂ = .73).  
Independent variables: Human capital. With our multi-item measure of 
human capital we aim to assess the quality of the expertise, knowledge, and skills 
present in a law firm. The scale developed by Subramaniam & Youndt (2005), based on 
earlier work on human capital (Schultz, 1961; Snell & Dean, 1992), proved to be 
operationally suitable (see Appendix A). CFA empirically confirmed the 
unidimensionality and reliability of this scale (ǂ = .88). Moreover, all standardized 
factor loadings exceeded .70 and were statistically significant (p < .05). 
Law firm reputation. Firm reputation was measured using the four-item scale 
developed by Combs & Ketchen Jr. (1999; see Appendix A). CFA confirmed the scale’s 
unidimensionality and reliability (ǂ = .89). Three of the four standardized factor 
loadings exceeded .80 (one item scored .64). All were statistically significant (p < .05). 
Formal governance. Morris and Pinnington (1998) found that PSFs are moving 
beyond self-supervision towards more formal forms of governance. They found that 
budgeting and internal control systems, as well as productivity and quality targets, are 
now frequently incorporated into PSFs’ formal governance architectures. Combined, 
these systems form the basis for our self-developed 7-item scale for formal governance 
(see Appendix A). After parceling, this scale proved to be unidimensional, with the 
first factor capturing 68 percent of the variance (ǂ = .77). Standardized factor loadings 
ranged from .70 to .76, and were all statistically significant (p < .05). 
Strategic planning. The strategic planning scale we used contained 20 items 
(see Appendix A), and was adapted from Rogers, Miller, and Judge (1999). The 
original scale was comprised of 6 dimensions, of which the final dimension contained 
two items and was called ‘broad analysis’ (“Our strategic issues are broad rather than 
specific” and “Planning focuses on broad plans, not narrow budgets”). Our expert 
panel advised against the inclusion of these items in the survey, so we removed these 
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during initial item reduction. Exploratory factor analysis on the remaining items 
revealed 4 dimensions, because the original ‘goals and plans’ and ‘scanning’ 
dimensions collapsed into one factor. After parceling, the scale became unidimensional 
and internally consistent (ǂ = .95). The standardized factor loadings of the three 
parcels were .88, .92, and .97, and all were statistically significant (p < .05). 
Law firm size. We used an archival measure of law firm size, operationalized 
as the number of lawyers employed by the focal firm. Data was provided by the Dutch 
Bar Association. 
Firm diversification. To measure firm diversification, we asked our 
respondents to indicate in which particular practice areas their firm had developed 
activities. They were presented with a list of 16 practice areas recognized as possible 
specializations by the Dutch Bar Association: (1) family law; (2) labor law; (3) 
construction law; (4) contract law; (5) property law; (6) business law; (7) competition 
law; (8) banking law; (9) public law; (10) tax law; (11) transport law; (12) bankruptcy 
law; (13) debt collection practice; (14) criminal law; (15) legal representation; and (16) 
arbitrage. Firm diversification was measured on a 0 – 1 index, constructed by taking 
x/16, where x denoted the number of practice areas selected from the above listing. 
Control variable: Law firm age. To control for firm age, a variable that can 
negatively impact firm performance through the liabilities of obsolescence and 
senescence (Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994), we included a variable capturing the 
number of years since founding, derived from a write-in item in our survey. 
3.3.3 Construct validity and reliability 
Convergent/discriminant validity. A construct is believed to display convergent 
validity when the multiple indicators used to measure it are positively and 
significantly related (Carmine & Zeller, 1979). Through SEM, convergent validity is 
examined by estimating the factor loadings of the individual items on their associated 
latent variable (Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991). As reported, our analysis showed that 
all factor loadings on underlying latent constructs were large and statistically 
significant, thus demonstrating the convergent validity of our measures. A set of 
constructs is said to possess discriminant validity when any given pair of constructs 
within that set does not correlate highly with each other. This indicates that the latent 
variables indeed measure different theoretical constructs (Carmine & Zeller, 1979). 
Discriminant validity can be assessed by comparing the fit of an unconstrained CFA 
model (in which all correlations are freely estimated) with that of one in which a pair 
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of constructs is constrained to unity (made to correlate fully by setting the covariance 
between latent constructs to 1). The set of constructs possesses discriminant validity 
when the unconstrained model consistently demonstrates a better fit, as measured by a 
lower chi-square value. We estimated all possible pair-wise constrained models, to test 
each possible pair of latent constructs for discriminant validity. In all instances, the 
pair-wise constrained models had significantly higher chi-square values than the 
unconstrained benchmark, suggesting that all our constructs indeed possess 
discriminant validity. 
Common method variance. While we used archival measures for two 
dimensions of law firm performance and for organizational size, and while two further 
variables (diversification and firm age) were measured through objective rather than 
psychometric self-report questions, the majority of our data were obtained from a 
single data source, which suggests the possible presence of common method bias. We 
tested for this problem by implementing a number of procedures advocated by 
Podsakoff and his associates (2003). These procedures entail comparing a 
measurement model in which all items are related to a single ‘method factor’ to a full 
measurement model in which all items are loaded onto their latent variables. The full 
measurement model yielded an adequate fit (ǘ2 2276.58; p < .001; CFI .95; RMSEA .07). 
Furthermore, the fit of the single method factor model was considerably worse (ǘ2 
10074.18; p <.001; CFI .81; RMSEA .17; Ʀǘ2 7797.60; Ʀd.f. = 45; p < 0.001). We proceeded 
to estimate a trait and method model, in which a single method factor latent variable is 
included in addition to the latent variables. When this model shows a better fit to the 
data, this indicates the presence of common method variance (CMV; Williams, Cote, & 
Buckley, 1989). The trait and method model indeed fitted the data better (ǘ2 1871.92; p 
<.001; CFI .96; RMSEA .06; Ʀǘ2 404.66; Ʀd.f. 54; p < 0.001). We subsequently 
determined the amount of variance explained by the common method factor by using 
the sum of squared loadings to compute the amount of CMV. In our case, CMV 
accounted for 15.6 percent of total variance, which is well below the 25 percent cut-off 
point suggested by Williams and his associates (1989).  
Multiple raters. We relied on an individually administered survey to uncover 
organizational properties. On average, we had more than two respondents per firm. In 
order to use all available information without giving disproportionate weight to firms 
with multiple raters, we took the average score of all raters per multiply rated firm. To 
establish the appropriateness of averaging, we determined the degree of interrater 
reliability. For all firms with multiple raters, we computed an intraclass correlation 
Chapter 3 
 
72
coefficient for each item included in the survey (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). We then 
averaged these intraclass correlations within and between firms, yielding an overall 
intraclass correlation of 0.86. As this value is well above commonly accepted standard 
values for interrater reliability (Landis & Koch, 1977), we decided that it was 
appropriate to base our empirical estimates on the averaged score per firm. 
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Model specification 
Our analyses involved maximum likelihood SEM, estimated with the help of LISREL 
8.80 software. SEM suits our hypothesized web of relationships, as it allows us to test 
for mediating effects directly (McEvily & Marcus, 2005). Also, with SEM we can correct 
for indicator measurement error, such that we do not have to make the false 
assumption that all indicators are measured perfectly. Table 2 presents descriptive 
statistics for and zero-order correlations between our latent variables, as well as their 
reliability coefficients.  
3.4.2 Estimation, fit, and hypotheses results 
Our theoretical model, as captured by Hypotheses 1 through 5, fitted the data well (ǘ2 
786.48; d.f. = 194; RMSEA .09). In addition to these overall fit measures, the multiple 
squared correlation coefficient (R2) of the dependent variable and the significance and 
hypothesized direction of the path coefficients also indicate that the model fits the data 
well (see Figure 1).  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliability coefficients 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Organizational Performance 4.95 1.50 (.73)       
2. Reputation 5.65 0.80 .47 (.89)      
3. Strategic Planning 4.31 0.92 .20 .02 (.95)     
4. Human Capital 5.53 0.77 .21 .05 -.04 (.88)    
5. Organizational Governance 4.57 0.83 .25 .01 .09 -.02 (.77)   
6. Organizational Size 22.26 44.81 .04 .11 .34 .10 .19   
7. Organizational Diversification 0.46 0.21 -.07 -.05 .30 -.31 .18 .37  
8. Organizational Age 27.34 30.58 -.11 .04 .23 -.03 .13 .55 .42 
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Hypothesis 1 suggested that human capital would be one of the main drivers 
of PSF performance, due to the knowledge-intensiveness of the services PSFs deliver. 
Our results support this hypothesis, as human capital has a positive and significant 
direct effect on PSF performance (ǃ = .20, t = 2.94). Also, Hypothesis 2 stated that PSF 
reputation would have a positively effect on performance, as the quality of 
professional services is difficult to observe directly (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). This 
assertion too was supported by our analyses (ǃ = .33, t = 5.80).  
Hypothesis 3a predicted a positive effect of formal governance on PSF 
performance, due to its ability to rationalize business practices and manage possible 
conflicts of interest, while Hypothesis 3b highlighted the possible negative 
ramifications of interfering with professionals’ autonomy through more formal 
controls. Hypothesis 3b had to be rejected in favor of Hypothesis 3a, as the positive 
effects of formal governance on PSF performance clearly prevail (ǃ = .19, t = 3.51). 
Another set of rivaling hypotheses juxtaposed the possible positive effects of strategic 
planning (Hypothesis 4a) with its possible negative effects (Hypothesis 4b). 
Hypothesis 4a clearly prevailed over Hypothesis 4b, as benefits like improved resource 
allocation and overcoming myopia outweighed costs like practice rejection and 
working with planning methods that are possibly ill-suited to the nature of 
professional work (ǃ = .17, t = 3.99). 
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Figure 1: Model results for PSF performance 
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Hypothesis 5 stated that the ability of formal governance and strategic 
planning to contribute positively to PSF performance would increase with PSF size 
and diversification. Econometrically, this hypothesis entailed 4 separate mediation 
effects, which we tested formally with the help of Sobel tests for statistical mediation 
(MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993). The relationship between PSF size and performance was 
indeed strongly mediated by formal governance (z = 2.34; p < 0.05) and strategic 
planning (z = 3.29; p < 0.01). Similarly, we also found that the relationship between PSF 
diversification and performance was mediated by formal governance (z = 1.75; p < 
0.10) and strategic planning (z = 2.58; p < 0.05). In short, our analyses support 
Hypothesis 5. 
Finally, we found a negative significant effect of our control variable 
organizational age on PSF performance, suggesting that law firms are subject to 
liabilities of ageing like obsolescence and senescence (Barron et al., 1994). 
3.5 Discussion 
3.5.1 Performance implications of governance and strategy  
In recent years, a number of scholars have contributed to a growing body of 
knowledge on the drivers of PSF performance. Hitt and his associates (2001) found 
that human capital contributes positively to performance in PSFs, especially in the 
higher ranges of the distribution of that variable, and that PSFs benefit from leveraging 
the human capital of their partners over a larger number of associates. Groysberg and 
Lee (2009) relatedly discovered that human capital is more valuable when 
endogenously developed than when externally attracted, as even stars suffer from a 
performance decline when they move to a new PSF. Furthermore, Greenwood and his 
colleagues (2005) found a linear positive performance effect for reputational capital, 
but a nonlinear effect for leverage, suggesting an optimal ratio of associates to partners 
beyond which the returns of additional leverage diminish. Other studies have mapped 
the effect of ownership type. In a sample of large management consultancy firms, 
Greenwood and his co-authors (2007) found that firms owned privately or through a 
partnership structure outperformed the reference group of public firms. Von 
Nordenflycht (2007) likewise found that public ownership amongst ad agencies was 
bad for smaller firms, but not for larger agencies. Finally, Hitt and his co-authors 
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(2006) found a positive effect of internationalization on performance, suggesting that 
PSFs can profitably apply their knowledge base to challenges encountered by their 
clients in foreign markets.  
However, a gap remains in this important body of work. Several scholars have 
highlighted the emergence of the managed professional business archetype, and have 
theorized about its characteristic features involving formalized governance and 
strategic planning (Cooper et al., 1996; Empson & Chapman, 1996; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Pinnington & Morris, 2003). But to date, no study has tested whether 
these two features are helpful or hurtful to PSF performance, even though arguments 
can be mustered for either effect. On the positive side, governance and strategy can 
rationalize the administration of PSFs, improving resource allocation and strategic 
foresight and reducing the potential for internal conflicts rooted in private interests 
(see Hypotheses 3a and 4a). On the negative side, the formalization and centralization 
of control might crowd out professionals’ intrinsic motivation while the associated 
practices might categorically be rejected by professionals in protection of their 
autonomy (see Hypotheses 3b and 4b).  Our study is the first to empirically assess 
these effects, and we find evidence that the positive effects of formal governance and 
strategic planning outweigh their negative performance implications. While this 
finding is relevant for scholars working on PSF performance, it should also be 
interesting to PSF scholars working on the diffusion and legitimation of the managed 
professional business archetype (e.g., Brock, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Pinnington & Morris 2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Our study shows that the 
spread of this archetype is spurred on not only by the rhetorical strategies and 
institutional entrepreneurship of elite PSFs who have a stake in its social acceptance 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), but possibly also 
because adopting its features provides substantive benefits to PSFs in general. 
3.5.2 Comparing performance drivers  
Prior work aimed at identifying the drivers of PSF performance has largely tested their 
effects in isolation, as most existing studies scrutinize only a single or maximally two 
performance drivers. In contrast, our study offers a comprehensive test of four salient 
drivers of PSF performance, integrating prior research by scholars interested in human 
capital (Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Hitt et al., 2001), firm reputation (Greenwood et al., 
2005), and other drivers. This yields two clear benefits. First, for PSF scholars 
interested in performance, a salient benefit of our more inclusive test is that it 
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establishes the robustness of earlier findings to the inclusion of several other variables 
with a known effect on the dependent variable. Our finding that these factors continue 
to have a statistically significant effect on performance in a competitive test validates 
and highlights the relevance of earlier studies. Second, for practitioners interested in 
enhancing PSF performance, a clear benefit or our research is that it enables a direct 
comparison of the regression coefficients provided in Figure 1 in order to see which 
performance drivers matter most. In contrast to the disproportionate attention given to 
human capital in the literature on PSF performance, its contribution is in fact the 
smallest of all included factors. Formal governance and strategic planning are stronger 
drivers, although individually their contribution to PSF performance is roughly on par 
with that of human capital. Given that ‘classic’ PSFs (Von Nordenflycht, 2010) like the 
law firms in our sample have only relatively recently embraced these characteristics, 
and as the diffusion of these features is far from complete, their implementation could 
well lead to additional benefits for many PSFs. Yet our results also show that firm 
reputation is by far the most important driver of PSF performance, and its impact is 
substantially greater than that of any of the other drivers. For practitioners interested 
in durably improving the performance of PSFs, the first best option is therefore to 
invest in strengthening their standing relative to their peers in the eyes of relevant 
audiences. 
3.5.3 Contingency elements in the theory of the PSF  
Several scholars have recently made a case for a special theory of the PSF, as the type 
of services PSFs provide and the organizational design choices they make to facilitate 
their delivery set them apart from most other organizational forms (Empson & 
Chapman, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2005, 2007; Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). An important question for this emerging theory is whether or not 
it should embrace a contingency-theoretical set-up, such that its core predictions are 
theorized to be dependent on PSFs’ scores on core contingency variables like 
organizational size and diversification (Greenwood & Miller, 2010). Empirical 
evidence from prior studies indeed suggests that the effects of certain performance 
drivers are contingent on size (Von Nordenflycht, 2007) and diversification (Hitt et al., 
2001). 
Yet the applicability of contingency-theoretical arguments to the PSF setting 
should not be taken for granted. One reason to be cautious is that PSFs can be 
organized as federal structures of semi-autonomous practice areas (Anand et al., 2007). 
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If all these practice areas share is a brand name and perhaps some basic back-office 
facilities, it should not be taken at face value that their administrative architectures or 
planning processes should change as they scale up or down. Another ground for 
caution is that the core technology of most PSFs – the customized application of 
human and reputational capital in the delivery of knowledge-intensive services – 
remains very similar as they expand or contract (Greenwood et al., 1994). Substantial 
revenue growth in the PSF setting obtains mostly from core technology preserving 
efforts to bring additional human resources into play, and to a far lesser extent from 
core technology changing investments in financial or technological capital. As core 
technology is an important contingency variable documented to determine the 
structural fit of manufacturing and non-professional service firms (Perrow, 1986; 
Thompson, 1967), the fact that PSFs enjoy little or no variance on this variable appears 
to make them less susceptible to contingency theoretical reasoning.  
In spite of these cautionary notes, our results do suggest that contingency 
elements should be built into the design of the nascent theory of the PSF. Larger and 
more diversified PSFs rely on a different mix of drivers to secure their performance 
than their smaller and less complex counterparts. One important difference is that 
larger firms rely more on formal governance and strategic planning to foster expedient 
decision-making and collective action, both of which are difficult to realize through 
informal and consensual mechanisms in complex environments (see Figure 1). 
Furthermore, our analyses also allow us to tease apart the contingency effects of size 
and diversification. In line with the aforementioned arguments about their internal 
organization and core technology, PSFs continue to draw on human capital and 
reputation as they grow in size (see Figure 1). This suggests that in the theory of the 
PSF, growth should be modeled as a process of leveraging the firm’s human and 
reputational resource base over new opportunities (cf. Greenwood et al., 2005; Hitt et 
al., 2001). Yet as firms diversify through the development of new practice areas 
(Anand et al., 2007), the relative importance of human and reputational capital lessens 
as compared to that of formal governance and strategy (see Figure 1). Likely, when 
firms decide to pursue opportunities in new markets areas, acquiring new talent and 
leveraging the firm’s reputation are not the greatest bottlenecks. Instead, due to the 
resulting compartmentalization of expertise and increasing inter-professional 
knowledge asymmetries in diversified firms, better monitoring and planning become 
the more critical success factors. In sum, as the theory of the PSF that is currently 
unfolding will begin to approach its final shape, it is likely that its main predictions 
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will not be universalistic, but rather bounded and contextualized by factors like PSF 
size and level of diversification.  
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 Chapter 4. External agency relations and agency 
problems in professional service firms: A 
multilevel study3 
 
Abstract 
We employ survey and archival data on a sample of 2083 lawyers working for 203 
Dutch law firms to test a multilevel theory of the specific corporate governance 
challenges facing professional service firms (PSFs). We conceptualize the external 
agency relations characterizing PSFs, and test how agency problems emerge in these 
relationships under the influence of PSF-specific practices and the risk propensities of 
individual professionals. Taking complaints filed against lawyers with the bar 
association as a measure for agency problems, we find that organizational practices 
like training and strategic planning and individual characteristics like job roles and 
experience influence their prevalence.  
4.1 Introduction 
Recent work has identified professional service firms (PSFs)—firms “whose primary 
assets are a highly educated (professional) workforce and whose outputs are 
intangible services encoded with complex knowledge” (Greenwood, Li, Prakash & 
Deephouse, 2005: 661)—as a distinctive organizational form facing specific challenges 
and featuring correspondingly specific practices (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Yet in spite 
of a growing literature on PSFs, little is known about the corporate governance 
challenges facing PSFs and the organizational practices they feature to meet them. 
Arguably, this is because the field of corporate governance is largely premised on the 
agency problems between managers and shareholders resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control in publicly listed firms (Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). As PSFs are typically owned internally by a subset of their employees 
                                                             
3 This chapter has been co-authored with Prof.Dr. J. (Hans) van Oosterhout and Prof.Dr. Pursey 
P.M.A.R. Heugens. This paper is currently under review at Organization Science. 
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(the partners), they hardly feature any separation of ownership and control and have 
therefore largely been off the radar for corporate governance researchers. 
Yet the fact that ownership and control are concentrated in the same hands in 
PSFs does not mean that they are immune to agency problems. The recurrent 
involvement of PSFs in corporate scandals presents evidence that PSFs are vulnerable 
to agency problems, albeit of a different kind than those burdening publicly listed 
firms. Agency problems troubling PSFs operating in traditional professions like law 
and accounting arise mostly in agency relations with external parties, like clients and 
third-party beneficiaries of professional services. These parties may have conflicting 
interests and are often unable to evaluate the quantity, quality, and integrity of 
professional services rendered to them.  
At present, the extent to which the specific organizational features of PSFs are 
conducive to agency problems appears to be underestimated systematically by 
scholars and practitioners. While traditional professions like law and accounting have 
historically been highly institutionalized (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; 
Lawrence, 1999), their professional associations primarily provide regulation and 
enforcement of individual professionals’ behavior rather than of PSFs’ organizational 
practices. Furthermore, recent research and policy debates on professional failures 
have focused almost exclusively on regulatory issues, thereby largely ignoring the 
distinctive organizational practices of the organizations providing professional 
services (Coffee, 2006; Kraakman, 1986; Wilkins, 1992). To direct more attention to the 
organizational aspects of PSFs, this paper develops a distinctively organizational 
theory of the corporate governance challenges and practices of PSFs. 
At the organizational level of analysis, our multilevel theory details 
hypotheses on how PSF-specific organizational practices can either contain or 
exacerbate the occurrence of agency problems in external agency relations. We first 
conceptualize two such agency relations—between professionals on the one hand and 
their clients and interested third parties on the other—which capture the specific 
governance vulnerabilities of PSFs. As organization-level explanatory variables, we 
focus on two sets of governance practices that tend to simultaneously co-exist in 
contemporary PSFs. First, because PSFs are traditionally organized as professional 
partnerships featuring mostly informal organizational practices, we investigate the 
effect of ‘soft’ controls like human capital development and the ‘club value’ that PSFs 
provide to their members. Second, as PSFs are increasingly adopting more formal 
governance practices, we also investigate the influence of ‘hard’ controls such as 
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strategic and financial planning and formal governance. At the individual level of 
analysis, our theory aims to explain why certain professionals are prone to be involved 
in agency problems in the PSF context, due to the differential risk propensities 
resulting from their differential roles and experience.  
Because external agency problems become empirically manifest only through 
the regulatory and enforcement role of professional associations, we take the 
complaints filed against individual lawyers with the bar association as a measure for 
the occurrence of external agency problems. Our data comes from three sources. First, 
the data for our dependent variable (complaints) is provided by the deacons of the 
local bar associations of nine Dutch legal districts. Second, the data on organization-
level practices derive from a survey administered amongst all licensed lawyers in the 
Netherlands. Third, archival data on individual-level explanatory and control 
variables was supplied by the Dutch bar association. To address the hierarchical 
nature of factors that affect the occurrence of agency problems in PSFs, and to deal 
with the problem that our individual-level observations are not independent, we rely 
on hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) techniques (Hofman, 1994; Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). Our dataset consists of 2083 individual-level observations (lawyers) nested 
in 203 organizational-level observations (law firms).  
Our study has three intended contributions. First, we develop and test a 
multilevel theory concerning the specific kinds of agency problems burdening PSFs. 
We thereby contribute to the emerging literature on the corporate governance of non-
publicly listed firms, which to date has concentrated primarily on private family-
controlled firms (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Gómez-Mejía, Takács Haynes, Núñez-
Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholz, 2001). 
Second, we assess how governance and control practices that are characteristic for 
PSFs as an organizational form either reduce or exacerbate the likelihood that 
individual professionals will become involved in agency problems. We hereby 
respond to recent calls for more research on organizational forms in general 
(Greenwood & Miller, 2010), and on the specific organizational challenges and 
practices of PSFs in particular (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Greenwood et al., 2005; 
Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu & Kochhar, 2001). Third, we show that the risk propensities of 
individual lawyers, as shaped by their organizational roles and experience, influence 
the chance that they will be involved in agency problems and attract complaints from 
either clients or interested third parties. Analogous to traditional agency-theoretical 
models (Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
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1998), the theory developed here thus allows us to identify the individual-level factors 
that make the type of agency relationships that define the PSF as an organizational 
form vulnerable to emergence of agency problems.   
4.2 Theory and hypotheses 
4.2.1 What are PSFs? 
Recent work has identified the PSF as a distinctive organizational form facing specific 
challenges, which derive from the nature of the services it delivers, its distinctive 
resource dependencies, and the highly institutionalized environment in which it 
operates (Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). PSFs deliver 
knowledge-intensive and intangible services (Løwendahl, 2005) that are highly 
customized through intensive client consultations (Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999), 
making the knowledge they exploit difficult to codify and commodify. Because of the 
resulting inalienability of professional knowledge from its human carriers (Dow, 2003), 
PSFs are human capital intensive (Hitt et al., 2001), while they have little need for 
external financial capital (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Finally, many PSFs offer (quasi) 
public or so-called ‘gatekeeper services,’ which facilitate complex market exchange by 
assuring the quality, legality, and integrity of transactions (Coffee, 2006; Kraakman, 
1986). PSFs therefore operate in highly institutionalized environments, in which both 
public authorities and professional associations set and enforce constraints on the 
services provided and on the professionals providing them (Greenwood et al., 2002).  
To cope with these challenges, PSFs are characteristically owned internally by 
a subset of their members (Dow, 2003; Hansmann, 1996; Hart & Moore, 1996; Richter & 
Schröder, 2007), and organized as professional partnerships (Greenwood & Empson, 
2003). The traditional PSF organizational archetype, which has become known as the 
‘P2’ (Greenwood, Hinings & Brown, 1990), exhibits unique human resource 
management and corporate governance practices. Because of their reliance on human 
capital (Maister, 2003), PSFs typically combine competitive hiring processes with high 
levels of on-the-job training by senior professionals, and an up-or-out promotion 
system that regulates admission to firm ownership (Galanter & Palay, 1991; Gilson & 
Mnookin, 1988; Morris & Pinnington, 1998). The governance of PSFs combines 
collective decision making by the partners with a high degree of decentralization and 
mostly informal collegial monitoring practices.  
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Although the P2 has historically been the dominant form of enterprise 
organization in classic professions such as law and accounting (Greenwood & 
Empson, 2003), changes in economic and social trends, government policies, and client 
preferences (Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck & Shimizu, 2006; Løwendahl, 2005; Maister, 
2003; Nachum, 1996) have led to the spread of a commercial ethos in the professions 
(Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996), which challenges traditional P2 
organizational practices (Cooper, Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1998; Empson, 2007). 
Many PSFs are now adopting face-changing strategies and practices, and are moving 
in the direction of a new organizational template coined the ‘Managed Professional 
Business’ (MPB, Cooper et al., 1996). Compared to the P2, the MPB introduces “more 
formal strategic planning, controls over quality of work and productivity of staff, 
greater emphasis on coordinated marketing activities and more elaborate and 
centralized financial systems” (Morris & Pinnington, 1998: 76), which appear to co-
exist durably with traditional P2 practices (Cooper et al, 1996).  
4.2.2 External agency relationships in PSFs 
Agency relationships arise in almost every form of human cooperation, including 
vertical delegation relationships (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 
1978) and horizontal co-production efforts (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 
1982). The defining features of an agency relationship include: (a) a separation of 
decision making and exposure to the consequences of those decisions, under 
conditions of (b) at least partially conflicting interests and (c) knowledge and 
information asymmetries (Arrow, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989). In agency relationships, the 
party making the decisions can use her decision authority to further her private 
interests instead of those of the party she is making the decision for, which then 
produces so-called agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). In public firms, the most 
consequential agency relationship arises out of the separation of ownership and 
control, as professional managers take the bulk of everyday business decisions while 
shareholders (amongst others) face the consequences of those decisions. The owner-
manager agency relationship is vulnerable to agency problems, as owners and 
managers can have diverging interests, while the latter also enjoy informational 
privileges over the former (Black, 1990, Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991).  
Because in PSFs ownership and control tend to be combined in the hands of a 
select group of professionals, PSFs hardly feature any owner-manager agency 
relationships. Yet PSFs paradigmatically exhibit two other agency relationships that 
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make them vulnerable to equally serious agency problems. These agency problems 
arise external to PSFs, and burden the agency relations between professionals and their 
clients on the one hand, and between professionals and interested third parties on the 
other.  
Professional – client agency. PSFs feature agency relationships with their 
clients because clients acquire expertise and services from professionals that they 
typically do not have and cannot produce themselves. PSF clients therefore surrender 
part of their decision-making powers to professionals. The agency relationship 
between professionals and their clients is highly vulnerable to the occurrence of 
agency problems, not only because of possible conflicts of interest in respect to fees 
and billable hours (Hayward & Boeker, 1998), but also on account of substantial 
information and knowledge asymmetries, making it difficult for clients to evaluate the 
quality and integrity of the professional judgments and actions taken on their behalf 
(Sharma, 1997). Client vulnerability is historically one of the most salient reasons 
behind the institutionalization of professions such as law and accounting. 
Professional–client agency is likely to be associated with agency problems like 
overbilling, sub-standard service quality delivery, and neglect of professional ethics. 
When detected, these behaviors tend to give rise to complaints filed by clients with the 
disciplinary bodies of professional associations. 
Professional – third party agency. PSFs also feature agency relationships with 
interested third parties, as professionals routinely make decisions that affect a host of 
other external parties, even though they do not transact with them directly. 
Paradigmatic examples of such ‘third party beneficiaries’ (Eisenberg, 1992) are the 
beneficiaries of a trust made up by a lawyer, and the participants in public equity 
markets relying on the assurance over the annual accounts of public firms provided by 
accountants (Goldberg, 1988). In many instances, it is possible to point out the third 
parties acting as ultimate principals in this type of agency relationship. When the 
involved third parties are more difficult to identify, however, the professional 
association may be regarded as the principal. This is because professional associations 
are both the author and enforcer of the rules and professional standards that give voice 
to third party interests. Because third party beneficiaries by definition are not 
themselves involved in professional transactions and occasionally difficult to identify 
as interested parties, they are most efficiently protected by rules and regulations 
(Calabresi & Melamed, 1972). In practice, agency problems in third party agency 
relationships in the professions tend to become manifest only through the 
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intermediary role of professional associations, in the form of breaches of professional 
rules, standards, or procedures, in response to which aggrieved parties tend to file 
complaints with professional disciplinary bodies. 
4.2.3 An organizational theory of PSF governance  
Due to agency theory’s origins in economic theory (Lazear, 2000; Spence & 
Zeckhauser, 1971), agents in agency relationships are traditionally assumed to pursue 
their self-interests whenever the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs (e.g. Ghoshal, 
2005). Empirical research, however, has demonstrated that human actors are 
motivationally more complex than how they are portrayed in economic theory (Frey & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). More specifically, their propensity to act selfishly or 
unethically is influenced by the organizations they work for (Trevino, Weaver, & 
Reynolds, 2006).  
In line with these findings, we develop a distinctively organizational, 
multilevel theory of corporate governance practices in PSFs. In this view, the agency 
relationships that characterize PSFs as an organizational form merely constitute the 
‘fault lines’ along which agency problems can materialize (Heath, 2009). Whether or 
not agency problems will actually occur, however, is at least partly dependent on the 
specific organization-level governance practices that PSFs feature, as well as on 
individual-level risk propensities that arise from functioning as a professional. At the 
organizational level, Hypotheses 1 through 3 deal with P2-like ‘soft’ controls, whereas 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 deal with MPB-like ‘hard’ controls. At the individual level, 
Hypothesis 6 relates to the effects of experience and job role, which shape 
professionals’ risk propensities.   
‘Soft’ controls in PSFs. Governance in PSFs has historically been based on 
informal or ‘soft’ controls, whose functioning is facilitated by the high degree of face-
to-face interaction between professionals in PSFs (Zey-Ferrel & Ferrell, 1982), and 
founded in their employees’ commitment to professionalism (Gendron, Suddaby, & 
Lam, 2006; Hall, 1968). Two features of the P2 archetype function as soft controls 
containing behavioral risks resulting from agency relations in PSFs: professional 
socialization and the social or ‘club’ value that the organization provides to individual 
professionals.  
In recognition of their unique resource dependencies (Greenwood & Empson, 
2003; Hitt et al., 2006), PSFs rely on various socialization processes (in addition to 
stringent selection procedures) to increase the quality and integrity of their human 
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capital base. Socialization combines formal and informal processes enabling members 
to function successfully in an organization (Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 2000; 
Coffey, 1994; Dirsmith, Heian, & Covaleski, 1997). Socialization not only helps to 
disseminate difficult to codify expert knowledge to junior professionals, but is also the 
main mechanism through which expectations of appropriate behavior are 
communicated (Brief, Buttram & Dukerich, 2001; Treviño, Weaver, Gibson & Toffler, 
1999).  
Two dimensions of socialization are specifically important within PSFs. First, 
a sound human capital base requires high degrees of on-the-job training and 
mentoring. In many PSFs, socialization processes are extensive and intense, such that 
junior professionals initially enjoy only limited levels of job autonomy, while they 
have to learn their profession by looking over the shoulder of senior professionals. 
Other PSFs, however, feature mentoring programs in which coaching and supervision 
is minimal, and in which juniors are mostly left to themselves. In PSFs of the latter 
kind, junior professionals are less likely to be infused with relevant norms and values 
than in PSFs of the former kind, where juniors learn them directly through the 
leadership behaviors of seniors (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005). Second, many 
PSFs have also adopted more formal human capital development strategies, such as 
off-the-job education and training programs, which also may contribute to the 
internalization of relevant norms and values and to the reduction of agency problems 
(Treviño & Weaver, 2003; Weaver et al, 1999a). See Hypothesis 1:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the attention paid to socialization of 
professionals in a PSF, the lower the propensity of its 
members to be involved in agency problems. 
 
It is conventional wisdom that the organizational context influences ethical 
decision-making and behavior within organizations (Butterfield, McCabe, & Treviño, 
1998; Treviño, 1986). An organization’s ethical climate (Peterson, 2002; Victor & Cullen, 
1987) and ethical culture (Treviño et al., 2001) have been found to influence employees’ 
organizational commitment and behaviors (Butterfield et al., 1998; Deshpande, 
George, & Joseph, 2000; Fritzsche, 2000). In PSFs more specifically, two distinctive 
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contextual factors are especially relevant in explaining whether agency relationships 
will culminate in agency problems. 
First, social capital refers to the value of the social network that a PSF provides 
to individual professionals (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 1988). Social capital is 
important in PSFs, because durable ties with expert colleagues enhance the value of 
the services that any individual professional can deliver. Frequent face-to-face contacts 
between fellow professionals are not only an important conduit through which 
professional knowledge and experience diffuse, but also provide a mechanism 
through which professionals can monitor the quality and integrity of each other’s 
work. Because agency problems occurring in relationships with external parties put 
this social capital at risk for any individual professional, the value of the social capital 
provided by a PSF is likely to be negatively related to the propensity of the 
professionals employed by it to be involved in such problems. Second, a shared sense 
of commitment to the organization will reduce professionals’ inclination to be 
involved in agency problems. Such an ‘esprit de corps’ is widely believed to contribute 
to a PSF’s reputation and brand value, and is therefore often intentionally cultivated 
within PSFs. Because social capital and a shared sense of commitment to the 
organization jointly represent the social or ‘club’ value of PSF membership (Buchanan, 
1965), we combine them in a single hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the ‘club’ value provided by a PSF, 
the lower the propensity of its members to be involved 
in agency problems. 
 
A related informal PSF-specific governance mechanism involves the 
reputation a PSF has in the eyes of its external beholders. PSFs are critically dependent 
on their reputation to attract and maintain clients and charge premium fees for their 
services. In markets where the quality and integrity of services are difficult for clients 
to asses, reputation is a powerful signal for both. This is especially true for PSFs that 
function as guardians of trust or gatekeepers on behalf of third party interests, as such 
PSFs pledge the intangible asset of their reputation as a hostage to vouch for the 
quality and integrity of their services (Coffee, 2006). Reputation is also a critical 
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resource for PSFs because it is instrumental in hiring and retaining high quality human 
capital (Fombrun, 1997). 
Because reputation is built—and destroyed—through recurrent transactions 
with clients, it plays a disciplinary role in assuring the quality and integrity of services 
delivered by PSFs (Dixit, 2004). This is because the shadow from the (discounted) 
value of future transactions provides powerful incentives not to be involved in agency 
problems today (Klein & Leffler, 1981). Because professionals employed by firms with 
better reputations stand to incur greater pecuniary losses from reputational damage, 
we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The better the reputation of a PSF, the lower the 
propensity of its members to be involved in agency 
problems. 
 
‘Hard’ controls in PSFs. In response to profound economic and institutional 
changes in the legal profession over the last three decades, many PSFs have adopted 
more formal organizational practices that have long been established in other forms of 
enterprise organization, but that were traditionally believed to be inimical to the 
professions. These more generic organizational practices fall into two broad categories. 
First, the introduction of strategic planning and performance management 
practices may pressure professionals to compromise professional norms and values in 
order to realize planned economic performance. These practices may trigger a more 
calculative mode of deliberation in professionals that not only has been found to 
negatively affect cooperative dispositions (Frank, Gilovic, & Regan, 1993) and increase 
the prevalence of unethical behaviors (Frank & Schulze, 2000), but may also crowd out 
the ‘softer’ professional values that give voice to the vulnerable interests of clients and 
third party beneficiaries (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Additionally, the introduction of generic 
performance management practices in PSFs often conflicts fundamentally with more 
traditional professional practices and attitudes, which may create a state of normative 
ambiguity within PSFs that is often referred to as ‘anomie’ (Durkheim & Thompson, 
2004; Merton, 1968), and which is empirically associated with various forms of 
opportunistic behavior (Cullen, Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 2004; Martin, Cullen, Johnson & 
Parboteeah, 2007). See Hypothesis 4: 
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Hypothesis 4: The more a PSF engages in strategic planning and 
performance management practices, the higher the 
propensity of its members to be involved in agency 
problems. 
 
A second category of ‘hard’ controls adopted by PSFs involves the formal 
governance of professionals, which is complementary to their increasing involvement 
in strategic and performance management. For example, the highly collegial and 
decentralized decision-making practices characterizing the P2 often stand in the way of 
effective strategy formation. Many PSFs have therefore adopted more centralized 
decision-making structures, which concentrate decision-making authority in the hands 
of a more limited set of managing partners or even involve the appointment of 
specialized (often financially trained) managers. Furthermore, the ‘soft’ controls of the 
P2 form are also poorly suited to monitor strategy implementation and performance, 
which has led many PSFs to introduce ‘hard’ controls at different levels in the firm. 
Some PSFs have adopted knowledge management systems in an attempt to ‘alienate’ 
professional knowledge of its human carriers and make PSFs less dependent on highly 
mobile human capital. Finally, PSFs have increasingly implemented formal ethics 
management programs in order to contain liability and reputational risks that become 
increasingly difficult to control though traditional collegial monitoring the larger PSFs 
become.   
The adoption of such formal governance practices is likely to increase the 
prevalence of agency problems for three reasons, however. First, the ‘hard controls’ 
through which they operate constitute the organizational levers through which 
professionals are pressured to put economic over professional performance, which 
may alienate professionals from professional values and ideals. Second, while formal 
governance practices can be effective in monitoring economic performance, they are a 
poor substitute for collegial monitoring in containing opportunistic agentic behaviors 
that are less observable and more difficult to detect. Third, formal ethics programs, 
more specifically, allow real actions and intentions to be decoupled from appearances, 
especially when such programs are adopted for symbolic purposes in order to contain 
the firm’s external legal liabilities (Treviño et al., 1999). Such programs may also 
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exacerbate agency problems when they conflict with hard performance controls or 
professional values, as this contributes to ‘anomie’ within PSFs. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the attention paid to governance and 
ethics management in a PSF, the higher the propensity 
of its members to be involved in agency problems. 
 
Professionals’ risk propensities. In PSFs, individual professionals are likely to 
have different propensities to become involved in agency problems due to the 
differential risk orientations that result from their experience and job roles. One 
vulnerable category is the non-partnered associate. PSFs feature highly competitive 
human resource management practices, centered on ‘up or out’ promotion principles 
(Morris & Pinnington, 1998), which stage the process of an associate’s admission to 
partnership as an all-or-nothing tournament. In ‘up or out’ systems, the fruits of 
several years of deferred compensation, hard work, and relentless dedication are 
distributed highly unequally between associates (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Eriksson, 
1999). The substantial rewards associated with becoming a partner, the disproportional 
influence of the threat of being denied partnership on decision making (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), and the single-shot character of promotion to partner decisions all may 
lead associates to become more frequently involved in agency problems than 
individuals working in different roles.  
Another vulnerable category is the experienced professional. With experience, 
professionals may become more risk prone and more frequently involved in agency 
problems (Elm & Nichols, 1993). More seasoned professionals can become 
overconfident in their own skills and expertise, and may therefore overestimate the 
chance of getting away with opportunistic behaviors. More experienced professionals 
are also less likely to be subjected to collegial correction of beliefs and behaviors, as 
they tend to work more autonomously. Furthermore, experienced professionals also 
tend to work on more complicated cases, which increases the chance of them becoming 
involved in agency problems. We therefore suggest that:  
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Hypothesis 6: Due to their higher risk propensities, both 
associate and more experienced professionals are more 
likely to be involved in agency problems. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we constructed a multilevel dataset consisting of lawyers 
(‘level 1 observations’; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) nested in Dutch law firms (‘level 2 
observations’). For our dependent variable, collected at level 1, we depended on the 
private and voluntary disclosure of complaints information by Dutch district courts. 
Seven out of 19 courts disclosed this information to the research team. Jointly, these 
seven districts are home to 556 law firms. Firm-level data was collected by means of a 
survey instrument. All firms for which at least one responded reported a score on all 
firm-level questionnaire items were retained in the final dataset. When scores of 
several respondents were available for a single firm, we averaged these ratings. This 
resulted in a level 2 sample of 203 law firms, representing a response rate of 36.5 
percent. The 556 firms located in the aforementioned seven districts jointly employed 
3894 lawyers, of which 2083 were affiliated with the firms in our sample. Complete 
archival complaints and control variable records were available for all of them, 
implying a level 1 population coverage of 53.5 percent for the seven disclosing 
districts.  
4.3.2 Research design and data collection 
For law firms, data on organizational variables pertaining to issues like corporate 
governance and strategy formation are difficult to obtain from archival sources, as 
they are privately owned and subjected to very limited disclosure obligations. We 
therefore developed a survey instrument to tap into the variables we aimed to 
research. To the largest extent possible, we relied on psychometric scales that were 
used and validated in prior research, as recommended by several experts (Babbie, 
2009; Dillman, 2007). In case appropriate scales were not available in the literature, we 
relied on canonical scale development processes to ensure construct validity (Hinkin 
1998, Nunnally 1978; Steenkamp & Van Trijp 1991). These processes involved: (1) 
inductive and deductive item generation, (2) content validity assessment and item 
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reduction with the help of an expert panel consisting of 10 academics specialized in 
strategy and organization and 10 lawyers, (3) internal consistency assessment, (4) 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for goodness of fit assessment, and (5) 
convergent/discriminant validity assessment. All multi-item scales were measured 
with seven point Likert items, where 1 always represented “strongly disagree” and 7 
“strongly agree”. In all, our survey instrument consisted of 92 items representing 8 
firm-level composite variables.  
We opted for an online survey design using Global Park survey 
administration software (www.globalpark.com). Our research was endorsed by the 
Dutch Bar Association (www.advocatenorde.nl). They provided us with a mailing list 
of all lawyers admitted to the bar in the Netherlands, containing their email addresses 
as well as individual-level scores on several variables used as independent and control 
variables in this study. We sent out two waves of electronic surveys. The first wave 
resulted in 674 fully completed responses. The second wave was sent out as a 
reminder two weeks later, and provided us with an additional 623 responses. Jointly, 
these 1297 lawyers represented 203 law firms. The breakdown of our level 2 sample 
over the various size strata represented in our sampling frame is provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Sample descriptives 
Organization size Sampling frame In sample Percentage 
2 – 5 lawyers 402 100 24.9% 
6 – 20 lawyers 131 80 61.1% 
20 – 60 lawyers 20 20 100% 
> 60 lawyers 3 3 100% 
4.3.3 Measures 
Dependent variable: complaints. We use archival data in the form of a count variable 
detailing the number of complaints against any specific lawyer working in one of the 
seven disclosing districts in the year 2008 as our dependent variable. Under Dutch law, 
complaints filed against lawyers by clients or interested third parties are recorded and 
investigated by local disciplinary courts. Privacy laws prevented us from obtaining 
information on later stages of the disciplinary process. In total, 310 complaints were 
reported in our focal year. The number of complaints filed against individual lawyers 
ranged from 0 to 7, with a mean of .20 and a standard deviation of .57.   
Socialization: developmental work experience. To capture the extent to which 
junior lawyers were socialized into the profession by seniors though close supervision, 
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we used the 4-item ‘developmental work experience’ scale developed by Malos and 
Campion (2000). The scale maps the extent to which interns and junior lawyers are 
closely supervised in their developmental work experience (ǂ = .97). Sample items 
include: “in our organization, interns are quickly assigned their own case” and “in our 
organization interns are quickly given client responsibilities” (see Appendix D for a 
complete overview of all scales and items used in this study). Confirmatory factor 
analysis showed a satisfactory fit with the data (ǘ2 = 24.23, d.f. = 2, CFI = .97 IFI = .97, 
NFI = .97, RMRS = .01). All factor loadings were significant and exceeded .60. 
Socialization: human capital development. A second dimension of lawyer 
socialization entails the more formal human capital development strategies adopted by 
law firms. The scale we used to capture this dimension is based on the 5-item scale 
developed by Malos and Campion (2000), but we added 15 items to capture additional 
practices that are more prevalent in the Dutch context (ǂ = .88). Sample items included: 
“as an employee or intern in our company you receive a lot of feedback from 
partners”, “in our company a great deal of attention is placed on the continued 
professional development of employees”, “in our company we regularly hold internal 
area of expertise meetings”, and “in our company there is a great deal of talk 
concerning possible promotion to partner”. Confirmatory factor analysis showed a 
satisfactory fit with the data (ǘ2 = 343.74, df = 155, CFI = .95 IFI = .95, NFI = .91, RMRS 
= .07). All factor loadings were significant and exceeded .40.  
Club value: social capital. We measured the degree of social capital existing 
in a given law firm using an existing four-item scale by Subramaniam and Youndt 
(2005). The scale proved to be adequately reliable (ǂ = .88). Sample items include: “our 
employees are skilled at collaborating with each other to diagnose and solve 
problems” and “our employees interact and exchange ideas with people from different 
practice areas of the company.” Confirmatory factor analysis showed a satisfactory fit 
with the data (ǘ2 = 5.96, df = 2, CFI = .99 IFI = .99, NFI = .99, RMRS = .02). All factor 
loadings were significant and exceeded .60. 
Club value: commitment. The degree to which lawyers are committed to the 
firm they work for was measured using a scale developed by Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993), consisting of seven items (ǂ = .92). Sample items include: “employees feel as 
though their future is intimately linked to that of this organization” and “it is clear that 
employees are fond of this firm”. Confirmatory factor analysis showed a satisfactory 
fit with the data (ǘ2 = 75.42, df = 14, CFI = .96 IFI = .96, NFI = .95, RMRS = .05). All 
factor loadings exceeded .60. 
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PSF reputation. As reputation is a social evaluation of the overall quality of an 
organization’s capabilities and outputs by outsiders (Bitektine, 2011; Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990), we had PSF’s reputations assessed by their competitors. In our survey, 
we asked each respondent to name up to five competitor firms which they believed to 
have an excellent reputation in their area of expertise. Across all respondents we then 
summed the number of times a firm was mentioned, and used the straight count as a 
measure of a firm’s reputation. Our reputation variable ranged between 0 and 23, with 
a mean of 1.01 and a standard deviation of 2.76. 
Strategic planning and performance measurement. To measure the extent to 
which law firms engage in strategic planning processes and monitor the performance 
of their employees, we used a 20-item scale (ǂ = .91) based on the strategic planning 
scale developed by Rogers, Miller, and Judge (1999). Of the 21 original items we 
retained 19, after discussions with our expert panel revealed that one of the 
dimensions of this scale (‘broad analysis’) was not readily applicable in law firms. Also 
based on our discussions with industry experts, we added one additional item to the 
‘goals and plans’ dimension of this scale (‘we have a written business plan’), to capture 
the broader take on these issues customarily found in law firms. Further sample items 
include: “planning is important for achieving efficiency”, “we develop formal plans 
for potential products and markets”, and “we use tight budget controls”. 
Confirmatory factor analysis indicated a satisfactory fit with the data (ǘ2 = 464.24, df = 
164, CFI = .94 IFI = .94, NFI = .91, RMRS = .09). All items had factor loadings above the 
.40 threshold, and all but two items had factor loadings exceeding .60.  
Organizational governance. To capture the extent to which PSFs have moved 
beyond self-supervision towards more managerial forms of monitoring (Morris & 
Pinnington, 1998), we developed a new twelve-item psychometric scale (ǂ = .86). 
Sample items include: “in my firm employees have regular performance appraisals” 
and “in my firm there is a great deal of attention for ensuring proper procedures 
guaranteeing financial integrity.” Confirmatory factor analysis showed a satisfactory 
fit with the data (ǘ2 = 115.97, df = 53, CFI = .97 IFI = .97, NFI = .94, RMRS = .06). All 
factor loadings were significant and exceeded .40.  
Ethics management instruments. Based on a thorough reading of the prior 
literature on ethics management (e.g., Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999a,b; Treviño et 
al., 2006) and discussions with our expert panel, we compiled a list of nine ethics 
management instruments commonly used in law firms: codes of conduct, ethics 
hotlines, ethics training programs, mission or core value statements, ombudspersons, 
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newsletters in which attention is regularly paid to ethical issues, regular meetings to 
discuss integrity dilemmas, ethics trainings and/or courses, and ethics committees. 
Respondents were asked to indicate which of these ethics management practices were 
currently in use in their firms. The number of flagged practices per firm was 
subsequently used as a straight count variable in the analysis. The number of adopted 
practices ranged from 0 to 5, with a mean of 1.35 and a standard deviation of 1.17.  
Risk propensity: exposure. Exposure both in terms of client contacts as well as 
exposure to high target demands was captured by organizational rank. We asked 
respondents whether they were interns, junior associates, senior associates, or partners 
at their firm. As this was a questionnaire item, we do not have information on all 
lawyers in the dataset. We therefore constructed a reference category, to which we 
assigned all lawyers whose organizational rank was unknown. Of the 2097 lawyers in 
our sample, 240 were junior associates, 20 senior associates, 40 partners, and 1783 fell 
into the ‘rank unknown’ reference category. In similar vein, we asked respondents 
whether they currently had managerial responsibilities, whether they served on the 
board of the firm, or whether they served as patron (a patron being a formally 
appointed mentor to an intern). Of the 2097 lawyers in our sample, 108 were 
managers, 134 served on their firms’ boards, and 188 acted as patrons.  
Risk propensity: experience. To capture individual professionals’ experience 
as a practicing lawyer, we measured the time elapsed since their admission to the 
Dutch Bar. The data was provided to us by the Dutch bar association, and was 
recorded as net experience: time elapsed since first admission to the Bar minus periods 
of temporary inactivity due to, for example, parental or sick leave. Experience ranged 
from 0 to 43.4 years, with a mean of 11.3 years and a standard deviation of 9.9 years.  
Control variables. Our level 2 control variables consisted of organizational 
age, size, and performance. Organizational age was measured through a survey item 
asking for the number of years elapsed since firm founding. Organizational size was 
operationalized as the number of lawyers currently active in the firm. We used an 
archival measure, provided to us by the Dutch Bar Association. As law firms do not 
routinely disclose performance data, we measured organizational performance with the 
help of a newly developed 16-item self-report scale (ǂ = .84), with the individual items 
rooted in both expert interviews and the literature on PSF performance (e.g. Desarbo, 
Di Benedetto, Song, & Sinha, 2005; Løwendahl, 2005). The scale consisted of the 
following items: “our firm has been able to attract the best junior lawyers”, “our firm 
has been able to retain many of its clients”, “our firm had a very competitive cost 
Chapter 4 
 
98
structure”, and “our firm has a high gross margin on its hourly fee”. Confirmatory 
factor analysis showed a satisfactory fit with the data (ǘ2 = 304.62, df = 94, CFI = .90 IFI 
= .90, NFI = .86, RMRS = .10). All factor loadings were significant and exceeded .40. 
Our level 1 control variables included gender and the university from which a 
lawyer received his or her law degree. Gender information was archival, and was 
provided to us by the Dutch Bar Association. 42.7 percent of the lawyers in our sample 
were female. The same institute also provided us with information concerning the 
specific university from which a lawyer received his or her law degree. All major Dutch 
universities were represented in our sample: Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (EUR; 
154 lawyers), Open Universiteit (OU; 12 lawyers), Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 
(RU; 268 lawyers), Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RUG; 124 lawyers), Universiteit Leiden 
(RUL; 480 lawyers), Universiteit van Maastricht (UM; 128 lawyers), Universiteit 
Utrecht (UU; 220 lawyers), Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA; 95 lawyers), 
Universiteit van Tilburg (UvT; 85 lawyers), and Vrije Universiteit (VU; 59 lawyers). 
4.3.4 Analysis 
To test our hypotheses, we used Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), as we were 
interested in explaining individual lawyers’ propensity to be involved in agency 
problems using both individual-level and organizational-level predictors. Using HLM 
allowed us to overcome two shortcomings from which non-hierarchical modeling 
techniques suffer when used to analyze our type of nested data. First, most non-
hierarchical modeling techniques are premised on the notion of simple random 
sampling with replacement from an infinite population. However, our sampling 
design is a two-stage sample (Snijders & Bosker, 1999), in which both level 2 and level 
1 units are sampled from their respective populations, and in which level 1 units are 
mutually dependent due to their joint inclusion in level 2 units. Such clustered data are 
best analyzed with hierarchical (linear) models, which allow both intercepts (i.e., 
average number of complaints per firm) and slopes (i.e., the predictive strength of 
independent variables in a given firm) to vary randomly (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
Second, treating level 1 observations as independent would produce biased standard 
errors, due to the distorting effect of unobserved sample size differences due to nesting 
in level 2 units. Using HLM allows us to simultaneously estimate level 2 and level 1 
equations while accounting for sample size differences, thus producing accurate 
standard errors (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
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In multilevel Poisson regression, it is essential to assign precise meaning to the 
variables included in the analysis, such that the empirical results can meaningfully be 
related to the theoretically motivated hypotheses (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
Assigning proper values to variables to facilitate further interpretation is especially 
important at the individual level of analysis, as in hierarchical models the level 1 
intercept and slopes become outcome variables at level 2. We chose to grand mean-
center all continuous and ordinal variables at both level 1 and level 2, which is also 
common procedure in the standard ANCOVA model (Miller & Chapman, 2001). After 
grand mean centering, the intercept can be interpreted as an adjusted mean for the 
level 2 unit to which a given level 1 subject belongs. To ensure the interpretability of 
our estimates for dichotomous variables, we left these uncentered.  
Standard (maximum likelihood) HLM estimations assume the dependent 
variable to be continuously distributed, and the residuals at both levels to have normal 
distributions. Yet our dependent variable is a non-normally distributed count variable, 
such that the application of regular HLM techniques could lead to erroneous 
conclusions (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Given that complaints are a rare event (the 
majority of Dutch lawyers did not receive a single complaint in 2008), the complaints 
distribution’s variance is driven by its mean. In such instances, multilevel Poisson 
regression is the most appropriate modeling technique, as the Poisson distribution is 
an approximation of the binomial distribution for the situation in which the number of 
‘trials’ (i.e., the number of lawyers at risk of receiving a complaint) is large and the 
‘success’ probability (i.e., lawyers actually receiving a complaint) is low (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 1998). We thus estimated our models using the multilevel Poisson regression 
routine in the HLM6 data analysis software package (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 
2004). 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Multilevel poisson regression results 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for our two-stage sample data. Table 3 displays 
the results of our multilevel Poisson regression analysis: Model 1 contains the level 1 
control variables only, Model 2 adds the level 1 predictors, Model 3 enters the level 2 
control variables, and Model 4 shows the full model including level 2 predictor 
variables.  
Chapter 4 
 
100
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
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‘Soft’ control results. Our results confirm Hypothesis 1. Model 4 in Table 3 shows that 
a lack of professional socialization in the form of on-the-job training, as captured by 
higher scores on the developmental work experience variable, results in a greater 
number of complaints raised against individual lawyers (Ǆ = .18; p < .05). Likewise, 
stronger professional socialization in the form of more formal training, as indicated by 
higher scores on the human capital development variable, has a significant negative 
effect on the number of complaints (Ǆ = -.50; p < .01).  
Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected on the basis of the results reported in Table 3, 
Model 4. PSFs with higher ‘club’ value do not experience lower complaint levels. This 
is true for both the social capital (Ǆ = -.12; p > .10) and organizational commitment (Ǆ = 
.11 p > .10) measures of ‘club’ value. 
Likewise, the results in Table 3, Model 4 suggest that Hypothesis 3 has to be 
rejected. PSF reputation has no curtailing effect on the number of complaints (Ǆ = .05; p 
> .10).  
‘Hard’ control results. Hypothesis 4 was supported. The results in Table 3, 
Model 4, show that lawyers working for law firms that place greater emphasis on 
strategic planning and that manage their personnel by subjecting them to economic 
performance targets are more likely to receive complaints and be involved in agency 
problems (Ǆ = .23 p < .05).  
On the basis of the evidence contained in Table 3, Model 4, Hypothesis 5 had 
to be rejected. A greater emphasis on more formal forms of governance by law firms 
appears not to cause the lawyers they employ to be involved in agency problems and 
incur complaints more frequently (Ǆ = .15; p > .10). Similarly, the adoption of ethics 
management instruments does not affect lawyers’ propensity to display opportunistic 
agentic behaviors and reap complaints as a results (Ǆ = -.08; p > .10). 
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Table 3: Results of multilevel poisson regression 
Variables Model 1 
Level 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
Full Level 1 
Model 3 
Full level 1 
& level 2 
controls 
Model 4 
Full level 1 
& level 2 
Intercept -1.61 (.16)** -2.02 (.17)** -1.99 (.21)** -2.04 (.20)** 
     
Developmental work 
experience 
   .18 (.07)* 
Human capital development     -.50 (.20)** 
Social capital    -.12 (.08) 
Commitment    .11 (.10) 
Reputation    .05 (.03) 
Strategic planning intensity    .23 (.10)* 
Organizational governance    .15 (.13) 
Ethics Instruments    -.08 (.07) 
Size   -.01 (.00)** -.02 (.00)** 
Age   -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)* 
Performance   -.05 (.09) .05 (.14) 
Junior associate  -.43 (.24)† -.43 (.29) -.45 (.27)† 
Senior associate  .81 (.71) .83 (.84) .62 (.77) 
Partner  -.34 (.71) -.30 (.74) -.48 (.69) 
Management  -1.29 (.46)** -1.32 (.52)* -1.28 (.51)* 
Board  -.08 (.35) -.02 (.42) -.11 (.43) 
Patron  .53 (.26)* .46 (.31) .58 (.30)* 
Experience  .06 (.01)** .07 (.01)** .07 (.01)** 
Male .18 (.09)* .17 (.08)* .18 (.11)† .18 (.11)† 
Age .03 (.00)** .00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) 
RU .13 (.18) .69 (.20)** .70 (.26)** .71 (.25)** 
RUG .30 (.21) .91 (.21)** .92 (.29)** .93 (.29)** 
RUL .12 (.14) .73 (.17)** .71 (.22)** .72 (.22)** 
EUR -.32 (.19)† .29 (.19) .23 (.24) .24 (.25) 
UU -.06 (.16) .55 (.18)** .54 (.24)* .57 (.25)* 
UvA .11 (.17) .78 (.19)** .75 (.25)** .75 (.25)** 
VU -.45 (.25)† .17 (.27) .15 (.36) .13 (.39) 
UvT .26 (.34) .97 (.33)** .98 (.49)* .96 (.46)* 
OU .68 (.50) 1.70 (.51)** 1.65 (.54)** 1.62 (.50)** 
UM .04 (.23) .71 (.23)** .69 (.28)* .69 (.28)* 
     
Level-1 N 2083 2083 2083 2083 
Level-2 N 203 203 203 203 
Tau .68 .73 .58 .53 
Reliability intercept .48 .49 .46 .43 
† < .10 significance level 
* < .05 significance level 
** < .01 significance level 
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Risk propensity results. Hypothesis 6 was broadly supported. The evidence 
reported in Table 3, Model 4 shows that junior associate lawyers were significantly less 
likely to attract complaints (Ǆ = -.45; p < .10) than senior associates closer to the 
admission to partnership decision or partners subjected to much lower levels of peer 
control. Furthermore, lawyers acting in a management role, which increases the peer 
scrutiny they are under and reduces their client contacts, experience lower levels of 
complaints raised against them (Ǆ = 1.28; p < .05). Lawyers acting in a patron role, in 
contrast, attracted more complaints (Ǆ = .58; p < .001). They apparently suffer from 
having to perform multiple tasks simultaneously, such as the supervision of interns 
and junior associates, on the one hand, and the handling of a full load of client 
contacts, on the other. Finally, and as hypothesized, risk propensity increased with 
experience (Ǆ = .07; p < .01). In other words, the longer someone’s tenure as a lawyer, 
the greater the likelihood of that person receiving complaints. 
4.4.2 Control variable results 
Level 2 control variables. Organizational size is a commonly recognized contingency 
factor, which has been documented to influence a wide range of organizational 
processes (Donaldson, 2001). Our analyses also reveal a size effect, as this variable 
negatively affects the number of complaints a given lawyer stands to incur (Ǆ = -.02; p 
< .01). We also detected a contingency effect for organizational age, as older law firms 
were less likely to see their employees involved in agency problems than younger ones 
(Ǆ = -.00; p < .05). Whereas it might have been expected that law firms experiencing 
financial distress would more likely be associated with agency problems, our results 
showed no such effect (Ǆ = .05; p > .10). 
Level 1 control variables. Gender had a significant effect on the propensity of 
an individual lawyer to attract complaints (Daicoff, 1997). Male lawyers received more 
complaints as compared to their female counterparts (Ǆ = .18; p < .10). Similarly, the 
university from which lawyers graduate appears to exert an influence on their 
propensity to be involved in agency problems in later career stages. Apparently, 
universities are not just organizations transferring (legal) scientific knowledge, but also 
institutions in which individuals are pre-socialized into the norm sets of their later 
profession, with greater or lesser efficacy (Spiegel, 1979).  
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4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 The corporate governance of non-publicly-listed firms 
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on the corporate governance of non-
publicly listed firms (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; McCahery & 
Vermeulen, 2008; Schulze et al., 2001). While even casual observation shows that there 
exists a variety of organizational forms in business (Hansmann, 1996), corporate 
governance research to date has focused almost exclusively on publicly-listed firms for 
which data are abundantly available due to the strict disclosure obligations to which 
firms of this type are subjected. However, this selective disclosure has likely resulted 
in significant sample selection biases (Heckman, 1979), resulting in a disproportionate 
focus on the agency relationships characterizing publicly-listed firms (Fama & Jensen, 
1983), to the detriment of those typifying other forms of enterprise organization 
(Schulze et al., 2001). Due to this systematic bias in corporate governance research, we 
currently lack sufficient understanding of the governance challenges and practices of 
other organizational forms, which typically have little to do with those emerging from 
conditions of separated ownership and control, which have long been regarded as a 
defining condition for the field of corporate governance (Berle & Means, 1991).  
After conceptualizing the external agency relations characterizing PSFs as an 
organizational form, we have theorized and assessed empirically how various types of 
organizational controls affect the prevalence of agency problems in these relationships. 
Specifically, we segregated the governance practices of PSFs into ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
controls, and found evidence that both types of controls influence the manifestation of 
agency problems in PSFs. We found that certain ‘soft’ controls—notably socialization 
in the form of both on-the-job mentoring and off-the-job training—have a significant 
negative effect on the likelihood that lawyers employed by a given PSFs are confronted 
with complaints. In contrast, we found that certain ‘hard’ controls—in particular 
strategic planning and performance measurement practices—in fact have a significant 
positive effect on the prevalence of complaints against individual lawyers. 
These findings suggest that the type of long-established informal practices 
that feature predominantly in PSFs of the P2–type (Greenwood et al., 1990) are better 
attuned to the specific governance challenges of PSFs than the more formal practices 
characterizing  MPB-like PSFs (Cooper et al., 1996). Presumably, this is because these 
informal practices are better suited to deal with hard to observe and difficult to 
monitor professional behaviors than more formal organizational practices (Greenwood 
External agency relations and agency problems in professional service firms: A multilevel 
study 
 
107
& Empson, 2003). While the latter seem better attuned to monitoring economic 
performance, and have often been specifically adopted for that purpose, they also 
appear to ‘crowd out’ traditional professional values from PSFs (Frey & Jegen, 2001). 
In general, our findings suggest that effective corporate governance practices are likely 
to be highly specific to an organizational form, and emphasize the need for corporate 
governance researchers to move beyond the study public firms and research the 
governance challenges and practices of other organizational forms, even if the data for 
such studies is difficult to collect. 
4.5.2 Professional service firms as a distinct organizational form 
Through this study we contribute in three ways to the rapidly growing literatures on 
the PSF as a distinct organizational form (Von Nordenflycht, 2010; Zardkoohi, 
Bierman, Panina, & Chakrabarty, 2011) and on organizational forms-based theories of 
organizational design and effectiveness more broadly (Greenwood & Miller, 2010). 
First, our finding that higher involvement in strategic planning and performance 
measurement leads to a significant increase in the prevalence of opportunistic agentic 
behaviors in PSFs provides scientific underpinnings to the popular view that such 
practices are difficult to reconcile with professionalism and traditional PSF practices. 
The adoption of more business-oriented practices may help remedy certain 
organizational inefficiencies that PSFs have long been able to afford due to the highly 
regulated and institutionalized markets in which they operate (Von Nordenflycht, 
2010). Yet such practices are not simply benign instruments, and their application 
appears to jeopardize vulnerable client and third party interests. In conjunction with 
our findings on the (pre-)socialization role of university education, mentoring, and 
training, these results suggest that legal professional associations ought to devote more 
time and effort to teaching (aspiring) lawyers about the perils and proper use of 
organizational practices like strategic planning and performance measurement.   
Second, our results shed interesting light on the transition many PSFs are 
currently undertaking, away from the traditional P2 archetype into the direction of the 
MPB. It has already been documented that the adoption of more formal organizational 
control practices need not come at the expense of more informal practices, and that 
both kinds often durably co-exist as separate layers within single PSFs (Cooper et al., 
1996). Our findings indicate that there may be a functional story to tell about this 
‘sedimentation’ of organizational practices within PSFs, as the socialization practices 
that PSFs traditionally feature play a vital role in containing professional agency 
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problems. As we found that certain more formal control practices can in fact increase 
the prevalence of opportunistic agentic behaviors in PSFs, our study suggests that 
there are limits to how far PSFs can go in adopting more business-oriented 
management practices in their quest to rationalize and modernize their business 
models (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). While more research is needed on the relative 
effectiveness of specific organizational practices in curbing agency problems in PSFs, 
managing partners in professional organizations are in the mean time advised to hold 
on to their organizational form-specific and time-tested human resource management 
practices. 
Third, our findings challenge the view that reputation mechanisms in markets 
for professional services function as an important external governance mechanism. 
More specifically, the view that PSFs vouch their reputational capital to assure the 
quality and integrity of the professional services they deliver (Coffee, 2006) is 
inconsistent with the evidence presented in Table 3, Model 4. While earlier research 
suggests that reputation is an important driver of PSF performance (Greenwood et al., 
2005), our findings suggest that the value of this jointly developed and maintained 
asset alone is an insufficient safeguard for protecting PSFs collectively against the 
opportunistic agentic acts of individual professionals. Future research is therefore 
needed to explore the concrete mechanisms through which collectively held and 
maintained assets like corporate reputation influence individual behaviors. Such 
research is necessary not only to develop a more definitive understanding of whether 
and how reputation mechanisms in professional service markets can function as a 
remedy for PSF-specific agency problems, but also to help us understand better how 
PSFs might use incentives and sanctions to develop and protect their ‘intangible assets 
at risk’.  
4.5.3 Individual-level risk propensities 
Finally, our results draw greater attention to the role that individual-level risk 
propensities play in explaining the likelihood that individual lawyers will be involved 
in agency problems that lead to complaint filings by clients and interested third 
parties. For the traditional agency theory model, which is premised on the condition of 
separated ownership and control in publicly listed firms, researchers have long 
established that individual-level factors shape managers’ propensity to engage in risky 
agentic behaviors (Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). Specifically, scholars have pointed to the influence of factors like age 
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(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), educational background (Westphal & Zajac, 1995), 
experience (Hitt & Tyler, 1991) and managerial level (Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, & dePorras, 
1987) on managerial decision making. To date, however, no research is available that 
demonstrates the influence that such individual-level factors can play in the 
emergence of agency problems in alternate organizational forms that feature different 
agency relationships. 
Our study shows that individual level risk factors also play a role in the PSF 
context, where they can put additional strain on the unique types of agency 
relationships that characterize this organizational form. For example, we found that 
the type of job roles professionals can take on in PSF contexts influence the likelihood 
that they become involved in agency problems. Furthermore, the results show that 
more experienced professionals are more likely to be involved in agency problems. 
Finally, although not explicitly hypothesized, we found that lawyers’ educational 
backgrounds influence their risk propensities. While we have only just begun to 
understand the finer-grained mechanisms through which professionals  come to accept 
excessive risk and reduce the self-policing impact of professional norms on their 
behavior, our findings do point out new avenues for PSF research. In particular, they 
demonstrate the applicability of demographic (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and 
decision-making (Hitt & Tyler, 1991) theories of organizational action in the PSF 
context. Additional studies are needed to assess whether other individual-level 
characteristics, which feature prominently as explanatory variables in these behavioral 
organizational theories, similarly influence the behavior of professionals in deeply 
institutionalized contexts. 
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Chapter 5. Organizational forms and professional 
service firm outcomes: A set-theoretic study4 
 
Abstract 
Organizational forms consist of specific configurations of interconnected 
organizational practices. A recent stream of research has traced the development of 
professional service firms (PSFs) from the professional partnership (P2) configuration 
into an emerging new configuration called the managed professional business (MPB). 
Using survey data on a sample of 450 Dutch law firms, we use set-theoretic methods 
and existing organizational theories to develop propositions about the economic and 
social performance of relatively pure P2 and MPB configurations as compared to 
hybrid ones. We address the implications the existence of multiple objective functions 
of these PSF organizational configurations.  
5.1 Introduction 
Organizational sociologists and management scholars have long been interested in the 
status and position of professionals in organizational collectives and society at large 
(Schön, 1983; Sorensen & Sorensen, 1974). Yet until relatively recently, these scholars 
have primarily dedicated their research attention to a better understanding of the 
professions (Abbott, 1988; Goode, 1957; Parsons, 1939): autonomous vocations into 
which professionals are selected on the basis of specialized educational training. In 
contrast, research on professional service firms (PSFs) – commercial businesses “whose 
primary assets are a highly educated (professional) workforce and whose outputs are 
intangible services encoded with complex knowledge” (Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & 
Deephouse, 2005: 661) – did not come off the ground until relatively recently.  
Based on empirical research on Canadian accounting firms, Greenwood, 
Hinings and Brown (1990) were able to move beyond Mintzberg’s (1979) classic 
characterization of the ‘professional bureaucracy’ by developing the first full-fledged 
                                                             
4 This chapter is co-authored with Prof.Dr. J. (Hans) van Oosterhout and Prof.Dr. Pursey P.M.A.R. 
Heugens. A previous version of this paper was presented at the EGOS consortium in Gothenburg, 
2011. This paper is currently under review at the Academy of Management Journal. 
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conceptualization of PSFs, which they coined the ‘Professional Partnership’ or ‘P2 
configuration’. The core observation of Greenwood and his associates is that the P2 
configuration is an organizational form in its own right, to be distinguished from other 
forms of enterprise organization by features like its limited size, weakly developed 
strategic capabilities, and consensus-oriented decision-making (Greenwood et al., 
1990:748-752). Subsequent research on Canadian law firms by Cooper, Hinings, 
Greenwood, and Brown (1996) revealed the existence of another PSF configuration, 
which they labeled the ‘Managed Professional Business’ (MPB). Whereas the MPB 
configuration is very much a PSF, it is distinct from the P2 in terms of its larger size, 
better developed strategy function, and centralized decision-making procedures.  
Although these landmark contributions set the stage for a productive stream 
of empirical research on PSFs (Greenwood et al., 2005; Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005), they also raised a number of fundamental questions in regard to PSF 
configurations. First, as most of the foundational work on PSF configurations is 
qualitative and interpretative (e.g., Robertson, Scarbrough, & Swan, 2003; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005) or conceptual (e.g., Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Malhotra & 
Morris, 2009) in kind, we presently lack a more systematic empirical validation of the 
P2 and MPB configurations. The first research question we address is therefore: can the 
P2 and MPB configurations be discerned in populations of PSFs, or are these configurations 
merely archetypes of which extant PSFs are predominantly hybrids? Second, against the 
backdrop of contingency-theoretical explanations of the substantive and symbolic 
performance of organizational forms (Donaldson, 2001; Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985), 
the PSF literature raises the question whether the P2 and MPB configurations are well-
fitted and efficient organizational forms, or whether they owe their existence primarily 
to the competition-reducing institutional peculiarities of the professional environment 
in which they operate (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Our second research question is thus: 
do the P2 and MPB configurations outperform hybrid configurations substantively in terms of 
financial performance and symbolically in terms of reputation? Third, all PSFs serve at least 
two objectives. One is the public objective of serving vulnerable client and third-party 
interests, for example by buttressing the legal system (law firms) or by ensuring the 
materiality and transparency of information in financial markets (auditing firms). 
Another is the private objective of generating profits for the owners of the firm. Prior 
contributors have argued that PSF’s public objectives have greater currency in the P2 
configuration, while private objectives are deemed more important in the MPB 
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configuration (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). These observations 
inspire our third research question: are MPB configurations more likely to violate 
vulnerable client and third party interests than P2 configurations? 
We explore these three research questions in the context of law firms, which 
are widely acknowledged to be paradigmatic for PSFs (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). 
Furthermore, prior qualitative research has hinted at the presence of both P2 and MPB 
configurations in populations of law firms (Cooper et al., 1996; Empson, 2007). Our 
data derive from a survey amongst Dutch law firms (n = 450), allowing us to map their 
configurations and determine in each individual case whether a firm is a P2, MPB, or 
hybrid. To obtain answers to the aforementioned questions we use fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA: Fiss, 2011), a novel empirical methodology 
derived from political science. Fs/QCA is a technique that it deliberately designed to 
unravel causal complexity by applying set-theoretic methods to cross-case evidence 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Due to its reliance on computerized Boolean logic procedures, 
fs/QCA is well-equipped to handle a greater volume of cases than the handful that 
researchers can maximally deal with using traditional, non-automated comparative 
procedures (Ragin, 1987). 
Our contribution to the PSF literature is threefold. First, we empirically 
validate existing configurational conceptualizations of PSFs, by looking whether these 
apply consistently to our sample of law firms. While we find evidence for the existence 
of the MPB configuration and a somewhat modernized version of the P2 which we 
label the P2.1, (a classic P2 in all respects except for its greater emphasis on formal 
governance and/or strategy formation), we also find that the extant variety of 
organizational configurations in our sample is much larger than any of the currently 
available conceptualizations of PSFs would allow, and that the PSF landscape is 
littered with a large variety of hybrids. Second, we find that the ‘pure type’ MPB and 
P2 configurations tend to outperform hybrid configurations in both substantive and 
symbolic terms. This evidence shows that the MPB and P2 configurations are not 
simply ‘relics of the past’ (Greenwood & Empson, 2003), but fit and well-adapted 
organizational configurations that can cope well with the pressures emanating from 
their task and institutional environments. Third, we show PSFs in general have 
difficulties with serving more than one objective function simultaneously (cf. Jensen, 
2001). For smaller P2 configurations, which are primarily geared towards serving 
public objectives (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), this tension has 
no direct consequence for the type of vulnerable client and third-party interests that 
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the professions have traditionally sought to protect. For larger MPB configurations, 
however, which are principally geared towards serving private interests, these 
tensions result in higher than average incidences of organizational misconduct (Greve, 
Palmer, & Pozner, 2010). In a concluding discussion section, we discuss the managerial 
and public policy implications of these findings. 
5.2 Professional Service Firms  
In order to address our research questions with regard to organizational design 
implications, Greenwood & Miller (2010) suggest that the focus should be on a specific 
type of organization. Hence, in our study we focus on what has recently been 
conceptualized as a distinctive organizational form: the professional service firms (Von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). PSFs deliver knowledge-intensive and intangible services 
(Løwendahl, 2005) that are highly customized through intensive client consultations 
(Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999), making the knowledge they exploit difficult to 
codify and commodify. Because of the resulting inalienability of professional 
knowledge from its human carriers (Dow, 2003), PSFs are human capital intensive 
(Hitt et al., 2001), while they have little need for external financial capital (Von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). Finally, because the quality of outputs and the quantity of inputs 
is difficult to evaluate for clients and other external parties (Alvesson, 2001), PSFs 
typically operate in highly institutionalized and professionalized environments and 
are uniquely dependent on their reputation in selling and delivering their services 
(Greenwood et al., 2002).  
Because of these unique existential conditions, PSFs typically feature rather 
specific combinations of organizational practices, as they are often owned by a subset 
of their employees (Greenwood & Empson, 2003), develop and maintain their human 
and reputational resource base through a somewhat unusual combination of 
credentials-based hiring practices  (Hitt et al., 2001) and tournament-type, merit-based 
promotion procedures (Malos & Campion, 1995), and feature highly decentralized and 
collegial decision and control structures that are quite unique for enterprise 
organizations. 
Although recent work on PSFs has tried to systematically connect these 
existential conditions, organizational challenges, and the organizational practices 
adopted to meet them into an inclusive conceptualization of the PSF as an 
organizational form (Von Nordenflycht, 2010), two obstacles currently stand in the 
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way of further developing our understanding of PSFs in organizational theory. First, 
recent environmental developments have led to significant and widespread changes in 
the configuration of organizational practices that were thought to characterize the PSF. 
More specifically, the combination of practices that make up the P2 archetype seems to 
increasingly give way to a new and emergent configuration called the MPB. Second, 
the current debate on the conceptualization of the PSF as an organizational form lacks 
appropriate empirical evidence that could decide the ongoing discussion on which 
organizational practices are present in the current population of PSF. In order to 
address these obstacles, we will first set the stage by positioning the MPB and P2 
configurations. Subsequently address the importance of environmental fit, followed by 
configuration change. The proposition section will follow with an in depth focus on 
the implications of specific configurations on respectively performance, reputation and 
misbehavior. 
5.2.1 The professional partnership versus the managed professional business 
In the literature on PSFs two main organizational configurations can be discerned. 
Greenwood et al. (1990) documented the Professional Partnership. They suggest that 
professional firms rely on a different set of controls as compared to regular 
organizations, due to their specific organizational challenges. As professionals apply 
an esoteric body of knowledge—which is difficult to code into knowledge systems—to 
complex problems they enjoy high levels of discretion and autonomy in the delivery of 
their services (Greenwood et al., 1990). Additionally, senior members, who typically 
own and manage the firms, continue to contribute to the delivery of the service. They 
are often responsible for their particular practice areas and hence place priority hereon 
in favor of the entire organization. In practice this means that the strategy of the firm 
can be described as the aggregate of the partners’ individual interest (Pinnington & 
Morris, 2003). In terms of organizational systems and practices, the P2-archetype relies 
on primarily informal and collegial control mechanisms at the expense of more formal 
and hierarchical systems (Greenwood et al., 1990). 
 Another documented configuration of organizational practices within PSFs 
can de described as being more consciously managed and is dubbed the Managed 
Professional Business (Cooper et al., 1996). The underlying values of the PSF have 
shifted from the application of expertise in the interest of public service to a focus on 
efficiency and value added provision of the services rendered by the firm (Pinnington 
& Morris, 2003). Partly due to changes in legislation, economic and social trends 
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(Løwendahl, 2005) as well as financial and factor market pressures (Cooper et al., 
1996), this fundamental shift inherently involves a move away from the traditional 
forms of control. As opposed to the decentralized decision making and the peer 
supervision form of governance in the P2, the MPB features a consorted effort of formal 
means of controls coupled with formal strategizing and planning to avoid strategic 
drift (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002). Figure 1 depicts these two PSF configuration 
documented within the law industry.  
Figure 1: P2 and MPB Configurations 
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5.2.2 Organizational configurations and environmental fit 
To maximize their effectiveness, all organizations – PSFs included – strive towards fit 
with their organizational environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Drazin & Van de 
Ven, 1985; Donaldson, 1987). Coping with these environmental requirements is 
necessary in order for organizations to survive and prosper (Hage & Aiken, 1970). 
When out of sync with these demands organizations adapt their structure to reduce 
misfit (Donaldson, 1995). For PSFs one of the key environmental determinants is client 
demands.  In the traditional P2-PSFs, partners enjoy high levels of discretion in both 
day-to-day activities and their manner of supervision of their subordinates 
(Greenwood et al., 1990). On the organization level, more strategic matters are usually 
decided upon through collegial practices such as partner meetings, where decision-
making is often based on consensus. These P2 features allow for operational autonomy 
and collegial decision making style and make these types of firms uniquely suitable for 
servicing an undiversified, national and homogenous client base. However, when a 
firm diversifies into multiple law areas it is often headed by new and more 
heterogeneous partners. As a consequence the organization becomes too large, 
complex, and unwieldy when the firm continues to rely on collegial decision making 
and informal governance practices. This situation is further aggravated when the 
organization expands internationally. These contingencies result in increased internal 
agency costs due to inter-partner monitoring and collective decision making 
(Greenwood & Empson, 2003). Consequently, large and complex firms often use 
formal controls to supervise daily operations and more directive forms of decision 
making such as a managing partner or a daily board (Cooper et al., 1996). Therefore 
given the nature of the work, small, national organizations are best organized in a P2 
manner with informal controls and collegial decision making. In contrast, large 
transnational PSFs function best as MPBs by introducing directive decision making 
and more formal methods of governance. 
5.2.3 Changing configurations and getting stuck-in-the-middle 
Changes within and movement between archetypes are difficult and complex for three 
interrelated reasons (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988). First, structural inertia (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984) suggests that organizations simply do not change as they do not 
perceive and recognize the need for change as they are caught in the current design 
and underlying values (Miller & Friesen, 1984; Pettigrew, 1985). Second, if the need for 
change is perceived, it is often subject to a cost-benefit analysis that will postpone 
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change until it becomes unavoidable. Thirdly, professionals currently in politically 
powerful positions will try to sustain and advance their vested claim on scarce 
resources (Miller & Chen, 1994; Mintzberg, 1983). These resources are often intimately 
tied to the structures and processes that currently prevail in the organization, which 
makes change unlikely.  
Even though change can be hazardous (Amburgey, Kelly & Barnett, 1993; 
Sing, House & Tucker, 1986; Haveman, 1992), when it does occur the most 
documented change in PSFs is through a process called sedimentation. Sedimentation 
(Cooper et al., 1996) refers to the layering of a new set of practices atop an old 
configuration. This results in a mixture of values and practices in the new 
organizational design. However, the systems and practices in configurations require 
substantive coherence and act in a complementary way. As configurations of 
organizational practices and structures give coherence to the underlying values related 
to the institutional context (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), they are the strategic and 
structural manifestations of the dominant institutional paradigm in the field. Therefore 
these configurations reinforce the value systems underlying the P2 (a professional 
logic; Greenwood et al., 1990) and the MPB (a commercial logic; Cooper et al., 1996). 
When changing parts of the organizational configuration its complementary nature is 
compromised.  Thus we expect that sedimented organizational forms are inconsistent 
and unstable in their structures, systems and values. This would forgo the 
complementary nature of archetype-systems and result in poorer performance as 
compared to ‘pure’ organizational forms. 
5.2.4 The performance implications of organizational forms 
Given the environmental contingencies faced by the PSF, it is up to top management to 
devise an organizational strategy as bundles of resources within a firm can be used to 
support multiple and differing activities (Løwendahl, 2005; Penrose, 1959).  In order to 
assure that the organizational competitive advantage will come to the fore; the most 
important consideration for a PSF is to define its product/market strategy (Ansoff, 
1967; Løwendahl, 2005). Three strategic choices need to be considered: the type of 
clients, the geographical reach, and the type of services that are going to be delivered 
(Lorsch & Tierney, 2002; Løwendahl, 2005). First, the organization has to decide 
whether it want to service their clients as an one-stop-shop firm or whether it wishes 
to cater to specific client demands through specialty services (e.g. ‘deal’ or ‘transaction’ 
firms; Hitt et al., 2001).  Second, the firm needs to decide on level of quality they wish 
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to deliver. Generic services with low profit margins require a different set of 
organizational practices as compared to specialty services with high profit margins. 
For example, these procedure services require greater leverage as it involves 
recognizable problems with reproducible solutions executable by juniors (Maister, 
2003). Third, a PSF also needs to decide how to deal with internal client demands (Hitt 
et al., 2001), i.e. does it wish to remain a local, national player, or an international 
player. These three performance considerations are strongly related. One-stop-shop 
firms are likely to offer generic services in a global setting whereas specialized firms 
with high profit margins retain a strong home market. The PSFs organize themselves 
either in the MPB (the global & generic one-stop-shop) or the P2 (the local & 
specialized deal firms) as their different organizational configurations of processes and 
systems are unique suited to efficiently address these performance pressures. 
Organizations that are stuck-in-the-middle will not be able to as efficiently as the pure 
form, address these performance pressures and hence we propose that:  
 
Proposition 1: Pure P2 or MPB organized law firms outperform 
sedimented firms. 
5.2.5 Category spanning and reputation 
PSFs, like any other type of organization, are routinely subjected to social evaluations 
by audiences like clients, prospective employees, regulators, and competitors 
(Bitektine, 2011). Through an assessment of their substantive and symbolic features, 
such audiences assign organizations their status, legitimacy, and reputation. For PSFs, 
reputation is arguably the most important type of social evaluation, as it has been 
documented that PSFs with better reputations can charge their clients premium prices 
for their products, save on advertising costs, and enjoy a better position in the market 
for scarce professional talent (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin & Suddaby, 2008).  
As a PSF’s reputation represents a reflection on, and an evaluation of its 
features, the organizational form of the PSF directly matters for its reputation. The 
emergent literature on category spanning (Hsu, 2006; Hsu, Hannan, & Koçak, 2009) 
suggests that PSFs that closely resemble one of the two archetypical categories in a 
professional field—P2 or MPB—are likely to be assigned better reputations than 
hybrids spanning both categories. This is the case for at least three reasons. First, the 
ability of organizations to appeal to audiences decreases significantly when they 
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display features of both the P2 and the MPB. Audiences may find it difficult to make 
sense of the product offerings by hybrid organizations, and may favor the products 
offered by category specialists (Hsu, 2006). Second, hybrids are at a positioning 
disadvantage, because they compete with two discrete sets of category specialists for 
customers of legal services (Khessina & Carroll, 2008; McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll & 
Khessina, 2003). Third, audiences tend to have less confidence in the quality of the 
products offered by hybrids, as their capabilities cannot be assessed as easily by raters 
by legal services whose primary evaluation experiences are in vetting the skill sets of 
category specialists (Ruef & Patterson, 2009). In short, we propose that hybrid PSFs 
incur social penalties as compared to PSFs that specialize in a single archetypical 
category.  
 
Proposition 2: Pure P2 or MPB organized law firms have a 
better reputation as compared to sedimented firms. 
5.2.6 Professional misconduct: P2 vs. MPB  
A final outcome of PSF-design is professional misconduct. As “it is logically 
impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a 
single valued objection function” (Jensen, 2002:1). PSFs have two objective functions. 
First, as they are gatekeepers (e.g. law firms as guardians of the law and accountants 
as ensuring materiality and transparency of information in financial markets) PSFs 
have a public responsibility. Failure to address this need for integrity will lead to 
negative externalities (Liu, & Turnovsky, 2005) in delivery of services by PSFs. 
However at the same time they have a profit orientation as partner demand a return 
on their investment. Professional configurations differ in the relative importance they 
assign to these two objective functions.  To assure their effectiveness in their 
gatekeeper function (Coffee, 2006), professional organizations in the P2-configuration, 
rely on informal controls and professional norms. The MPB-configuration on the other 
hand, has strategic planning and performance management practices that pressure 
professionals to compromise professional norms and values in order to realize 
planned economic performance. This may trigger a more calculative mode of 
deliberation in professionals has been found to negatively affect cooperative 
dispositions (Frank, Gilovic, & Regan, 1993) and increase the prevalence of unethical 
behaviors (Frank & Schulze, 2000). Additionally, it may also crowd out the ‘softer’ 
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professional values that give voice to the vulnerable interests of clients and third party 
beneficiaries (Frey & Jegen, 2001). These generic practices in PSFs often conflict 
fundamentally with traditional professional practices and attitudes. We hence 
conjecture that: 
Proposition 3: P2 organized law firms have lower level of 
professional misconduct as compared to MPB or 
sedimented firms. 
5.3 Data and methods 
5.3.1 General overview 
Any attempt at theoretical development requires the interplay between theory and 
method (Van Maanen, Sørensen & Mitchell, 2007). Theories without any 
methodological foundation are likely to receive little empirical support. Methods that 
stand removed from theory can be technically sophisticated but uninformative to 
extant theory. Research on organizational configurations offers a unique arena to 
address this interplay between theories and methods. Organizational configurations 
take a holistic and systemic approach to studying organizations, rather than focusing 
on individual elements that are related to an organizational outcome. By studying 
these interrelated patterns configuration research is able to describe, explain and 
predict (Short, Payne & Ketchen Jr., 2008). Description is done through studying 
organizational patterns along key dimensions that are prevalent across organizations. 
Subsequently these patterns can be explained through the use of extant theories such 
as contingency theory. Finally, based on these explanations and descriptions, 
organizational configuration research is able to predict which sets of firms are likely to 
be successful given a set of contingencies. The most appropriate methodology to 
conduct configuration research is set theoretic-methods: “set-theoretic methods 
contribute to theory building by providing a rigorous way to combine verbal 
statements with logical relationships…allowing for the expression of complex causal 
relations in ways that generate new insights for organizational theory” (Fiss, 2007: 
1181). Through fs/QCA, we will apply set-theory to our sample of Dutch law firms.  
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5.3.2 Sample & research design 
Archetypes as suggested by Short et al. (2008) are context specific organizational 
configurations based on the presence or absence of organizational features that include 
strategic, structural and procedural elements. However data on organizational features 
in the Dutch law industry is not readily available due to limited disclosure obligations. 
Hence, for the purpose of this study, we constructed a survey instrument that aims to 
tap into the organizational features that, identified by previous literature (e.g. 
Greenwood et al., 1990; Pinnington & Morris, 2003), are reminiscent of the P2 and the 
MPB archetypes. We developed our survey in line with recommendations made by 
Dillman (2007). For our measurement instrument, we first used psychometric scales 
validated in prior studies. If such scales were unavailable, we developed new scales 
based on development procedures suggested by Hinkin (1998) and Steenkamp and 
Van Trijp (1991). First, through inductive and deductive reasoning possible items for 
scales were generated. Subsequently, in the second step, these items were judged both 
in terms of their content validity and their relevance, by an expert panel comprised of 
10 academics specialized in strategy and organization processes and 10 lawyers. As 
final three steps, the scales were tested for their internal consistency, their 
measurement properties through CFA and their convergent and discriminant analysis.  
All our scales were measured on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 represented ‘strongly 
disagree’ and 7 ‘strongly agree’.  
The survey was administered online to all Dutch lawyers in 2008 using Global 
Park survey administration (www.globalpark.com). We received a mailing list that 
included 6323 lawyers working for 1678 independent law firms with 2 or more 
lawyers from the Dutch Bar Association. The first wave resulted in 480 completed 
responses. Following a reminder after 4 weeks another 443 responses were collected, 
making a total of 923 completed surveys representing a response rate of 14.6%. These 
lawyers represented 450 different law firms, covering 26.8% of all firms. Of the group 
of firms staffed with 2 – 5 lawyers, we have 14.8% in the sample (175 firms); of the 
group with 6 - 10 lawyers we have 43.0% (122 firms); of the group of firms with 11-60 
lawyers we have 70.5% (129 firms); and of the final group with more than 60 lawyers 
we have responses from all firms, i.e. covering 100% (24 firms) of the sample frame. 
This sample shows significant variation in terms of size, structure, strategy and 
governance.  
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5.3.3 Outcome measures 
For our analysis we use three different types of dependent variables. First we use firm 
performance. Normally research on PSF-performance uses profits per partner as proxy 
of firm performance. In the Dutch context however, limited disclosure obligations 
make it impossible to use this measure as indicative of firm performance. Additionally 
the expert panel indicated that profits per partner did not fully capture what lawyers 
would consider good firm performance. Hence we constructed a performance measure 
based on inductive item generation through interviews with the expert panel and the 
deductive generation through the use of literature of PSF performance.  This process 
resulted in four different facets that lawyers suggest constitute good firm performance: 
profits, organizational efficiency, attraction of quality staff, and customer retention. 
The profits items included statements such as “my firm successfully achieved a high 
profits-per-partner ratio” and “my firm realized a large growth in profits”. Through 
items such as “my firm successfully developed or maintained a very efficiency 
organization structure” and “achieved a low overhead percentage” we measured 
organizational efficiency. Attraction of quality personnel was measured by asking 
whether the firm was successful in attracting the best interns, junior lawyers and 
senior lawyers. Finally, based on DeSarbo, Di Benedetto, Song and Sinha (2005) we 
measured customer retention by asking whether the firm was successful in retaining 
its largest clients, and able to attract new clients. In all these four facts comprised 16-
items that shows very good reliability (Cronbach’s ǂ = .84) and explained 62.0% of the 
variance. Subsequent confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) shows a satisfactory fit with 
the data (ǘ2 = 860.46, df = 98, CFI = .85, NFI = .83, RMRS = .12) All factor loadings are 
significant.  
Reputation, our second dependent variable is measured using the four-item 
scale developed by Combs & Ketchen Jr. (1999). As the quality of the inputs as well as 
the quality of the services lawyers render is difficult for clients to judge, reputation is 
often used as proxy and therefore constitutes a key resource for PSFs. The scale shows 
very good reliability (Cronbach’s ǂ = .88) explaining 75.3% variance and confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) shows excellent fit with the data (ǘ2 = 14.38, df = 2, CFI = .99, NFI 
= .99, RMRS = .02) All factor loading are significant. 
The misconduct scale is self-developed and aims to measure the extent of 
misbehavior within the firm. The items (e.g. “how often do employees break formal 
rules set by the Dutch Bar Association?”) tap into clear examples of misconduct. The 6 
item scale proves to be very reliable (Cronbach’s ǂ = .83) covering 54.9% of the 
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variance. CFA shows satisfactory measurement properties (ǘ2 = 202.31, df = 9, CFI = 
.87, NFI = .87, RMRS = .09) All factor loadings are significant. 
5.3.4 Independent measures 
Our independent measures are aimed to tap into the difference in organizational 
practices between the P2 and MPB archetype. Organizational diversification measures the 
ratio of different law practice areas the firm is engaged in where 1 represents a firm 
that is completely diversified covering all 18 identified law practice areas. Often P2 
archetype firms are relatively small and only have the expertise to service a narrow 
range of different law areas. Hence we expect for low levels organizational 
diversification to be associated with the P2 form, whereas the MPB firms are typically 
more diversified. The median score of diversification was .50 with a standard 
deviation of .21. 
The strategy planning scale we use contains 20 items and is adapted from 
Rogers, Miller and Judge (1999). It focuses on the extent of the existence of ‘goals, 
plans and scanning’ for potential markets and clients, ‘accounting control’, ‘integration 
and coordination’ and ‘flexibility’. The original scale has 21 items; however on the 
advice of expert panel we dropped the final two items that captured the ‘broad 
analysis’ dimension of the scale. Also we added one item (“we have a written business 
plan”) in the “goals, plans and scanning” dimension. The items combines into a 
reliable scale (Cronbach’s ǂ = .92) explaining 64.7% of the variance. CFA shows 
satisfactory measurement properties (ǘ2 = 727.01, df = 164, CFI = .96, NFI = .95, RMRS 
= .06) All factor loadings are significant. For this scale, given the literature, we expect 
that the P2 archetype firms exhibit low levels of strategic planning, whereas the large 
and complex nature associated with the MPB demand extensive planning.  
We measure the presence of formal governance using a self-created 8-items 
scale that aims to tap into the absence or presence of formal governance in the firm. It 
contains items as “in my firm all employees undergo formal periodic performance 
appraisals” and “a lot of time is invested in the development of procedures that ensure 
financial integrity.” These 8 items form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s ǂ = .78) and 
explains 53.8% of the variance. CFA shows excellent measurement properties (ǘ2 = 
37.45, df = 99, CFI = .99, NFI = .97, RMRS = .03) All factor loadings are significant.  
Similar to the argument for strategic planning, we expect formal governance to be 
limited for the P2 firms whereas it is extensive for the MPB firms. 
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 In contrast, the presence of informal governance systems should be more 
prevalent with the P2 firms as a means to ensure efficiency and combat misbehavior. 
For the MPB firms this is largely replaced by formal governance systems. Sample items 
include “there is significant informal information exchange in relation to the goals set 
by the organization” and “it is completely normal for coworkers to point out potential 
mistakes or inappropriate behavior to each other”. The four items of the self-
constructed scale prove reliable (Cronbach’s ǂ = .79) and explain 59.5% of the variance. 
CFA shows excellent measurement properties (ǘ2 = 2.23, df = 2, CFI = .1, NFI = .1, 
RMRS = .01) All factor loadings are significant. 
A final point of divergence between the P2 and the MPB archetype rests with 
its decision making procedures. The P2 decision making structure reflects the collegial 
nature of this configuration. Decision making is done by reaching consensus. However 
this form of decision making is inefficient for MPBs. Due to its large size and often 
complex structure, MPB firms rely on forms of directive decision making to speed up 
the decision making process. Therefore we constructed a three point scale that 
captures the manner of decision making. If the organization uses a ‘board of directors’ 
we took this to signify the most directive form of decision making. When decisions 
were still made in partner meetings this is less directive in nature. Subsequently, the 
manner in which decisions are made-either though voting or consensus-is used to 
differentiate between this form of decision making. The consensus form is the least 
directive, the more unanimous, in nature, whereas voting during partnership meetings 
lies between the unanimous and board of director form.  
For our operationalization of organizational structure, we include two 
measures. The first is internationalization. This measure included three points of 
reference: not active internationally, active in one other country, active in two or more 
countries.  
Our second measure for organizational structure is organizational size. We 
classify firms with fewer than 10 lawyers as small, those with 15 as medium sized and 
firms with more than 20 lawyers as large.  
 To summarize, given the literature on configurations, we believe that the 
MPB firms are likely to be large, international and diversified, whereas the P2 is small, 
national and undiversified. Consequently given these contingencies,  we believe P2 
firms should score low on strategic planning, formal governance, high on informal 
governance and exhibit a collegial decision making structure. In turn we believe that MPB 
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firms should score high on strategic planning, formal governance, low on informal 
governance, and exhibit a directive decision making structure.  
5.3.5 Construct validity 
Convergent and discriminant validity. Besides judging a survey instrument on the 
reliability and measurement properties of its scales, it is also necessary to address 
issues of convergent and discriminant validity. A construct is said to have convergent 
validity when the multiple indicators used to measure the construct are positively and 
significantly correlated (Carime & Zeller, 1979). Using structural equations modeling 
(SEM) this can be discerned by looking at the factor loading of the items underlying 
the latent variable (Steenkamp & Van Trijp, 1991). As we reported above, the survey 
scales we use all have significant and positive standardized factor loadings thus 
indicating the convergent validity of our survey instrument. A survey instrument is 
said to possess discriminant validity when the theoretical constructs under 
investigation are not highly significantly correlated with each other. When this is the 
case, the latent variables indeed measure different constructs (Carmine & Zeller, 1979).  
This can also be assessed using SEM through comparing a unconstrained confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) model (in which all correlations are freely estimated) with 
models in which pairs of latent variables are set to unity, i.e. fully correlate with each 
other. This is done by setting the covariance between the constructs to 1. We estimated 
these models for each pair of latent variables. When all models show worse fit as 
compared to the freely estimated CFA model, a survey instrument is said to be 
discriminantly valid. This proves to be the case as all model show significantly lower 
fit.  
 Common method variance. Except for our variable organization size, all data was 
obtained from our survey instrument.  This exposes our analyses to the presence of 
common method bias. In order to test the extent of this problem we use two 
procedures. First as suggested by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff (2003) we 
estimated common method variance through a three model procedure. As an initial 
step a single method factor model is estimated. This means that the entire 
measurement model is loaded on a single latent variable. This model yielded a model 
fit of ǘ2 = 18658.48, p <.0000 df = 1595, RMSEA = .154. When we compare this model to 
the actual measurement model, its properties are considerable worse: ǘ2 = 4437.58, p 
<.0000 df = 1517, RMSEA = .065; Ʀ ǘ2 = 14247.90, Ʀ df = 78, p <.0000.  The next step 
entails estimating a trait and method model, wherein the items are loaded not only on 
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their respective latent variables but also on the single method factor. When that model 
shows better measurement properties as compared to the measurement model, it 
indicates the presence of common method variance (Williams, Cote, & Buckley, 1989). 
This proved to be case: ǘ2 = 3717.74, p <.0000 df = 1446, RMSEA = .059; Ʀ ǘ2 = 719.84, Ʀ 
df = 71, p <.0000.  The amount of common method variance can subsequently be 
determined on the basis of the sum of squared loadings associated with the method 
factor. Where the common cut-off point is at 25 percent as suggested by Williams et al. 
(1989), our common method variance only adds up to 6.7%. Another common test for 
the presence of single method bias is Harman’s single-factor test. If indeed a problem, 
an unrotated principal component factor solution should show that a single factor 
explains a significant portion of the variance. In our case, the largest factor only covers 
17% percent of the variance and the first 4 factors contribute to only 23.8% of the 
variance explained. This indicates that are results are not driven by one general factor, 
thus suggesting that common method variance does not seriously bias our results. 
5.3.6 Calibration 
An important step in the process of conducting fs/QCA analysis involves the 
calibration of the variables. This requires specifying anchor values using the 
measurement scores of the variables such that they can be calibrated to fit into 
membership sets. The anchors values are specified based on theoretical foundations 
and descriptive statistics. Three of these anchors need to be specified. The first assigns 
cases into the category for the full membership. For example a researcher can specify a 
value that, when crossed, warrants inclusion into the membership set of high-
performing firms. This value additionally means that variance over that particular 
value is considered irrelevant. Whether a firm is just over this value or to a large extent 
is treated as similar, both are assigned the value of 1. Similarly a threshold value is 
specified for low-performing membership set. All cases below this value are assigned 
the value zero. Finally, the researcher needs to specify a value that is termed the 
crossover point. If a value is higher than the crossover threshold but below the full 
membership anchor this indicates that a case is more in than out.  When this value is 
lower than the crossover point but above the fully-out anchor, the observation is more 
out-than in.  For each of our scales, which we averaged, we used the median score as 
crossover point.  For the full non-membership and full membership anchors 
respectively, we subtracted and added 1 standard deviation from this value. Size, 
internationalization and decision making where calibrated using the points of the 
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categories indicated at the variable description. Using the “direct method” of 
calibration described by Ragin (2008), the anchors can be used to transform the 
variables into measures between 0 and 1, suitable for fs/QCA. “The basic intuition 
underlying this calibration is that it rescales an interval variable using the crossover 
point as an anchor from which deviation scores are calculated, with the values of full 
membership and full non-membership as the upper and lower bounds” (Fiss, 2011: 
35). The transformation was done using the compute command in version 2.5 of 
fs/QCA. Additionally Ragin (2009) suggests the avoidance of the precise value of .5 as 
this score is difficult to analyze. Therefore following Fiss (2011) we randomly added 
and subtracted .001 from the observations of .5.  
5.3.7 Analysis 
To test our hypotheses, we employ fs/QCA. This method is grounded in set theory 
and is particularly suited for testing causal processes that underlie typologies (Fiss, 
2011). In a nutshell, fs/QCA explores how membership of cases in causal conditions is 
linked to membership in the specified outcomes (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop & 
Paunescu, 2010). This also opens up the possibility for analyzing conjectural causation, 
meaning that it is the combinations of conditions rather than a single condition that 
leads to certain outcome. This suggests the presence of complementarities between 
causal conditions. Additionally the results of the analysis can indicate multiple paths 
that lead to a similar outcome, thereby introducing the idea of equifinality (Fiss, 2007). 
In specific the ability of fs/QCA to discern between core and peripheral conditions, 
allows for drawing conclusions on 1st and 2nd order equifinality. This method is also 
able to address issues of asymmetric causality. The reverse of the combinations of 
conditions that lead to high scores of the outcome variable do not necessarily lead to 
low scores on the same outcome variable. It may be that other causal conditions result 
in for instance poor performance. In our analysis, we will report both the causal 
configurations that lead to high scores on the outcome as well as the causal 
configurations that will lead to low scores.  
 Standard statistical methods are unable to unveil similar results. Although 
regression analyses can be augmented and suggest complementarities through 
interaction effects, they still assume a single path leading to a certain outcome 
(Grandori & Furnari, 2008), i.e. the method is unable to address the concept of 
equifinality. Additionally although three way interactions are currently a possibility 
for regression methods its interpretation is inherently difficult (Drazin & Van der Ven, 
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1985). It will become impossible to interpret when, as in our case, 6 variables are 
introduced and causally connected. This would lead to six way interactions. Also, 
cluster and factor analysis are unable to differentiate between core and peripheral 
conditions in the combinations that lead to a certain outcome. In all fs/QCA is better 
suited to investigate the complementary nature of configurations.  
To empirically accomplish our fs/QCA analysis we follow the three step 
approach as suggested by Fiss (2011). The first step is to construct a truth matrix and 
“each row of this table is associated with a specific combination of attributes, and the 
full table thus lists all possible combinations” (p. 25). The empirical cases are 
subsequently sorted in these possible combinations, where some rows may have large 
numbers of observations, some a few and some none at all.  
Second, minimal consistency levels and number of cases are indicated. 
Consistency refers to extent that cases correspond to the set-theoretic relationships in 
all possible solutions. This consistency is thus the proportion of cases that exhibit a 
certain configuration divided by the number of cases that exhibit the same 
configuration but do not exhibit the outcome. Additionally the level of consistency is 
adjusted by given small penalties for minor inconsistencies and large penalties for 
major inconsistencies. We set the lowest consistency score threshold for solutions at 
>.80, which is in line with previous work (Fiss, 2011). However, we were more 
stringent in the necessary number of minimal acceptable cases. Important 
considerations in the number-of-cases threshold are the total number of cases, the 
number of causal conditions, the substantive knowledge of the researchers regarding 
the cases, the degree of calibration precisions, the extent of measurement and 
assignment error and the interest of the researcher in either fine- or coarse-grained 
patters (Ragin, 2009). Given the large number of cases in our dataset, the number of 
admitted solutions would significantly increase when the boundary would be set to 3 
as done in previous research. This allows us to err on the side of caution as 
membership in a category may be caused by measurement or coding error. Hence low-
frequency causal combinations are treated similar to those combinations that lack 
strong empirical instance altogether (Ragin, 2009). We set the number-of-cases 
threshold to a minimum of 6 observations. For the dependent variables high-
performance 116, for high-reputation 26 and for high-misconduct 49 cases exceed both 
thresholds. For the negated outcomes (i.e. the low-performance, low-reputation and 
low-misconduct outcomes) we have respectively, 106, 137 and 56 cases.  
Chapter 5 
 
130
Finally, Boolean algebra will be used to logically reduce the number of truth 
table rows to simplified combinations. As a limited number of variables can result in a 
large number of truth tables rows, the result is that there are no or a limited number of 
observations in each of these rows. Counterfactual analysis allows overcoming this 
lack of empirical variation. We distinguish between two types of outcomes. We 
present the parsimonious solution that includes both the “easy” and “difficult” 
counterfactuals. Easy counterfactuals are situations in which a redundant causal 
condition is added to a combination of conditions that already lead to the desired 
outcome. Difficult counterfactual relates to situations where a condition is removed 
from a set of combinations that lead to the outcome given that this condition is 
redundant. Also, we present the intermediate outcome that deals only with easy 
counterfactuals. On the basis of these two outcomes core and peripheral conditions are 
identified. Core conditions are those not eliminated from the parsimonious solution, 
while those eliminated can be seen as peripheral, interchangeable conditions.  
5.4 Results  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all measures. The table 
shows the expected positive correlations between size, strategic planning, 
diversification, formal governance, directive decision making and internationalization 
and the expected negative correlation between size and informal governance. Likewise 
diversification is positively correlated with strategic planning and formal governance 
and internationalization.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
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5.4.1 High & low performance configurations 
Table 2 shows the results for the fuzzy-set analyses of high and low performance. The 
notation used, follows that introduced by Ragin and Fiss (2008). Full circles represent 
the presence of a condition, the crossed-out circles the absence of a condition. Blank 
spaces represent ‘don’t care’ situations in which the causal condition may either be 
present or absent. Large circles are core features that are present in both the 
intermediate and the parsimonious solution. Peripheral features-the small circles-are 
conditions present only in the intermediate solution. 
 
Table 2: High & low performance configurations 
 High performance Low performance 
 Generalist  MPB Small 
national  
Star Misfit 
1 
Misfit 
2 
Unmanaged 
firm 
Structure 1a 1b 2 3 1 2 3 
High Diversification 3 3  I 3 3 I
Large Size I 3 I I I I
International I  I I I I I
Practices       
Strategy formation 3 3 3   I I
Formal Governance 3 3 I 3 I I I
Directive Decision 
making 
I  I I I I 
Informal 
Governance 
 I 3 I  I I
        
Consistency .79 .85 .77 .80 .80 .84 .81 
Raw coverage .14 .14 .12 .16 .24 .20 .27 
Unique coverage .05 .08 .04 .07 .07 .04 .15 
        
Overall solution 
coverage 
.46 .43 
Overall solution 
consistency 
.78 .78 
 
The solution table of the fuzzy-set analysis for high performance shows that 
there are four different conjectural causal configurations possible with acceptable 
consistency scores5. These outcomes point to the presence of first-order, or so-called 
across-type equifinality. In other words there are different causal combinations that 
                                                             
5 The configuration tables for performance, reputation and misconduct show only those configuration 
that have unique coverage scores of .03 and higher. Those configurations that have lower coverage 
score are shown in the appendix. 
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lead to a high performance outcome. Additionally, a number of neutral permutations 
exist in solution 1 that suggests second-order or within-type equifinality, i.e. the 
presence of core and peripheral conditions. The first two configurations that lead to 
high-performance, solution 1a and 1b, show the same core conditions, the main 
difference is between them is firm size. The original template for the P2 suggests a lack 
of strategy formation and formal governance, coupled with the presence of informal 
governance and unanimous decision making. We dubbed solution 1a the generalist. 
The outcomes suggest that the original collegial mechanisms have partly been replaced 
by more formal practices to adapt to its contingency of high diversification. The 
generalist has collegial decision making, and the presence or absence of informal 
governance is a don’t care situation. However, strategy formation and formal 
governance are core conditions when coupled with high levels of diversification. 
Solution 1b is largely in line with the configuration suggested by the MPB. It has 
strategy formation, formal governance and high levels of diversification as core 
conditions, with the absence informal governance as a peripheral condition.  
 Solutions 2 and 3 are small, national, undiversified firms. Here formal 
processes are combined with informal processes. In configuration 2 strategy formation 
is complementary with the informal governance. In configuration 3, formal 
governance is a necessity if there is an absence of informal governance. 
Proposition 1 suggests that sedimented firms should perform worse as 
compared to pure configurations as they suffer from system misfit. Additionally, 
contingency factors should determine the practices necessary to ensure proper 
functioning. The three configurations listed below seem to only partly confirm this 
hypothesis. Both solutions 1 and 2 lend credence to the contingency argument. Both 
configurations have high levels of diversification but lack any sort of system to 
regulate and organize this contingency. Solution 3 is basically an unmanaged firm, 
therefore unsurprisingly leading to poor internal coordination and low levels of 
performance. For high performance however, the hybrid organizations (solutions 1a, 3 
& 4) are high performing firms together with the MPB. The original P2 form is not 
among the high-performance configurations. 
5.4.2 High & low reputation configurations 
Solution table 3 presented below shows the configurations of the fuzzy-set analyses for 
high and low reputation. Interestingly, the number of configurations that lead to high 
levels of reputation show fewer numbers of outcomes as compared to the analysis for 
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high performance configurations. Additionally the outcomes are also different in terms 
of causal conditions. Solution 1, which we dubbed the P2.1, indicates a firm that has low 
levels of diversification, no internationalization and small in size, still should have 
strategic formation and formal governance, but definitely not mix this with the 
traditional P2 practice of informal governance. In contrast, international organizations 
should have informal governance coupled with formal practices. The absence of mixed 
elements is also evident in the MPB configuration which neatly overlaps with the 
theoretical predictions. Firms large, diversified and international in nature, require 
strategic formation, formal governance and especially directive decision making 
combined with a lack of informal governance. Overall this suggests that audiences 
indeed evaluate firms showing coherence in their practices more favorably as 
compared to mixed ones. However audiences do demand that firms show the quality 
of their formal systems even if firms might not require them given their size and 
limited diversification.  
Table 3: High & low reputation configurations 
 High reputation Low reputation 
 P2.1 International Star MPB Misfit 
configuration  
Unmanaged 
firm  
Structure 1 2 3 1 2 
High Diversification I I 3 3 
Large Size I I 3  I
International I 3 3 I I
Practices     
Strategy formation 3 3 3 I 
Formal Governance 3 3 3 I I
Directive Decision 
making 
I I 3 I I
Informal Governance I 3 I I I
      
Consistency .80 .82 .80 .81 .80 
Raw coverage .12 .05 .04 .12 .26 
Unique coverage .11 .04 .04 .03 .09 
      
Overall solution 
coverage 
.20 .48 
Overall solution 
consistency 
.80 .75 
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The results for the low reputation analysis show overlap with those of the low 
performance category. Of the two configurations leading to low performance one is 
identical to configurations leading to low performance. Configuration 1 (similar to 
configuration 2 for low performance) shows that audiences judge firms that do not 
responded to contingency factors properly, poorly. Configuration 2 is an unmanaged 
firm that lacks formal and informal governance and is judged as poorly led as it has 
unanimous decision making.  
In all proposition two is to some degree accepted. The MPB is among the high 
reputation configurations and the international star is well adapted to its 
contingencies. On the other hand, the P2 form is not among the high reputation 
configurations yet its revised form the P2.1 is. Unsurprisingly, In terms of low 
reputation, poorly managed and ill-adapted configurations are punished by their 
audiences. 
5.4.3 High & low misconduct configurations 
The solution table for high and low misconduct (table 4) shows a slightly different 
picture as compared to the two tables presented above. A core characteristic shared by 
the two outcomes for high levels of misconduct is organizational size coupled with the 
peripheral condition of high levels of diversity. These firms are apparently overly large 
and complex that, even when managed formally, misbehavior cannot be rooted out.  
Significant in these findings are also that solution 1a is seen also in another 
outcome. 1a is similar to the MPB configuration that leads to high performance. Hence 
what is good for performance does not ensure the proper functioning of the 
organization in terms of upholding professional ethics. This confirms proposition three 
that a firm cannot maximize on more than one objective function. The second solution 
that results in misbehavior by lawyers rests again in a contingency situation where 
being large and diversified without any form of practices offers little in the way of 
control. 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from the configurations in the low 
misconduct category is that, again size matters. Small firms are the only type of firms 
that show low levels of misconduct. Additionally, of these solutions only solution 4 is 
found in previous analysis. In was also present in the high reputation analysis. 
Configuration 1 and 2 show one important element that is not observed in any other 
configuration until now. It combines the presence of one of the formal mechanisms 
governance or strategizing with informal governance. 
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Table 4: High & low misconduct configurations 
 High misconduct Low misconduct 
 MPB Misfit 1 Small 
formalizing 
P2 
Small 
formalizing 
P2 
Small 
Generalist  
International 
Star 
Structure 1a 1b 1 2 3 4 
High 
Diversification 
3 3 I I 3 I
Large Size 3 3 I I I I
International  I I I I 3
Practices      
Strategy 
formation 
3 I I 3 3 3
Formal 
Governance 
3 I 3 I 3 3
Directive 
Decision making 
 I I I I I
Informal 
Governance 
I I 3 3 I 3
       
Consistency .88 .87 .81 .82 .80 .86 
Raw coverage .16 .07 .19 .11 .08 .05 
Unique coverage .09 .03 .12 .04 .04 .03 
       
Overall solution 
coverage 
.21 .31 
Overall solution 
consistency 
.84 .80 
 
Small, undiversified, non-international firms seem to benefit from a healthy dose of 
formal processes; however the P2 elements of informal governance and unanimous 
decision making are also necessary. When diversification comes into play, as shown in 
configuration 3, the informal governance gives way to both formal elements. These 
result support proposition three that the P2 is best equipped to handle matters of 
professional misconduct, with the caveat that is does require an investment in at least 
some formal processes. 
5.5 Discussion 
The objective of this paper is to add to the discussion on organizational configurations 
by integrating different theoretical perspectives and by focusing on a single distinctive 
organizational form: the PSFs (Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Based on an analysis of these 
themes in the context of Dutch law firms, the contributions of our study are threefold. 
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First, contributors to the PSF literature have previously documented two 
organizational configurations, the P2 and the MPB (Greenwood et al., 1990; Cooper et 
al., 1996). However their description has been based on interpretative case studies, and 
with the notable exception of Pinnington and Morris (2003), the extent of their 
applicability in the entire domain of a professional industry such as law and 
accounting has not been researched. Additionally, the original descriptions of these 
two configurations are approximately two decades old. Under the influence of recent 
economic upheavals (Løwendahl, 2005), they may in reality have been subject to 
change. Our sample, the Dutch law industry, provides an opportunity to validate these 
prior conceptualizations of the PSF, and assess their relative prevalence in a 
competitive organizational field. In our analyses, a number of different observations 
come to the fore. First, we find evidence that the MPB is indeed a common 
organizational configuration, and that it has persisted to this day in much the same 
form as was originally described by Cooper and his associates (1996). Second, 
however, our results also show that the P2-archetype, while still discernable, no longer 
exists in exactly the same form as first described by Greenwood and his colleagues 
(1990). Specifically, we observe that, consistent with the broader societal trend towards 
formalization, efficiency, and commercialization (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), law 
firms are also subject to these institutional forces. Originally the P2-archetype relied 
exclusively on informal and collegial manners of supervision and control. Yet we find 
that especially the reliance on the informal governance practices has been wholly 
replaced by formal governance and strategy formation processes. However, consensus 
decision making remains the most adequate form of inter-partner interaction. To 
highlight this change that has occurred in the P2 configuration, we dubbed this form 
the P2.1. However, due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, we cannot claim this is 
part of a broader configurational evolution in the form of sedimentation of the MPB 
configuration on the P2 configuration. In sum, as long as we account for some minor 
differences in the P2 configuration that can readily be interpreted as structural 
adaptations to newly emerged contingences in the institutional landscape, MPB and 
P2.1 configurations still dominate the population of Dutch law firms.  
Second, we have assessed the causal links between the various types of 
configurations present in the Dutch law industry and their substantive and symbolic 
performance. What is noteworthy about these analyses is that we detected that only 
P2.1 and MPB configurations are present in the Dutch law industry, but also a number 
of different hybrid configurations. Whereas such hybrid configurations have been 
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described in the literature as being unstable and inconsistent in their values, systems, 
and structures (Gray, 1999), our analyses show that they do not necessarily yield poor 
performance. While we cannot assess whether these hybrids are stable or unstable, 
their performance and reputation implications are often positive. On the other hand, 
the MPB configuration in its purest form appears to be the most powerful 
configuration for generating high substantive and symbolic performance. These results 
seem to support a generic structural contingency theory-based take on PSF 
performance (Greenwood & Miller, 2010), indicating that the success of PSF 
configurations is dependent on the contingencies these firms face. Internationalization, 
for example, requires PSFs to use informal governance for coordination across borders. 
Similarly, high levels of diversification or increased size require formal governance 
and strategy formation in order to provide the integration and coordination necessary 
to safeguard high substantive and symbolic performance in complex and opaque 
organizational environments. Inversely, not responding to these contingencies leads to 
substantive and symbolic performance, and high levels of misconduct. In sum, while 
the P2.1 and the MPB are stably amongst the highest-performing configurations, 
hybrids can also realize acceptable performance, as long as they emerge out of 
adaptations to crucial contingency factors.  
Our third contribution entails an improved understanding of what produces 
the darker side of organizational configurations. Specifically, our answer to the 
question as to what causes PSFs to engage in misconduct (Greve et al., 2010) and 
jeopardize vulnerable client and third party interests lies in the tradeoffs that PSFs 
must necessarily make when combining public and private objective functions. In 
general, PSF research treats these two objectives as being separate, while the findings 
we have reported suggest the necessity of conjoint analysis. One part of research on 
PSFs relates to the performance implications of PSF management practices, and thus 
highlights the maximization of the private objective function (e.g., Greenwood et al, 
2005; Hitt et al., 2005). This first branch of the PSF literature stresses that PSFs are very 
affluent enterprises that are superior vehicles for creating wealth for their owners 
(Aharoni, 1993). Another part of the research on PSFs research focuses on the societal 
impact PSFs have, and stress the maximization of the public objective function. In this 
second branch of the literature, PSFs are primarily seen as stimulators and guardians 
of the economic order. In their role as stimulators, PSFs help shape the industries of 
their clients in positive ways. Specifically, they are often heralded as knowledge 
engines (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002), which through their innovations (Alvesson, 1995) 
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and solutions to complex organizational problems stimulate the value creation process 
within their clients’ firms (Hansen et al., 1999; Løwendahl, Revang, and Fosstenløkken, 
2001). In their role as guardians, PSFs are primarily portrayed as gatekeepers (Coffee, 
2006), vouching for their clients’ legitimacy by staking their reputation on the validity 
of their complex business transactions. 
What our empirical results show, however, is that it is absolutely critical to 
assess the private and public objective functions of PSFs simultaneously when vetting 
the effectiveness and desirability of any PSF configuration in particular. For example, 
the MPB configuration offers an organizational design that does well in terms of the 
private objective function by ensuring high substantive and symbolic performance, but 
it does so at the cost of poor outcomes on the public objective function: the MPB scores 
very high in terms of the level of organizational misconduct it produces. The absence 
of strong informal governance, through which professionals can collegially correct one 
another’s misdeeds and which is one of the hallmarks of the original P2-configuration, 
is the key ingredient that is missing in these firms. As our analyses suggest, informal 
governance can be used as a complement to or as a substitute for formal governance 
when organizational size, complexity, and scope are minimal. However when PSFs 
grow, diversify, or internationalize, they require more formal governance. 
Promisingly, however, our results show that there are a number of small firm 
configurations that are seemingly able to balance both the public and private objective 
functions, but only to the extent that these involve symbolic performance and 
avoidance of misconduct. In short, senior managers of PSFs and public policy makers 
ought to be aware of the inherent tradeoffs between the private and public objective 
functions of PSFs. As our analyses show, any attempt to further stimulate the 
substantive and symbolic performance of PSFs beyond a satisfactory minimum is 
likely to generate a weaker score on the public objective function and result in greater 
misconduct.
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Firms strategies in chapter 2 
Firm: A STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Defiance R1: Yes, we are trying to increase 
the number of advisory products.  
Training Manipulate  R1: We have created a bachelor in 
cooperation with a university to 
train our people to be able to 
advise clients. 
(Advisory) Services Formal business 
development 
Defiance R2: We have hired a business 
manager, and with him a strategy 
for new product development 
mainly related to automation. 
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Defiance R2: We want to provide business 
through a full service concept, but 
also want to hold on to the bottom 
of the market. 
Mentality 
professionals 
General mentality Compromise R1: You need to offer good salary 
packages but also education. You 
really need to offer them options.  
Automation of 
services 
Portals/ Online 
Service 
Manipulate R1: We are way ahead in terms of 
web based access. We give 
presentations on it, to show that. 
XBRL Compromise R3: We do too little. However, it 
is a key point for us to increase 
efficiency in the audit. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce R1: A non-professional need to be 
very good to be accepted by a 
professional, I doubt we would 
accept a non-professional at a 
similar level.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Compromise  R1: I would be in favor of more 
directive decision making, but you 
need to know when you are 
directive or when you need to 
convince.  
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Acquiesce R2: Another sore spot is the 
reward system. Everyone gets the 
same based on a point system, but 
we do not have a differentiated 
performance pay system. 
Evaluation Defiance R2: Our performance system has 
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functionality  criteria such as how good are you 
with your clients, what is your 
profitability and how satisfied are 
your people. 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R3: It has been debated whether to 
merge locations, however a lot of 
people were against it. 
Critical mass Defiance R2: You need a large club to get 
scale advantages from you IT 
investments, as well as being able 
to specialize.  
Separation audit & 
advisory 
Acquiesce R3: Our firm still has a mixed 
practice, so we did not separate 
audit and advice. 
Service lines  Compromise R1: It is a matrix structure 
organized geographically and 
through service lines.  
Staff services Defiance R1: We have staff services with 
their own directors, who all report 
to one partner. 
Internationalization Clients/ Services Defiance R1: Being in an international 
network allows you to service 
your clients in a uniform manner.  
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Firm: B STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R1: It’s not smart to compete 
on price, you need to excel in 
terms of advise and your 
relation with the client.  
Training Manipulation R3: We are trying to use new 
techniques such as Wiki and 
e-learning.  
(Advisory) Services Formal business 
development 
Defiance R2: It is very important! You 
need to be innovative and 
come up with new products, 
new ideas and solutions. We 
have a R&D department for 
that.  
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Compromise R3: We want to be a generalist 
first, then a specialist when we 
are able. 
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Acquiesce R3: Cold calling is not 
working.  
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Compromise  R3: If you come work for us, 
you can still work and live in 
your local community. 
Automation of 
services 
Portals/ Online 
Service 
Defiance R3: We have an online portal 
on which clients can log on. 
XBRL Defiance R3: IT in consolation work is 
really important. It resulted in 
a new business model. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce R2: I think to be a good 
manager you need to 
understand who the client is, 
how he reacts, and what the 
problems are. To do this you 
need to have technical 
expertise.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Compromise R3: We are mainly organized 
centrally but with local 
differences.
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Defiance R1: We have profit sharing 
throughout the firm, even the 
secretary.  
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R1: No you need to show your 
face in the market, and clients 
should not be scared of the 
size of your firm. 
Critical mass Defiance R3: We have an acquisition 
program. 
Separation audit & 
advisory 
Defiance R4: We have separated audit 
and advice since 2007. 
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Service lines  Defiance R3: We are organized along 
service and staff lines. 
Staff services Defiance R3: We need to start growing 
and put the right people in 
place for ICT and HRM. 
Internationalization Clients/ Services Compromise R3: We focus on the Dutch 
market but we have the 
ambition to grow 
international. At the moment 
we use local partners. 
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Firm: C STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R3: Our profits for accounting are 
dropping and we have to make 
that up through accountancy, the 
question is if we have the right 
people.  
Training Compromise R2: We have had intense training 
courses to develop commercial 
skills.  
(Advisory) Services Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Defiance R2: We have a full service firm, 
but we’re not really good at cross-
selling. 
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Acquiesce R1: Cold calling wasn’t very 
successful, networking works 
better. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Compromise R1: We have three generations in 
the firm that we cater to but we are 
still reasonably traditional.  
General mentality Acquiesce R1: It is really difficult for us to 
let go of the old way of working. 
Automation of 
services 
Portals/ Online 
Service 
Defiance R1: Clients can log on through 
portals. 
XBRL Compromise R2: You can still make reasonable 
profits through annual accounts.  
However we need to do that 
efficiently, and invest in XBRL.  
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Compromise R2: The managing director is still 
an RA.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Acquiesce R2: There is centralized 
strategizing, however you have to 
adapt to local prerogative.  
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Compromise R1: There is a differentiated pay 
system. 
Evaluation 
functionality  
Compromise R1: We have a performance pay 
system in which commercial goals 
are included.  
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R1: We still want to remain local, 
however we make sure it remains 
efficient in terms of scale 
advantages. 
Critical mass Compromise R1: We still want to remain local, 
however we make sure it remains 
efficient in terms of scale 
advantages. 
Separation audit & 
advisory 
Compromise R1: We need clear separation of 
responsibility because of rules but 
also because our accountants want 
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to do one or the other.  
Staff services Compromise  R2: There are staff services at the 
head-office. 
Internationalization Network Compromise R3: We do not plan to expand 
internationally but we have 
alliances.  
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Firm: D STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R4: Changing your core business 
is full of risks, and it is quite 
frightening, as it is a threat for 
25% of the partners.   
Training Compromise R1: At the international partner 
meeting we set the whole thing in 
motion, tools and training.  
(Advisory) Services Formal business 
development 
Defiance R2: I think business development 
is now the number 1 priority for 
us.  
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Compromise R1: We are very selective in what 
we offer. We only offer things we 
are good at and things our clients 
really need.   
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Defiance R1: We plan it more nowadays, 
whom to target and we follow up 
on how it went.  
Mentality 
professionals 
Part time 
employment 
Acquiesce R3: If you see the amount of time 
I put into the firm. I cannot endure 
if someone believes a less then 40 
hours working week is enough. 
General mentality Compromise R1: We are starting to become less 
traditional. 
Automation of 
services 
XBRL Acquiesce 
 
R3: Unfortunately, things need to 
hurt first, before we start acting. 
Same thing with XBRL. We 
discussed it, but decided not to 
invest in it yet. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce  R3: I’m not sure if it would be 
accepted. Professionals are highly 
educated, and you need someone 
with clients and market knowledge 
to lead. 
Decision 
making/voting  
Compromise R1: We think it is necessary to be 
more directive, however, we still 
do not really hold people 
responsible.
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Manipulate R1: We have a point system, if 
you perform well you get more 
points and have a larger claim on 
the profits.  
Evaluation 
functionality  
Manipulate R4: The performance criteria have 
changed, and are now much more 
geared towards leads and business 
development. 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R4: It is really a constellation of 
diverse practices and partners.  
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Critical mass Compromise R2: We do want a minimal 
complement at each location, to 
minimize risk purposes.  
Separation audit & 
advisory 
Defiance R4: We have separated control 
and advice, and we have a 
compliance offer, and check if we 
can take on a client 
Service lines  Defiance R2: We have structured our firm 
along corporate, SME, and tax 
service lines.  
Staff services Defiance R3: There is a manager to run the 
staff services.  
Internationalization Network Manipulate R1: We are part of an international 
firm but not everyone is happy 
with that. For example, they don’t 
appreciate mandatory structures.  
Clients/ Services Manipulate R3: Our international network is 
really beneficial for us.  
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Firm: E STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R1: There was a lot of resistance, 
but over time is has reduced. 
People are getting more 
enthusiastic, and more 
entrepreneurial.  
Training Compromise R3: Very intense! It was a cultural 
shock. It required a lot of money 
and training to get it going. We are 
still working on it. 
(Advisory) Services Formal business 
development 
Compromise R3: The annual report will remain 
important, the other service are 
just additional.  
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Compromise R2: We are going from a 
generalist role to more of full 
service firm with expert 
knowledge.  
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Compromise R3: There are developments there, 
to which we need to get 
accustomed to. They want to work 
part-time, we try to adjust to these 
demands. 
Part time 
employment 
Compromise R3: It is difficult but we do offer 
part-time employment.  
Automation of 
services 
Portals/ Online 
Service 
Compromise R3: We try to stay ahead and tell 
client that we have these online 
services.  
XBRL Compromise R1: We have been on the side line 
for a long time but are now 
working on implementing XBRL. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Manipulate R1: We have a non-professional 
running offices, as we know 
professional are not great 
managers.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Compromise R2: We have a full-time board 
which centrally governs the firm, 
however, each office is run by a 
managing partner. 
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Acquiesce R1: The partnership is not really 
enthusiastic about a differentiated 
partner reward system.  
Evaluation 
functionality  
Defiance R1: We introduced the concept of 
competence management. Our 
strategic goals are coupled to the 
specific competences of our 
people. 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R2: We want to keep a network of 
offices to ensure that clients find 
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us everywhere both 
geographically as well as in terms 
of types of services.  
Critical mass Defiance R3: We need larger units to serve 
larger clients and to be able to 
specialize.  
Separation audit & 
advisory 
Defiance R1: Audit is separated from 
accountancy and advisory in order 
to assure quality.  
Internationalization Network Acquiesce Not part of an international 
network. 
Clients/ Services Acquiesce R3: When demand is large 
enough, we might want to join an 
international network 
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Firm: F STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Manipulate R1: We have one person who 
coordinates all the 
communication between the 
customer and the company. We 
call this person the relation 
manager. That is our vision. 
(Advisory) 
Services 
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Defiance R2: We have a full-service firm, 
but this does certainly not mean 
we neglect specialism. We do 
both. 
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Compromise R1: Cold calling is possible but in 
our network we get promoted 
through word of mouth. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Defiance R2: We have flexible working 
areas. 
R3: Our contracts allow you to 
‘buy’ things that are of 
importance to you. 
Automation of 
services 
Portals/ Online 
Service
Manipulate R2: We are one of the groups that 
are ahead in terms of ICT. We 
have a portal that is free of 
charge, and we have electronic 
client files. 
XBRL Defiance R2: XBRL is fully up and running 
here. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/boa
rd members 
Acquiesce R1: We think you need managers 
with both legs in the practice. 
Only then will your people follow 
you. 
Decision 
making/voting  
Defiance R2: Our two-headed board makes 
the policies on which a small 
group of people can vote.  
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Defiance R3: You can buy shares on 
different levels of the 
organizations. We try to stimulate 
entrepreneurship this way.  
Evaluation 
functionality  
Compromise R3: We have competency based 
evaluations and coaching 
meetings, this does not however 
determine pay. 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) 
Number of 
locations 
Acquiesce R2: In the past, our firm sought 
country wide coverage, but no 
anymore. We want to have a 
strong local presence. We did 
consolidate some locations, as 
they just weren’t efficient.  
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Critical mass Compromise R3: We need to grow. If we don’t 
we need to think about of joining 
another party. 
R2: We try to grow 
autonomously, but we don’t 
necessarily preclude merging. 
Separation audit 
& advisory 
Defiance R3: Yes we separated audit from 
consolidation and advice in order 
to assure quality.  
Staff services Defiance R3: Yes we have staff services at 
our head-office. 
Internationalization Network Compromise R2: We have a network for 
international clients. We don’t 
have the ambition to go 
international ourselves. 
Clients/ Services Compromise R2: International advice is a 
growing market at the moment. 
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Firm: G STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor
Core business Compromise R1: Our raison d’être is secured 
by law. Sure things are easier 
now, with XBRL, but we still 
provide the auditors assurance, 
and that means something.  
Training Compromise R2: How do you engage in 
acquisition? What skills are 
necessary? That means training, 
and we are in the middle of that 
process.  
(Advisory) Services Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Compromise R1: We are looking to expand our 
services for instance business risk 
services and consultancy. 
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Defiance R4: Nowadays, cold acquisition is 
part of the market. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Compromise R1: We promote flexibility. You 
can work with clients using 
laptops, all records are electronic, 
and you can work from home.  
Part time 
employment 
Compromise R1: People are just different, not 
better or worse. They want to 
work, earn money, develop 
themselves, but also have a social 
network, go out, go on holiday. 
This should all be possible 
General mentality  Compromise R1: We try to relate to the attitude, 
but you cannot combine that with 
a career in accountancy.  
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce R3: A non-professional as 
manager would not work with us. 
You need to really understand the 
business.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Compromise R3: It has changed. It is a bit more 
directive, but not too much. 
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Acquiesce R2: No, the system we use is 
equal profit sharing, so we assume 
everyone contributes equally. 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R1: No we clearly stick to the old 
principle of local offices. It gives 
visibility. 
Critical mass Compromise R3: You need a certain level of 
critical mass to be able to service 
your client well. 
R2L: We have an autonomous 
growth strategy of X% per year. 
Service lines  Defiance R1: The strategy is made along the 
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lines, so audit, assurances, fiscal, 
and specialist services. 
Staff services Defiance R2: We now have staff services 
for P&O, automation, finance and 
marketing. This used to be the 
work of the partners, but we 
wanted them to serve their clients.  
Internationalization Network Defiance R1: That way, you can rely on a 
large amount of knowledge and 
experience, as well as economies 
of scale for automation purposes.  
Clients/ Services Defiance R1: This is really and advantage. 
It makes it much easier to 
approach larger companies. 
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Firm: H STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Defiance R2: We want to make the base 
product as efficient as possible, to 
be able to spend more time 
advising.  
Training Compromise R2: We are giving summer 
courses to our consolidation 
department to change their 
mindset. 
(Advisory) Services Formal business 
development 
Defiance R1: There is a special department 
that focuses on developing new 
products.  
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Compromise R1: We mainly deliver advice on 
financial processes. For other 
processes, we refer our clients to 
specific partners.  
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Acquiesce R2: We stopped cold acquisition. 
Networking is much better as you 
need to have a trust relationship 
with the clients. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Compromise R3: I think we are exaggerating. 
There is too much emphasis on 
the I, not on the firm. 
Part time 
employment 
Compromise R2: There is a possibility for part-
time employment. 
General mentality Compromise R1: We have provided our people 
with more freedom compared to 
some years ago, when everything 
was monitored. 
Automation of 
services 
Portals/ Online 
Service 
Defiance R3: Our portal is ready. The 
software just needs to be finalized. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Compromise R2: We have someone, who used 
to be an accountant running the 
firm operationally. But that was 
not a criterion.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Acquiesce R1: The daily board prepares 
strategic plans and the partners 
vote on them. 
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Acquiesce R1: We have stopped the 
discussion on a performance pay 
system. You need to work within 
boundaries; and if you fall below 
those you’re out. 
Evaluation 
functionality  
Compromise R2: There are assessment criteria 
for partners, but secretaries who 
bring in new clients are also 
rewarded extra.  
Organizational (Merging) Number Acquiesce R3: We work with local heroes 
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structure of locations that need to be in the local 
network, so local presence is 
necessary. 
Critical mass Compromise R1: We have moved people 
around to ensure the development 
of specialism. We want to grow 
both autonomously as well as 
through acquisition. 
Separation audit & 
advisory 
Defiance R1 Because of the regulations we 
have decided to make the audit 
practice a separate specialism, so 
our people had to choose.  
Service lines  Compromise R1: We are working along matrix 
lines, which is quite difficult. 
Staff services Defiance R3: There are staff services. 
Internationalization Network Compromise R1: Our clients are starting to go 
international, so we have joined 
an international network to service 
them. 
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Firm: I STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R2: We try to change our people 
into full-fledged advisors in 
order to respond to the shift 
from compliance to advice. 
Training Manipulate R1: We have a master class in 
order to train our people to 
display entrepreneurial behavior. 
(Advisory) 
Services 
Formal business 
development 
Manipulate R1: In order to develop new 
products, we have started 
cooperating with a university, 
and they have developed some 
really nice products.  
R2: We have an internal 
committee for product 
development, automation and 
people. 
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Compromise R3: You need develop specialist 
knowledge in certain areas. 
R2: For the MKB you need to be 
multidisciplinary.  
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Defiance R3: What we try to do is 
organize events with other 
parties like banks and discuss a 
particular subject.  
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Defiance R2: Work/life balance is really 
important and we try to facilitate 
this. 
Part time 
employment 
Compromise R3: Yes it is possible, but not for 
management positions.  
Automation of 
services 
Portals/ Online 
Service
Compromise R2: We have portals just to send 
files to our clients such that they 
can verify them. 
XBRL Compromise R3: Currently, we are trying to 
work with XBRL to follow the 
trend. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce R3: Well, I think it would only 
be possible if you separate the 
operational from the 
professional affairs. 
Decision 
making/voting  
Compromise R1: This getting more directive, 
but it would be exaggerating to 
say its directive.  
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Acquiesce R3: No, there is equal profit 
sharing. 
Evaluation Compromise R3: These criteria are very 
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functionality  diverse:  professional skills, 
acquisition, and teamwork.  
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R1: Local presence is of real 
importance.  
Critical mass Compromise R2: We have been looking for 
other parties to expand in order 
to be able to ensure the quality 
of our specialized services, and 
to ensure the return on the 
quality system. 
Separation audit & 
advisory 
Defiance R3: Yes these are separate 
entities. 
Service lines  Defiance R3: We are structured along the 
various service lines. 
Staff services Defiance R2: We’ve grown in size, so we 
professionalized our HR. We 
have attracted someone to do 
this.  
Internationalization Network Compromise R3: We have an international 
network for support purposes. 
We don’t have the ambition to 
go international. 
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Firm: J STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Defiance R1: We have always invested in 
perfection in the annual statement. 
We should reduce this to deliver 
an 8, to be able to shift the 
attention to advisory…perhaps we 
can move our annual reports 
construction to Eastern Europe to 
reduce costs. 
Training Acquiesce R1: Training wasn’t very 
successful. We actually stopped 
training sessions, because the 
group didn’t want to go back.  
(Advisory) Services Formal business 
development 
Defiance R1: We have a product manager 
who develops new products.  
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Defiance R1: We do not want all 
competences, but we have a 
network of firms that we refer our 
clients to.  
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Acquiesce R1: We don’t believe in client 
hunting. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Compromise R1: We adhere to the 
developments of the labor market 
in terms of work-life balance. 
Automation of 
services 
Portals/ Online 
Service 
Defiance R1: We have made huge 
investments in digital filings, as 
well as portals. 
XBRL Defiance R1: We have also invested in 
XBRL, I think it offers 
opportunities.  
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Manipulate R1: Appointing a non-professional 
as manager really meant 
negotiating, and convincing, but 
now I have a mandate now to 
change things.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Defiance R1: It is quite directive. We have 
a 3-year strategic plan, which is 
being implemented. 
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Acquiesce R1: We have an equal profit 
sharing system. 
Evaluation 
functionality  
Compromise R1: We decide on performance 
goals that have to do with 
productivity and the quality of 
your work. 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R1: We want to be close to our 
clients with small offices. Large 
offices just move slowly.  
Critical mass Manipulate R1: Adding offices is done 
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through acquisitions, mainly for 
additional services. 
Staff services Defiance R1: Recently, a non-accountant 
has been put in charge of staff 
services. 
Internationalization Network Acquiesce No international network. 
Clients/ Services Acquiesce Clients do not demand this. 
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Firm: K STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Acquiesce R1: We have a great consolidation 
practice, but in time it will 
diminish, so we will need to 
ensure that the quality of our 
advisory services increases. 
Training Acquiesce R1: We offer external training and 
reforming into advisors. 
(Advisory) Services Formal business 
development 
Compromise R1: Product development is really 
important, but I feel we do too 
little and too ad hoc. 
Range of services, 
specialist concept 
Compromise R3: Well at some point in time we 
need to decide if we want to go 
full service. We have some 
specialization but we are not using 
it optimally. 
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Compromise R1: Some offices do use cold 
calling, and others don’t. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Defiance R1: Work-life balance has high 
priority for us. 
Part time 
employment 
Compromise R2: Part-time is definitely an 
option but not for management.  
Automation of 
services 
XBRL Acquiesce R2: Well, you see, it needs to be 
necessity before we start doing it. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Compromise R1: We have someone for the 
operational part of the firm. He is 
a non-professional.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Acquiesce  R1: There is a daily board that 
prepares the plans that are 
discussed in partner meetings. 
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Acquiesce R2: No, we haven’t thought of a 
differentiated profit system yet. 
Evaluation 
functionality  
Acquiesce R1: We have a really nice 
organization. We do not really 
judge people on their productivity 
or contribution, only if they do 
something extra. 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R1: Local coverage is important 
with a minimum complement of 
20 people. 
Critical mass Compromise R3: At this point, I think that our 
firm is too small to be able to 
invest in ICT and specializations.  
Separation audit & 
advisory 
Acquiesce R3: At some point this will 
probably be necessary, but not 
now. 
Internationalization Network Acquiesce They do not have an international 
network. 
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Appendix B. Internal resistance in chapter 2 
Firm: A STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT   
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Defiance R1: Yes, we are trying to increase the 
number of advisory products.
Mentality 
professionals 
General mentality Compromise R2: In a traditional organization as 
this one, you come across a lot of 
criticism. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce R1: A non-professional need to be 
very good to be accepted by a 
profession. I doubt we would accept a 
non-professional at a similar level.  
R4: Well that is something I have 
been saying that for 15 years! The 
director of Avis also doesn’t polish 
his own cars! 
Decision 
making/voting  
Acquiesce  R1: I would be in favor of more 
directive decision making, but you 
need to know when you are directive, 
or when you need to convince.  
Organizational 
structure 
Service lines  Compromise R1: Changing the structure to service 
lines of course led to discussion. It 
used to be arranged regional. 
 
Firm: B STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Automation of 
services 
XBRL Defiance R3: It is definitely a challenge. Some 
people see it as a threat, but, 
personally, I see it as a challenge. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce  R2: To be a good manager, I think 
you need to understand who the client 
is, how he reacts, and what the 
problems are. You need to have 
technical expertise to be able to do 
this.
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Firm: C STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R2: Turning people to account 
managers is not easy. In fact, a lot of 
people are saying that they don’t feel 
at home here because of this change. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Compromise R2: Well you do see that some 
managers find it difficult that they 
don’t see their people from 9 to 5. It 
requires some getting used to. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Decision 
making/voting  
Acquiesce R2: There is centralized strategizing, 
however, you have local prerogative 
to adapt.  
 
Firm: D STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R1: Accountants and tax advisors are 
risk averse. They don’t like change. 
R3: I think it just stays the same for 
95%. We do audits, and try to sell 
some advisory services. 
(Advisory) 
Services 
Formal business 
development 
Defiance R3: I have let people go that didn’t 
want to engage in business 
development or innovation. 
Client 
acquisition 
Cold Acquisition Defiance R2: We conducted an internal 
marketing campaign to get people 
enthusiastic about engaging in client 
acquisition. 
Automation of 
services 
XBRL Acquiesce R3: Unfortunately, things need to 
hurt first, before we start acting. 
Same thing with XBRL, we 
discussed it but decided not to invest 
in it yet. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce  R3: I’m not sure if it would be 
accepted. Professionals are highly 
educated, and you need someone 
with clients and knowledge of the 
market to lead. 
Organizational 
structure 
(Merging) Number 
of locations 
Acquiesce R2: Well, I think that’s only human. 
Each partner tries to defend his little 
island. 
Internationaliz
ation 
Network Manipulate R1: We are part of an international 
firm, but not everyone is happy with 
that. For example, they don’t 
appreciate mandatory structures.  
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Firm: E STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R1: There was a lot of resistance, but 
over time it has reduced. People are 
getting more enthusiastic and more 
entrepreneurial.  
Training Compromise R3: Very intense! It was a cultural 
chock, we requires a lot of money and 
training to get it going. We are still 
working on it. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Compromise R3: There are developments there, to 
which we need to get accustomed to. 
They want to work part time, we try 
to adjust to these demands. 
ORGANIZATION
Performance 
pay system 
Division profits Acquiesce R1: The partnership is not really 
enthusiastic about a differentiated 
partner reward system.  
 
Firm: F STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Manipulate R3: The normal accountant does not 
have the communicative and 
commercial skills to fully comprehend 
what clients want. You need real 
relation managers for that. 
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce R1: We think you need managers with 
both legs in the practice. Only then 
will your people follow you. 
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Firm: G STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Training Compromise  R4: There are a lot of people here 
that are skeptical of all the 
changes, whether they are really 
necessary.   
Client acquisition Cold calling Defiance R2: Not everyone is suited for 
cold acquisition. You need to be a 
smooth talker.  
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce R3: A non-professional as 
manager would not work with us. 
You need to really understand the 
business.  
Decision 
making/voting  
Compromise R4: Well, you cannot always say 
what you like, there is a clear 
difference between the older and 
younger partners. 
Performance pay 
system 
Division profits Acquiesce R1: The partnership is not really 
enthusiastic about a differentiated 
partner reward system.  
Internationalization Network Defiance R1: Well, joining an international 
firm meant no longer being the 
owner of your own office. How 
that would play out frightened 
people.  
 
Firm: H STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Defiance R3: There is a general resistance 
to change. These people have 
been doing the same thing for ten 
years, so they don’t want to 
change. So, if you want to change 
you need to do it by force, on 
every level of the organization.  
Client acquisition Cold Acquisition Acquiesce  R3: Cold-calling is horrible. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life 
balance 
Compromise R3: I think we are exaggerating. 
There is too much emphasis on 
the I, not on the firm. 
ORGANIZATION
Performance pay 
system 
Division of 
profits 
Acquiesce R1: We have stopped the 
discussion on a pay performance 
system. 
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Firm: I STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Compromise R2: Well, what you see is that a 
number of colleagues cannot make 
the transition, and they will probably 
leave or have little growth 
opportunities. 
Training Manipulate R1: You need to change the mindset 
of people towards being an advisor. 
They really fear the unknown. 
Client 
acquisition 
Cold Acquisition Defiance R3: I’m not enchanted by this trend 
of cold calling. 
Mentality 
professionals 
Work/life balance Defiance R3: Work-life balance is sometimes 
hard when you try to look for 
replacements. There are few that 
have the drive to fully pursue their 
career.  
ORGANIZATION
Organizational 
governance 
Background 
management/board 
members 
Acquiesce R1: Putting a non-professional in 
charge? I don’t see that happening 
anytime soon. 
Decision 
making/voting  
Compromise R3: People have their own little 
islands and you cannot change their 
way of thinking overnight.  
 
Firm: J STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Defiance R1: Does every employee embrace 
our transformation? No. Does every 
partner? Yes, in principle.  
Training Acquiesce R1: Training wasn’t very successful. 
We actually stopped training 
sessions, because the group didn’t 
want to go back.  
 
Firm: K STRATEGY QUOTE
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Accountant to 
Advisor 
Core business Acquiesce R2: We are not very innovative. In 
fact, we are somewhat in the middle. 
(Advisory) 
Services 
Formal business 
development 
Compromise R1: Well people are slow to change, 
when the money keeps rolling in. 
Client 
acquisition 
Cold Acquisition Compromise R1: It’s neither in people’s education 
nor in their nature. 
Automation of 
services 
XBRL Acquiesce R2: Well, you see, it needs to be 
necessary before we start doing it. 
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Appendix C. Survey instrument used in chapter 3 
Human capital 
1. Our lawyers are highly skilled. 
2. Our lawyers are widely considered the best in their practice area. 
3. Our lawyers are creative and bright. 
4. Our lawyers are experts in their particular area and function. 
5. Our lawyers develop new ideas and knowledge. 
 
Reputation  
Comparing this company to all other law firms 
1. How well respected is this company? 
2. How good of a value is this company perceived to provide for its price? 
3. How strong is this company’s reputation for consistent quality and service? 
4. How strong is this company’s brand name recognition in its service area? 
 
Organizational governance  
1. In my firm all employees undergo formal periodic performance appraisals.  
2. In my firm everyone is aware of the formal internal rules and regulations. 
3. In my firm you can expect to receive an appropriate reward when you have 
significantly contributed to the attainment of financial or operational goals. 
4. In order to assure that realistic personal and organizational goals are set, we 
regularly compare our goals with those of similar firms. 
5. In my firm new employees receive adequate instructions concerning our 
goals, methods, and regulations. 
6. In my firm a lot of time is invested in the development of procedures that 
ensure financial integrity. 
7. In my firm the quality of the services we deliver is regularly compared with 
our self-set quality standards. 
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Strategic planning intensity  
1. We use tight budget goals. 
2. Trends in performance are closely monitored. 
3. We keep close watch on costs incurred in various practice areas. 
4. We keep close watch on costs incurred by each lawyer. 
5. We intensely monitor profits made by practice area. 
6. In hindsight we check if the incurred costs match the budgeted costs for that 
service. 
7. Planning is important for achieving efficiency. 
8. Planning helps integrate practice areas through information exchange. 
9. Information sharing is critical in delivering our services. 
10. Planning helps us achieve coordination of goals and projects within our firm. 
11. Planning helps us achieve coordination and organizational unity within our 
firm. 
12. Planning’s crucial role is facilitating information sharing. 
13. We often adjust our goals to meet changes in the market. 
14. In our planning we must deal with strategic issue turnover. 
15. We really plan all the time rather than at regular intervals. 
16. Specific, short-range goals are known to all partners in the firm. 
17. We develop formal plans for potential services and markets. 
18. We have a written business plan 
19. We systematically search for new services, customers and investments. 
20. Our planning deals with a broad range of strategic issues. 
 
Organizational performance  
Over the last three years, my firm… 
1. …has used a very competitive hourly fee. 
2. …has had a competitive cost structure. 
3. …has had a low overhead percentage. 
4. …has been able to retain its largest clients. 
5. …has been able to retain most of its clients. 
6. …has been able to attract new clients. 
7. …has had a very efficient firm organization. 
8. …has had great success in achieving long-term organizational goals. 
Appendix 
 
169
Appendix D. Survey instrument used in chapter 4 
Developmental work experience  
In my firm, junior lawyers are quickly allowed… 
1. to handle their own cases. 
2. to have direct client contact. 
3. to have a role in client matters. 
4. to appear before a judge. 
 
Human capital development  
In my firm… 
1. the cases are very interesting. (original item) 
2. the cases are very gratifying. 
3. you are paid well. 
4. the relations between lawyers are very good. 
5. the relations between partners and staff/interns are very good. (original item) 
6. the training and coaching are very poor. (reverse coded) 
7. there is a great deal of financial transparency. 
8. we often discuss the criteria involving potential promotion to partner. 
(original item) 
9. realistic billable hour targets are set. 
10. your capabilities as a lawyer are greatly stimulated. 
11. as staff member or intern you receive ample feedback from partners. (original 
item) 
12. we often hold jurisprudence meetings. 
13. a great deal of attention is paid to the constant professional development of 
employees. (original item) 
14. employees have, next to the legal patron, also access to personal coaches and 
mentors. 
15. the teaching of courses at universities or other institutions is stimulated. 
16. we regularly engage in peer consultations. 
17. you are able to take courses for personal development regularly. 
18. people find partaking in legal courses important. 
19. people find taking management and skills courses important. 
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20. you can easily drop by a colleague’s office for advice. 
 
Social capital  
1. Our lawyers are skilled at collaborating with each other to diagnose and solve 
problems. 
2. Our lawyers share information and learn from each other. 
3. Our lawyers interact and exchange ideas with people from different areas of 
the company. 
4. Our lawyers apply knowledge from one area of the company to problems and 
opportunities that arise in another. 
 
Commitment  
1. Our lawyers feel as though their future is intimately linked to that of this 
organization. 
2. Our lawyers would be happy to make personal sacrifices if it were important 
for the organizations’ well being. 
3. The bonds between this organization and its lawyers are weak. (reverse 
coded) 
4. In general, lawyers are proud to work for this organization. 
5. Our lawyers often go above and beyond the call of duty to ensure this 
organizations’ wellbeing.  
6. Our lawyers have little or no commitment to this organization. (reverse 
coded) 
7. It is clear that our lawyers are fond of this organization. 
 
Strategic planning intensity  
1. We use tight budget goals. 
2. Trends in performance are closely monitored. 
3. We keep close watch on costs incurred in various practice areas. 
4. We keep close watch on costs incurred by each lawyer. 
5. We intensely monitor profits made by practice areas. 
6. In hindsight we check if the incurred costs match the budgeted costs for that 
service. 
7. Planning is important for achieving efficiency. 
8. Planning helps integrate practice areas through information exchange. 
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9. Information sharing is critical in delivering our services. 
10. Planning helps us achieve coordination of goals and projects within our firm. 
11. Planning helps us achieve coordination and organizational unity within our 
firm. 
12. Planning’s critical role is facilitating information sharing. 
13. We often adjust our goals to meet changes in the market. 
14. In our planning we must deal with strategic issue turnover. 
15. We really plan all the time rather than at regular intervals. 
16. Specific, short-range goals are known to all partners in the firm. 
17. We develop formal plans for potential services and markets. 
18. We have a written business plan. (new  item) 
19. We systematically search for new services, customers and investments. 
20. Our planning deals with a broad range of strategic issues. 
 
Organizational governance 
1. In my firm employees have regular performance appraisals. 
2. In my firm there is a great deal of informal information exchange in relation to 
the goals of the firm. 
3. In my firm everyone is aware of the formal internal riles that indicate what is 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
4. In my firm it is considered normal to point out to coworkers that their 
behavior is inappropriate. 
5. In my firm when you contribute significantly to achieving financial or 
operational goals, you receive a satisfactory reward. 
6. In order to assure realistic personal and organizational goals we often 
benchmark our firm to comparable firms. 
7. In my firm, new employees are adequately informed of its goals, ways of 
working and rules. 
8. In my firm there is a great deal of attention for ensuring proper procedures 
guaranteeing financial integrity. 
9. In my firm lawyers are quite aware of each other’s cases, integrity and work 
ethos. 
10. In my firm partners invest a great deal of time in supervising non-partners. 
11. In my firm it is considered normal to call on coworkers to think along on 
work-related personal and functional issues. 
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12. In my firm the quality of our services that we deliver is regularly tested 
against our target quality. 
 
Performance 
Over the last three years, my firm… 
9. …has achieved high gross profits per partner. 
10. …has used a very competitive hourly fee. 
11. …has earned a high gross margin on its provided services. 
12. …has had a competitive cost structure. 
13. …has had a low overhead percentage. 
14. …has been able to attract the best interns. 
15. …has been able to attract the best junior lawyers. 
16. …has been able to attract the best senior lawyers. 
17. …has been able to maintain its good reputation on the labor market. 
18. …has been able to retain its largest clients. 
19. …has been able to retain most of its clients. 
20. …has been able to attract new clients. 
21. …has achieved a large growth in profits. 
22. …has achieved a large growth in staff. 
23. …has had a very efficient firm organization. 
24. …has had great success in achieving long-term organizational goals. 
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Appendix E Survey instrument used in chapter 5 
Strategic planning intensity  
1. We use tight budget goals. 
2. Trends in performance are closely monitored. 
3. We keep close watch on costs incurred in various practice areas. 
4. We keep close watch on costs incurred by each lawyer. 
5. We intensely monitor profits made by practice areas. 
6. In hindsight we check if the incurred costs match the budgeted costs for that 
service. 
7. Planning is important for achieving efficiency. 
8. Planning helps integrate practice areas through information exchange. 
9. Information sharing is critical in delivering our services. 
10. Planning helps us achieve coordination of goals and projects within our firm. 
11. Planning helps us achieve coordination and organizational unity within our 
firm. 
12. Planning’s critical role is facilitating information sharing. 
13. We often adjust our goals to meet changes in the market. 
14. In our planning we must deal with strategic issue turnover. 
15. We really plan all the time rather than at regular intervals. 
16. Specific, short-range goals are known to all partners in the firm. 
17. We develop formal plans for potential services and markets. 
18. We have a written business plan. (new  item) 
19. We systematically search for new services, customers and investments. 
20. Our planning deals with a broad range of strategic issues. 
 
Formal governance  
1. In my firm employees have regular performance appraisals. 
2. In my firm everyone is aware of the formal internal riles that indicate what is 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 
3. In my firm when you contribute significantly to achieving financial or 
operational goals, you receive a satisfactory reward. 
4. In order to assure realistic personal and organizational goals we often 
benchmark our firm to comparable firms. 
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5. In my firm, new employees are adequately informed of its goals, ways of 
working and rules. 
6. In my firm there is a great deal of attention for ensuring proper procedures 
guaranteeing financial integrity. 
7. In my firm partners invest a great deal of time in supervising non-partners. 
8. In my firm the quality of our services that we deliver is regularly tested 
against our target quality. 
 
Informal governance 
1. In my firm there is a great deal of informal information exchange in relation to 
the goals of the firm. 
2. In my firm it is considered normal to point out to coworkers that their 
behavior is inappropriate. 
3. In my firm lawyers are quite aware of each other’s cases, integrity and work 
ethos. 
4. In my firm it is considered normal to call on coworkers to think along on 
work-related personal and functional issues. 
 
Performance  
Over the last three years, my firm… 
1. …has achieved high gross profits per partner. 
2. …has used a very competitive hourly fee. 
3. …has earned a high gross margin on its provided services. 
4. …has had a competitive cost structure. 
5. …has had a low overhead percentage. 
6. …has been able to attract the best interns. 
7. …has been able to attract the best junior lawyers. 
8. …has been able to attract the best senior lawyers. 
9. …has been able to maintain its good reputation on the labor market. 
10. …has been able to retain its largest clients. 
11. …has been able to retain most of its clients. 
12. …has been able to attract new clients. 
13. …has achieved a large growth in profits. 
14. …has achieved a large growth in staff. 
15. …has had a very efficient firm organization. 
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16. has had great success in achieving long-term organizational goals. 
 
Reputation 
Comparing this company to all other law firms 
1. How well respected is this company? 
2. How good of a value is this company perceived to provide for its price? 
3. How strong is this company’s  reputation for consistent quality and service? 
4. How strong is this company’s brand name recognition in its service area? 
 
Misconduct 
How often do the following practices occur in your firm? 
1. Charging the client more hours than the actual hours used. 
2. Charging senior fees while junior conduct the work. 
3. Employees break the formal rules of the organization. 
4. Employees break the informal rules of the organization. 
5. Employees break the behavior norms set for by the Dutch Bar Association. 
6. Employees break the informal rules that exist in the legal profession. 
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Appendix F. Additional performance, reputation and misconduct 
configurations found in chapter 5 
 High performance 
 International Generalist International firm 
Structure 1a 1b 
High Diversification 3 
Large Size 3 I
International 3 3
Practices  
Strategy formation 3 3
Formal Governance 3 3
Directive Decision making I I
Informal Governance 3
   
Consistency .84 .89 
Raw coverage .06 .08 
Unique coverage .00 .02 
   
Overall solution coverage .46 
Overall solution consistency .78 
 
 Low reputation 
 International 
Managed Generalist 
Unmanaged 
firm 1 
Unmanaged 
firm 2 
Misfit 
2 
Structure 1 2 3 4 
High Diversification 3 I I 3
Large Size  I I I
International 3 I I I
Practices    
Strategy formation 3 I I 
Formal Governance 3 I  I
Directive Decision making I  I I
Informal Governance 3 I I 
     
Consistency .90 .82 .85 .83 
Raw coverage .09 .15 .10 .23 
Unique coverage .00 .01 .02 .01 
     
Overall solution coverage .48 
Overall solution consistency .75 
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 High Misconduct 
 Merged, directionless firm International Generalist 
Structure 1 2 
High Diversification 3 3
Large Size 3 3
International I 3
Practices  
Strategy formation 3 3
Formal Governance 3 3
Directive Decision making I I
Informal Governance I 
   
Consistency .83 .79 
Raw coverage .23 .07 
Unique coverage .01 .02 
   
Overall solution coverage .21 
Overall solution consistency .84 
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Executive summary 
Over the last decade there has been a substantial increasing interest in Professional 
Service Firms (PSFs), whereas research until the 1990s was mostly focused on the 
status and position of professionals in organizational collectives and society.  This lack 
of attention is surprising given that PSFs form an integral part of the contemporary 
knowledge-based economy. PSFs are among the most affluent business enterprises, 
can be considered knowledge engines and have a public professional objective by 
serving vulnerable client and third party interests.  
In this dissertation I focus on two canonical industries of PSFs: the law and 
accounting industries. Although PSF research lacks a precise definition it has been 
identified as a distinctive organizational form facing specific challenges, which derive 
from the nature of the services it delivers, its distinctive resource dependencies, and 
the highly institutionalized environment in which it operates. In order to deal with 
these challenges, PSFs organize themselves along the lines of two organizational 
configurations. The P2-configuration comprises an organizational form in its own 
right, to be distinguished from other forms of enterprise organization by features like 
its limited size, weakly developed strategic capabilities, and consensus-oriented 
decision-making. Although the P2 has historically been the dominant form of 
enterprise organization in classic professions such as law and accounting, changes in 
economic and social trends, government policies, and client preferences have led to the 
spread of a commercial ethos in the professions, which challenges traditional P2-
organizational practices. Many PSFs are now adopting face-changing strategies and 
practices, and are moving in the direction of a new organizational template coined the 
‘Managed Professional Business’. In comparison to the P2-configuration, MPB-
organized firms complement their existing P2 practices with “more formal strategic 
planning, controls over quality of work and productivity of staff, greater emphasis on 
coordinated marketing activities and more elaborate and centralized financial 
systems” (Morris & Pinnington, 1998: 76) in order to avoid strategic drift.  
This shift from the professional logic to the commercial logic is the point of 
departure for this dissertation and forms the basis of my overarching question: what 
are the effects of the changing logic from professionalism to commercialism on PSFs? 
This question is addressed through a number of sub-questions. First, how do PSFs 
perceive the current institutional change and what are their organizational responses 
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to the resulting clash of the professional with the commercial logic? Although mid-tier 
firms are similarly confronted with conflicting demands of the trustee and commercial 
logic, the structures and procedures resulting from this clash are different as compared 
to those documented with the big 4. The mid-tier firms pick and choose between 
components of strategic and structural organizational responses. These differences are 
due to the continued influence of the professional logic, which makes both partner and 
non-partnered accountants unwilling to compromise their professional norms. 
Resistance to change within these firms thus results in differing organizational 
responses. The diffusion process of the commercial logic in the field segment 
populated by mid-tier firms therefore looks more like a process of institutional 
bricolage. While significant environmental jolts are hypothesized in prior literature to 
result in revolutionary transformations of organizations rather than their evolutionary 
development this is not what we observe in my group of mid-tier firms. My findings 
call into question whether the entire accounting profession has changed from the 
trustee to the commercial logic.  Apparently the generalizability of findings from prior 
literature within the classical industries is limited.  
Second, although prior literature has documented the introduction of novel-
to-context strategic and governance practices alongside the traditional drivers of PSF 
performance, their actual implications are as of yet unknown. Therefore my related 
research question is: what are the performance effects of the novel organizational 
practices as compared to the original drivers of PSF performance? My findings suggest 
that size and diversification indeed positively influence governance and strategizing. 
In turn governance, strategy formation, human capital and reputation, all have a 
positive impact on PSF performance. Through my findings I contribute to the literature 
on PSFs in three ways. My study is the first to empirically assess the effects of novel-to-
context organizational practices, and I find evidence that the positive effects of formal 
governance and strategic planning outweigh their negative performance implications. 
Second, prior work aimed at identifying the drivers of PSF performance has largely 
tested their effects in isolation, as most existing studies scrutinize only a single or 
maximally two performance drivers. Third, several scholars have recently made a case 
for a special theory of the PSF. My results suggest that contingency elements should be 
built into the design of the nascent theory of the PSF.  
Third, the professional or so-called “social trustee definition of 
professionalism subordinates self-interest and commercial gain in favor of ideals of 
service and public welfare” (Greenwood, 2007: 191). When these ideals of service and 
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pubic welfare are subordinated in favor of commercial gain and self-interest this could 
be quite detrimental for professional behavior. As novel practices in the MPB-
configuration are developed to that aim, the question becomes: what are the effects of 
both novel organizational and traditional PSF practices on professional misconduct? 
After conceptualizing agency problems in PSFs my findings suggest that the type of 
long-established informal practices that feature predominantly in PSFs of the P2–type 
are better attuned to the specific governance challenges of PSFs than the more formal 
practices characterizing MPB-like PSFs. Presumably, this is because these informal 
practices are better suited to deal with hard to observe and difficult to monitor 
professional behaviors than more formal organizational practices. While the latter 
seem better attuned to monitoring economic performance, and have often been 
specifically adopted for that purpose, they also appear to ‘crowd out’ traditional 
professional values from PSFs. 
In the final chapter I combine the novel-to-context and traditional practices by 
analyzing configurations of PSFs. Using set-theoretic methods, I analyze what the 
effects of specific combinations of practices within PSFs are on substantive and 
symbolic performance as well as on professional misconduct. An interesting question 
with regard to this chapter is: are there configurations of organizational practices that 
allow for optimizing all three objective functions of PSFs? My empirical results show 
that it is absolutely critical to assess the private and public objective functions of PSFs 
simultaneously when examining the effectiveness and desirability of any PSF 
configuration in particular. For example, the MPB configuration offers an 
organizational design that does well in terms of the private objective function by 
ensuring high substantive and symbolic performance, but it does so at the cost of poor 
outcomes on the public objective function: the MPB scores very high in terms of the 
level of organizational misconduct it produces. The absence of strong informal 
governance through which professionals can collegially correct one another’s 
misdeeds, and which is one of the hallmarks of the original P2-configuration, is the key 
ingredient that is missing in these firms. 
  
.  
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Summary (Dutch)  
Gedurende het laatste decennium is de interesse in Professional Service Firms (PSFs) 
sterk toegenomen. Onderzoek tot omstreeks 1990 was grotendeels gericht op de status 
en positie van professionals in hun professie en in relatie tot de maatschappij. Dit 
gebrek aan academische aandacht is opmerkelijk gezien het integrale belang van deze 
groep ondernemingen in de hedendaagse kennisintensieve economie. PSFs behoren tot 
de meest welvarende ondernemingen, kunnen worden gezien als kennisontwikkelaars 
en hebben een publieke functie als vertegenwoordigers van hun cliënten en derde 
partijen.  
In dit proefschrift richt ik me op twee klassieke PSF industrieën: advocatuur 
en accountancy. Hoewel er geen precieze definitie bestaat van de PSF, is deze 
recentelijk geïdentificeerd als unieke organisatievorm met zijn eigen uitdagingen 
welke voortkomen uit het type service dat PSFs leveren, hun afhankelijkheid van 
professionals en de zeer geïnstitutionaliseerde omgeving waarin ze opereren. Om het 
hoofd te kunnen bieden aan deze uitdagingen organiseren PSFs zich langs de 
blauwdruk van twee organisatieconfiguraties. De P2-configuratie is een 
organisatievorm sui generis vanwege zijn beperkte omvang, zwak ontwikkelde 
strategische capcaciteiten en op consensus gerichte besluitvorming. Hoewel de P2 van 
oudsher de dominante organisatievorm is bij klassieke professies zoals de advocatuur 
en accountancy, hebben economische en sociale ontwikkelingen, overheidsbeleid en 
klantvoorkeuren geleid tot de ontwikkeling en verspreiding van een meer 
commercieel ethos in de vrije beroepen. Veel PSFs voeren nu vergaande strategische 
en procesgerichte veranderingen door, en ontwikkelen zich door in de richting van een 
nieuw organisatiesjabloon dat de ‘Managed Professional Business’ wordt genoemd. In 
vergelijking met de P2-configuratie, vullen MPB-georganiseerde bedrijven hun 
bestaande P2 praktijken aan “met meer formele strategische planning, meer controle 
op de kwaliteit van het werk en de productiviteit van het personeel, meer nadruk op 
gecoördineerde marketing activiteiten en meer uitgebreide en gecentraliseerde 
financiële systemen” (Morris & Pinnington, 1998: 76) om onsamenhangende 
strategisch keuzes te voorkomen.  
Deze verschuiving van de professionele logica naar de commerciële logica is 
het uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift en vormt de basis van mijn leidende vraag: Wat 
zijn de effecten van de veranderende logica van professionaliteit naar commercialiteit 
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voor PSFs? Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden zijn een aantal deelvragen 
geformuleerd. Ten eerste: Hoe percipiëren PSFs de veranderingen in hun institutionele 
omgeving en wat zijn de resulterende organisatieveranderingen? Hoewel de 
middelgrote bedrijven eveneens geconfronteerd worden met de tegenstrijdige eisen 
van de trustee logica en de commerciële logica zijn hun reacties hierop in termen van 
structuur en praltijken anders dan de veranderingen gedocumenteerd bij de ‘grote 4’. 
De middelgrote organisaties kiezen uit een palet van strategisch en structurele reacties. 
De verschillen tussen de reacties zijn het gevolg van de aanhoudende invloed van de 
professionele logica, die ervoor zorgt dat zowel partners en niet-partners, weigeren 
hun professionele waarden te compromitteren. Weerstand tegen verandering binnen 
deze bedrijven resulteert dus in verschillende organisatorische reacties. Het 
diffusieproces van organisatiepraktijken vanuit de commerciële logica in middelgrote 
accountantsbedrijven lijkt dientengevolge sterk op institutionele bricolage, een proces 
waarin organisaties hun reacties samenstellen uit elementen van meerdere logica’s. 
Hoewel volgens de literatuur, grote schokken in de omgeving van bedrijven zouden 
moeten leiden tot revolutionaire transformaties van organisaties, is dit niet wat ik 
waarneem binnen deze groep organisaties. Mijn bevindingen laten zien dat de 
verandering van de trustee naar de commerciële logica niet aanwezig is voor de gehele 
accountancy industrie. Klaarblijkelijk ontbreekt het aan generaliseerbaarheid van 
eerdere bevindingen binnen deze klassieke industrie.  
Ten tweede, hoewel literatuur de introductie van strategievormings- en 
governancepraktijken documenteert, in aanvulling op de traditionele praktijken, is de 
invloed van deze praktijken op de economische prestatie van PSFs vooralsnog 
onduidelijk. Mijn gerelateerde onderzoeksvraag is: Wat zijn de effecten van de nieuwe 
organisatiepraktijken in vergelijking met de traditionele praktijken op PSF prestaties? 
Mijn bevindingen laten zien dat omvang en meer diversificatie in positieve relatie 
staan tot formele governance en strategievorming en dat dit, net als de kwaliteit van 
de professionals en reputatie van het kantoor, leidt tot verbeterde prestaties van PSFs. 
Met deze bevindingen draag ik als volgt bij aan de literatuur. Als eerste laat ik de 
positieve effecten van de nieuwe organisatiepraktijken in PSF zien. Ten tweede geven 
mijn uitkomsten inzcht in de grootte van de effecten van de nieuwe en traditionele 
praktijken, waarbij reputatie de grootste bijdrage levert aan PSF prestaties. Als laatste 
laten mijn uitkomsten zien dat, gezien de invloed van ondernemingsomvang en 
diversificatie, contingentie theoretische argumenten onmiskenbaar onderdeel zijn van 
de zich ontwikkelende theorie over PSFs.  
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Ten derde, de professionele of zogenaamde “sociale trustee definitie van 
professionalisme maakt eigenbelang en commerciële belangen ondergeschikt aan de 
idealen van dienstverlening en publiek welzijn” (Greenwood, 2007: 191). Wanneer 
deze idealen van dienstverlening en publiek welzijn ondergeschikt raken aan de 
commerciële doelen en eigenbelang kan dit zeer schadelijk zijn voor professioneel 
gedrag. Omdat aan nieuwe praktijken in the MPB-configuratie commerciële doelen ten 
grondslag liggen, wordt de vraag: Wat zijn de effecten van de nieuwe en traditionele 
praktijken op professioneel wangedrag? Nadat ik eerst de agency problemen van PSFs 
heb geconceptualiseerd, laten mijn uitkomsten zien dat de traditionele informele 
praktijken, veelal aanwezig in het klassieke P2–type, de governance uitdagingen die 
verband houden met dienstverlening en publieke belangen beter aankunnen dan de 
meer formele praktijken die de MPB karakteriseren. Vermoedelijk komt dit omdat 
deze informele praktijken geschikter zijn om professioneel gedrag te controleren dan 
de meer formele praktijken, welke vooral bedoeld zijn om economische prestaties te 
waarborgen.  
In het laatste hoofdstuk combineer ik de nieuwe en traditionele 
orgasatiepraktijken in een analyse van organisatieconfiguraties van PSFs. Met behulp 
van methoden gebaseerd op de verzamelingenleer, analyseer ik het effect van 
specifieke combinaties van de organisatiepraktijken op financiële en symbolische 
prestaties, alsook op professioneel wangedrag. Een interessante vraag die in dit 
hoofdstuk wordt gesteld is: Zijn er configuraties van organisatiepraktijken die ervoor 
zorgen dat alle drie de doelen kunnen worden geoptimaliseerd binnen PSFs? Mijn 
empirische resultaten laten zien dat het absoluut essentieel is om gelijktijdig de private 
en publieke doelfuncties van PSFs te analyseren bij het doorlichten van de effectiviteit 
en wenselijkheid van een bepaald PSF configuratie. De MPB-configuratie bijvoorbeeld, 
zorgt voor goede financiële en symbolische prestaties, maar zorgt gelijktijdig voor 
slechtere uitkomsten ten aanzien van de publieke doelstelling, aangezien professioneel 
wangedrag meer voorkomt in MPBs. De afwezigheid van een sterke informele 
governance, praktijken waarin professionals elkaar op collegiale wijze kunnen 
corrigeren, is een belangrijk ingrediënt dat ontbreekt bij deze ondernemingen. Deze 
traditionele praktijk is een van de kenmerken van de originele P2-configuratie, dat zijn 
waarde in het waarborgen van goede uitkomsten ten aanzien van de publieke 
doelstellig van PSFs heeft bewezen.  
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ON DESIGNING PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS
Research on professional service firms (PSFs) did not come off the ground until recently.
This lack of attention is surprising, given their integral role in contemporary knowledge-
based economies. In this dissertation, I focus on two professional industries: law and
accounting. Historically, these industries were infused with a dominant professional logic,
with its corresponding Professional Partnership configuration as dominant form of enter -
prise organization. However, changes in economic and social trends, government policies,
and client preferences have led to the spread of a commercial ethos in the professions,
with the corresponding configuration of the Managed Professional Business. This shift
from the professional to the commercial logic is the point of departure for this disserta -
tion. But what are the effects of this changing logic from professionalism to commercialism
on PSFs? This dissertation shows, first, that the shift from professionalism to commer -
cialism is not complete for all PSFs, as many professionals in mid-sized firms resist this new
logic. Second, although in conflict with the logic of professionalism and the corresponding
organizational practices, novel-to-context practices of strategy formation and formal
governance do contribute to the performance of PSFs. Yet they do so at a cost, third, as
they increase misconduct of lawyers which in Professional Partnerships were effectively
remedied by collegial controls. Fourth, PSFs face a choice about the corporate objective
function they pursue, as my final study suggests that combining professional and
commercial logics in a single configuration is seemingly impossible.
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